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ABSTRACT 
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This dissertation examines how representations of violence and of 
human suffering can affect us. It discusses how media discourses have 
desensitized audiences by domesticating violent images that fail to 
shock and to cause empathy. In contrast to media representations, this 
study looks at literary representations and the experience of reading 
narratives that are thematically and aesthetically violent. The discussion 
follows Marco Abel's (2007) approach to the representation of violent 
events in terms of their aesthetic force; that is, in terms of literature's 
potential to defer the transformation of the experience of violence into 
the representation of violence. The analyses of Beloved (1987) by Toni 
Morrison, Push (1996) by Sapphire, and The Dew Breaker (2004) by 
Edwidge Danticat illustrate how Black Women writers have deployed 
the deferral of truth as a narrative strategy that carries the potential to 
disrupt knowledge, to bring back sensation, and to offer readers the 
possibility of constructing new meanings. In this way, these literary 
narratives of violence and suffering become spaces of indeterminacy 
and doubt, but also of imagination, creativity, and reflection.  
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RESUMO 
IMAGINING PAIN: THE REPRESENTATION OF VIOLENCE IN 
BELOVED, PUSH, AND THE DEW BREAKER 
 
MARINA BARBOSA DE ALMEIDA 
 
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA CATARINA 
 
2011 
Professor Orientador: Dr. Sérgio Luiz Prado Bellei 
 
 
A presente tese reflete sobre maneiras de sermos afetados por 
representações de violência e sofrimento humano. A discussão parte da 
incapacidade do discurso midiático em sensibilizar sua audiência 
quando imagens violentas não são capazes de causar choque e empatia. 
Em contraste a estas representações, este estudo examina representações 
literárias e a experiência de leitura de narrativas que são temática e 
esteticamente violentas. O argumento segue a metodologia proposta por 
Marco Abel (2007) na qual a representação de eventos violentos é 
abordada em termos de sua força estética; em termos do potencial da 
literatura em suspender o significado e a verdade evitando, assim, a 
transformação da experiência da violência em uma representação da 
violência. As análises de Beloved (1987) de Toni Morrison, Push (1996) 
de Sapphire e The Dew Breaker (2004) de Edwidge Danticat ilustram 
como escritoras negras norte-americanas utilizam o recurso narrativo 
deferral of truth (“postergar a verdade”). Tal recurso carrega o potencial 
de subverter o conhecimento do leitor, trazer de volta sensação e 
oferecer a possibilidade de criarmos novos significados. Desta forma, 
estas narrativas de violência e dor tornam-se espaços de indeterminação 
e dúvida, mas também de imaginação, criatividade e reflexão.   
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“It's gonna hurt, now,” said Amy. “Anything dead coming back to life 
hurts”. 
(Toni Morrison Beloved p. 42) 
1 
1. Introduction 
 The story of this dissertation began few years before I started 
my doctoral studies. And it began with a book of images. In July 2005 I 
left the exhibition Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography in 
America at the Chicago Historical Society with its catalog in hands. 
Although I had been curious to see this exhibition, attending it proved to 
be a frustrating experience. I ended up restless and sulky, but curiously, 
sulky at myself for being unwilling to see the whole collection of 
photographs 
1
 being displayed. I purchased the catalog telling myself I 
could see the photographs later. Or deluding myself from the fact that, 
although I found them horrific images, I wanted to have them, bring 
them home with me. 
 Back home I placed the catalog in a bookshelf. I was doing my 
Master's at the time - on racial and gendered representation in Di 
Cavalcanti's mulattas ± and I did not pick up that book for months. 
Occasionally someone would pick the catalog out of the shelf, flip its 
pages and either ask me where I got it or silently place it back. Once, a 
IrLeQd goLQg tKroXgK tKe pKotograpKs reOXFtaQtO\ asNed “ZK\ do \oX 
Kave a EooN oI pLFtXres oI KXQg EOaFN Forpses"” , repOLed ZLtK ZKat 
EeFaPe P\ deIaXOt aQsZer “)or ZorN” $Qd tKe FataOog ZeQt EaFN to its 
place on the shelf, waiting to become work as I waited for a convincing 
answer. 
 My work came when I wrote my doctoral project. I was going 
to depart from the violence in and of those images in order to address 
the representation of racial violence in African American literature. 
Back in the museum I was intrigued by those photographs, by the choice 
of organizing such show, and significantly, by the fact those events took 
place and thousands of people attended, took pictures, kept and 
exchanged them. I still am. Of course I can posit a list of individual and 
collective reasons, present historical and psychoanalytical explanations. 
However, none of them turn the sensation of looking at them into the 
ultimate meaning of them. In this way, I like to think that, for me, these 
photographs remain suspended (with an array of other violent images) in 
a place in my mind where they simply exist awaiting for meaning. 
Surely this dissertation was an attempt at finding and constructing 
meaning and, I hope, it will join the group of texts and studies that have 
offered fragments of a history. But my search for an understanding 
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 Refer to the appendix for images. 
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(innumerable times I have thought it to be a naive and idealistic goal) 
led me to what now I believe to be a better way of understanding 
understanding. That I should approach the violence in and of those 
photographs and events without removing their violence for, as soon as 
shock and horror are set aside, those images become bearable and the 
events explained. My dissertation became, then, a reflection on how to 
keep the shock, the violation of our mind, senses, and body, that 
watching violence and pain are capable of triggering. A reflection on 
what other ways of knowing intersect in the act of watching violence 
and the pain of others.  
 I have organized my reflections in the form of an academic text. 
What follows is a contextualization of these personal sensations and 
reflections in light of analyses and methodologies engaging notions and 
concepts in order to construct my discussion. In this doctoral 
dissertation, I approach the representation of violence and suffering in 
American culture as a significant site in which racial and gender 
categories are constructed. Because the thematic of violence and 
suffering can render emotional reactions, this study focuses on how 
affects and emotions inform the narratives we all create. 
 This dissertation is divided in two parts. The first part consists 
of the presentation of my theoretical discussion on the possibility of 
being affected by representations of violence and of the suffering of 
others. I depart from cultural analyses that discuss how media practices 
and discourses have desensitized viewers. This is followed by a 
discussion on the representation of racial violence in the United States. 
In both instances my argument is illustrated with non-literary narratives 
in order to contrast media to literary representations. The latter are 
proposed as sites for the creation of  new ways of being, of becoming, in 
the world (O'Sullivan 2001: 130). 
 In the second part, I present Black women's literature in order to 
illustrate and argue my thesis. Certainly there are many other literary 
texts in American literature that offer that sort of aesthetic antidote to 
desensitization; yet I have chosen to focus on Black women's thought 
and writing. I have selected three novels as part of my corpus: Beloved 
(1987) by Toni Morrison, Push (1996) by Sapphire, and The Dew 
Breaker (2004) by Edwidge Danticat. Even though these novels address 
many themes, my focus (and reason for their selection) is on how they 
address the theme of violence. The three novels tell the stories of 
characters surrounded by physical and psychological violence and their 
3 
everlasting shattering physical and psychic effects.  
 Before we move to the theoretical discussion, I would like to 
present how this study approaches key notions, such as, the theme of 
violence and of watching human suffering and concepts of 
representation and identity. Following that, there is an initial discussion 
on how these concepts inform the discussion on categories of 
identification, such as racial and gender categories, that constitute social 
and cultural relationships in the Western world and, particularly, in the 
United States. Finally, I present literature and my object of study within 
this context. 
 
 
1.1 Representing Violence and Human Suffering 
 6OavoM äLåeN LQ Violence (2009) identifies three kinds of 
violence in the globalized world: subjective, systemic, and symbolic 
violence. The first one entails the visible acts of violence in which 
vLoOeQFe Ls “perIorPed E\ a FOear LdeQtLILaEOe ageQt” () ± crimes and 
terrorism are in this category. The other two are types of what he terms 
oEMeFtLve vLoOeQFe 6\stePLF vLoOeQFe FoQsLsts LQ äLåeN
s Zords LQ “tKe 
often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our 
eFoQoPLF aQd poOLtLFaO s\stePs” () aQd FoQtrar\ to sXEMeFtLve 
violence, it is invisible and often perceived as inherent to society and 
culture. Symbolic violence works in the same invisible manner and 
consists of the vLoOeQFe “ePEodLed LQ OaQgXage aQd Lts IorPs” () tKat 
is, the violence of discourse, or better, the violence of hegemonic 
discourses. 
 $FFordLQg to äLåeN tKe tKree t\pes oI vLoOeQFe ZorN 
simultaneously so that the experiences of crimes and terrorism are 
understood as a violent and destructive disruption of a non-violent 
peaceful state of things. This idea is sustained by the symbolic and 
systemic types of violence, which create the non-violent dimension 
agaLQst ZKat Ze PeasXre aFts oI vLoOeQFe ,Q äLåeN
s Zords “:e Qeed to 
perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts. 
A step back enables us to identify a violence that sustains our very 
eIIorts to ILgKt vLoOeQFe aQd to proPote toOeraQFe” () $Q aFt oI 
vLoOeQFe Ls PeasXred agaLQst a staQdard oI a “QorPaO” QoQ-violent state 
() aQd Ior äLåeN tKe LPposLtLoQ oI sXFK staQdard oI QorPaOF\ Ls “tKe 
highest form of vLoOeQFe” aQd tKe reasoQ ZK\ OaQgXage (a PedLXP oI 
non-vLoOeQFe) eQds Xp LQvoOvLQg “XQFoQdLtLoQaO vLoOeQFe”() )or 
4 
instance, using reactions to Without Sanctuary as an example, we could 
say that both indifferent and shocking reactions to lynching photography 
are inserted in the realm of possibilities that American racial discourse 
(racist and anti-racist) has created. The necessity and acceptance of such 
exhibition as a key element of American memory and history are part of 
the cultural and political ideology behind American racial discourse. In 
the same manner, viewers' reactions of horror, indifference, or pleasure 
are a reflection of the symbolic and systemic violence that created the 
EaFNgroXQd agaLQst ZKLFK tKose FrLPes LrrXpted 8Qder äLåeN
s 
perspective, one could say that the history of racial relations and the 
construction of racial discourse in the United States have rendered 
possible a kind of filtering mechanism that stops these horrific images 
from having a full impact in the viewers' symbolic dimension ± and part 
of the criticism 
2
 of the show departs from here.  
 In this way, we could say that empathy and indifference behind 
our reactions to the suffering of others are governed by the symbolic and 
systemic dimensions of violence (if we understand the three operating 
concurrently). Acts of violence (subjective violence) may horrify us and 
cause revolt if it disrupts what we consider a peaceful state of non-
vLoOeQFe äLåeN
s e[aPpOe Ls LOOXstratLve Kere  
 
The cover story of Time Paga]LQe oQ  -XQe  >«@ Zas 
'the Deadliest War in the World'. This offered detailed 
documentation on how around 4 million people died in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo as the result of political 
violence over the last decade. None of the usual 
humanitarian uproar followed, just a couple of readers' letters 
>«@ 7o pXt Lt F\QLFaOO\ Time picked the wrong victim in the 
struggle for the hegemony in suffering. It should have stuck 
to the list of usual suspects: Muslin women and their plight, 
or the families of 9/11 victims and how they have coped with 
tKeLr Oosses >«@ 7Ke deatK oI a :est %aQN 3aOestLQLaQ FKLOd 
not to mention an Israeli or an American, is mediatically 
worth thousands of times more than the death of a nameless 
&oQgoOese (äLåeN -03)  
 
  äLåeN
s e[aPpOe LOOXstrates ZKat tKe PaMorLt\ $PerLFaQ 
readership of Time magazine would conceive of as a disruption of a 
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 Check second section of part one for some of the criticism. 
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peaceful state of non-violence. Different cultures and societies ± and 
within the same culture and society ± this notion may vary. However, 
äLåeN argXes tKat sXFK QotLoQ Ls represeQtatLve oI tKe :esterQ OLEeraO 
democratic audience's reaction to their suffering and the suffering of 
others. 
 The media experience of watching violence and suffering 
renders the potential for several distinct human reactions. On opposites 
side we encounter a viewer's reaction of horror and disgust or a reaction 
of gleeful interest. Within this continuum lies the extreme reactions of 
blindness and refusal to see what happens in the daily lives of people; or 
a disavowal of reality; or even a fetishist attitude towards the individuals 
aQd pOaFes represeQted LQ tKe QeZs QarratLves (äLåeN  &KoXOLaraNL 
2006). All these reactions are possible and they involve certain 
emotions. However, it bears asking: which ones involve a greater 
participation of moral and ethical values? Or should we allow for the 
possibility of all of them or a blend of some as authentic human reaction 
to anything? 
 ,Q tKe e[aPpOe Xsed E\ äLåeN tKe “FoXpOe oI readers
 Oetters” 
signals to what, in media studies, is termed compassion fatigue. This 
concept describes the audience's indifference towards distant suffering 
(Moeller 1999; Chouliaraki 2006). In The Spectatorship of Suffering 
(2006), Lilie Chouliaraki questions whether the media today can 
“FXOtLvate a dLsposLtLoQ oI Fare Ior aQd eQgagePeQt ZLtK tKe Iar aZa\ 
otKer” () ZKetKer tKe PedLa
s praFtLFe oI PedLatLoQ ZLtK IoFXs oQ 
images can further aQ “etKLFaO seQsLELOLt\” () LQ Xs speFtators )or 
Chouliaraki, the experience of watching human suffering on TV 
becomes domesticated because contemporary media's discursive 
praFtLFe Ls LQIorPed E\ a vLeZ oI “PedLatLoQ as LPage” () FoPELQed 
to ZKat tKe aXtKor FaOOs a “FoQtePporar\ PXtatLoQ oI tKe oOd dLvLde 
between the West and tKe 
orLeQt
” 
3
 (05). This type of mediation turns 
reaOLt\ LQto ILFtLoQ as &KoXOLaraNL pXts Lt tKe reaO dLsappears “LQto a 
PLrror LPage oI reaOLt\ ZKLFK Ls tKe oQO\ reaOLt\ oI toda\
s speFtators” 
(05). Once images can fail to trigger the speFtator
s “etKLFaO seQsLELOLt\” 
                                                 
3
 Chouliaraki argues that the media's politics of discourse is a reformulation of historical 
critical accounts of world divisions and economic and political relationships of 
subordination. Echoing Stuart Hall's work on white power and colonialism, Chouliaraki 
states tKat FoQtePporar\ e[perLeQFe oI ZatFKLQg 79 reIOeFts “a sLPLOar s\PEoOLF strXFtXre 
oI poZer terrLtor\ aQd LdeQtLt\” () 
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Chouliaraki argues that the overexposure to human suffering via 
teOevLsLoQ Kas “XQaestKetLFL]LQg QXPELQg eIIeFts” ()  
 In this way, for äLåeN aQd &KoXOLaraNL tKe PedLa
s aELOLt\ to 
mobilize various mechanisms that render us, viewers, (ethically) 
insensitive to the most brutal acts of physical violence against other 
KXPaQ EeLQgs Ls soPetKLQg to Ee IoXgKt agaLQst $FFordLQg to äLåeN 
combating subjective violence is pointless when those who combat it are 
committing systemic and symbolic violence that generated the first one 
(174). The ultimate cause of violence lies in the phenomena of the threat 
of the other, the different other that is not-me. This fear is founded and 
sustained by language ± ZKLFK Ls “tKe ver\ PedLXP oI overFoPLQg 
dLreFt vLoOeQFe” ()  
  äLåeN
s aQd &KoXOLaraNL
s tKesLs are reLterated LQ tKe FXOtXraO 
analyses of violence that constitute the theoretical basis of this study. 
According to these analyses of contemporary violence, we could say 
that inasmuch as the visible (subjective) kind of violence remains the 
one that shock us ± the one that disrupts our sense of peace ± 
desensitization and indifference will continue to be our most common 
reaction. Also, tKese aQaO\ses sKare äLåeN
s vLeZ tKat tKe oQO\ eIILFLeQt 
way to stop physical violence and suffering is to address the systemic 
and symbolic violence that create the background for the first one. 
 Having said that, I want to posit here the focus of this doctoral 
study: the potential effects of our encounters with images and narratives 
of violence and suffering of others. This study is an examination of what 
other affective investments are possible in the experience of watching 
the suffering of others that are not numbness and indifference. If 
language plays a significant role in the creation of physical violence 
and, at the same time, is also the medium through which a non-violent 
state can be achieved, perhaps we should look at means through which 
language can affect us, how language can become violent to the point 
that it triggers empathy, compassion, transformation, and why not non-
violence. Albeit I do not dismiss the importance of addressing the 
systemic and symbolic modes of violence behind the common reaction 
of numbness in the experience of watching the suffering of others, I 
focus my study on what may seem like the surface level of violence in 
OLgKt oI äLåeN
s argXPeQt , IoFXs oQ tKe vLsLEOe vLoOeQFe tKat KXrts aQd 
destroys bodies, the violence that is heard in cries of pain or expressed 
in the silence of destruction. And, because of that, I focus on the 
potential reactions of horror or pleasure, and, more importantly, on the 
7 
possibility of transformation that lies in human emotions - a potential I 
locate in the aesthetic experience of reading literature. 
 In the narratives analyzed here violence kills, destroys, and 
denigrates individuals, families, and communities. It is brutal and 
terrible. It is verbal, physical, and psychological. Also, violence creates 
a corrosive pain that, when unsuccessful in destroying the body, it 
destroys one's mind, senses, and selfhood. Because violence and 
suffering articulate aspects of racial, gendered, and class structures, they 
become sites for the (re)construction of identities. 
 My discussion is centered around the experience of violence in 
the United States and the fictionalization of past and present ideology 
and crimes. I find in Black women's literature great examples of works 
that illustrate my argument. However, that does not mean I restrict the 
notion of violent encounters with art to this tradition. On the contrary, 
this is not a characteristic of one or few literary traditions, but an aspect 
of the aesthetic quality of texts. Apart from the obvious restriction of a 
doctoral study, my choice was also based on Black women's literary 
tradition of dwelling over aspects of black women's social positioning: 
one of struggle against racism and sexism, and the violence and pain 
potentially involved in that experience (Keizer 2007: 155). 
 Whilst what äLåeN FaOOs objective violence certainly appear in 
the background of my discussion and analyses of the novels, this study 
does not go further into an examination of the systemic and symbolic 
dimensions of violence in the United States. This study has benefited 
from the extensive literature available for research and the chosen 
methodology is the examination of racial and gender relations through 
the lenses of Feminist Criticism, Critical Race Theory, and Cultural 
Studies. Having said that, due to these diverse literature and scholarly 
criticism, I believe it is necessary that I explain how this study 
approaches basic concepts such as the notion of race, racialized and 
gendered bodies, and racial and gendered identities. 
 
1.2 The Construction and Representation of Identities  
 This study examines literary representations of violence and 
suffering and how these can affect readers. It also thinks of these 
aIIeFtLve eQFoXQters ZLtK a OLterar\ te[t as sLtes Ior tKe FreatLoQ oI “QeZ 
Za\s oI tKLQNLQg aQd IeeOLQg” ('eleuze 1991: 16). With that in mind, it 
is important to define how notions of identity and subjectivity come to 
articulate meanings in and through representations of violence and 
8 
suffering.  
 As the first section of part one shows, the analysis of systems of 
representation (here the representation of violence and suffering in 
Western media) always approaches meanings within the culture that 
produces them. Within Western culture, for example, certain subject 
positions are produced and we, as subjects, learn how to position 
ourselves within them. As Kathryn Woodward (1997) explains: 
 
Representation includes the signifying practices and symbolic 
systems through which meanings are produced and which 
position us as subjects. Representations produce meanings 
through which we can make sense of our experience and of 
ZKo Ze are >«@ tKese s\PEoOLF s\stePs Freate tKe 
possibilities of what we are and what we can become. (14) 
 
 Consequently, individual and collective identities are 
established and discourses are created as sites from which individuals 
and groups can position themselves and from which they can speak. In 
this way, Woodward defines identification as “tKe proFess oI LdeQtLI\LQg 
with others, either through lack of awareness of difference or separation, 
or as a resXOt oI perFeLved sLPLOarLtLes” () $OtKoXgK a FXOtXre Pa\ 
oIIer Xs varLoXs possLELOLtLes oI “LdeQtLI\LQg ZLtK otKers” Ze PXst 
imagine our belonging to a shared idea or characteristic (Anderson 
1991). That is to say that within a united group or community there are 
different ways in which their identity is imagined. For Stuart Hall 
(1997), such cultural identity may be best understood in two ways.  
 The first one understands cultural identity as a single authentic 
self shared by people of a same history, place, and ancestry. This notion 
views other selves as less important in uniting these people, and stands 
as tKeLr FoOOeFtLve trXtK reQderLQg a seQse oI “oQeQess” 7KLs Ls tKe 
notion that shaped post-colonial cultural practices such as Negritude 
poetry (Hall 1997: 111), the Pan-Africanism of Du Bois early in the 
tZeQtLetK  FeQtXr\ aQd “FoQtLQXes to Ee a ver\ poZerIXO aQd FreatLve 
force in emergent forms of representation amongst hitherto marginalized 
peopOes” () +aOO states 7Ke prodXFtLoQ oI LdeQtity here is rendered 
tKroXgK a detaLOed aQd “passLoQate” researFK dLsFover\ aQd reteOOLQg oI 
the past. However, as expected, an imaginary coherence is enforced in 
various experiences in an attempt to construct unity. For example, the 
image of Africa as the “KoPe” aQd “PotKer” oI aOO EOaFN popXOatLoQs or 
the fate of suffering of black people through the representation of 
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slavery are known examples.  
 The second way understands cultural identity through the 
importance of difference within a group. It views difference transformed 
through history similarly to Woodward's definition of identification, that 
is, as a process of becoming.  
 
Far from being externally fixed in some essentialised past, 
tKe\ >FXOtXraO LdeQtLtLes@ are sXEMeFt to tKe FoQtLQXoXs µpOa\¶ 
of history, culture, and power. Far from being grounded in a 
Pere µreFover\¶ oI tKe past ZKLFK Ls ZaLtLQg to Ee IoXQd aQd 
which, when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into 
eternity, identities are the names we give to the different 
ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the 
narratives of the past. (Hall 112) 
 
 According to Hall it is only through this second view that we 
can understand the trauma of the colonial experience. The Western 
regime of representation not only created the Other but also made the 
Other see him/herself as Other. It made the Other conform to that 
NQoZOedge E\ e[terQaO LPposLtLoQ aQd Zorse E\ tKe otKer¶s LQQer 
subjecting to the norm. In Black Skin White Masks (1967), Fanon 
describes this process of inner subMeFtLoQ aQd “FoQ-IorPatLoQ” to tKe 
norm (Hall 112-113). What is crucial here is this idea of otherness as not 
oQO\ e[terQaO LPposLtLoQ EXt aOso as “LQQer FoPpXOsLoQ” +aOO taONs 
about the ways in which black people and black experience were 
positioned and sXEMeFted LQ tKe “doPLQaQt regLPes oI represeQtatLoQ” as 
being the effects of cultural power and normalisation (112). However, I 
would also include here the ways in which white people and white 
e[perLeQFe Zere posLtLoQed LQ tKe “doPLQaQt regLPes oI represeQtatLoQ” 
aQd tKe eIIeFt oI tKat sXperLor posLtLoQ LQ tKe FoQstLtXtLoQ oI oQe¶s 
subjectivity (Ware 2004).  
 ,Q +aOO¶s terPs cultural identity is understood as 
simultaneously uniting people with a common past and with different 
experiences. Furthermore, difference and similarity are understood in 
relation to points of reference. For example, against the developed 
European countries and the United States, African countries and the 
Caribbean countries are seen as similar, the Other, the underdeveloped, 
the periphery. However, the experience of Caribbean and African 
populations is distinct regarding their economic, political and cultural 
dependency to Europe and the United States, not to mention within 
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heterogeneous Africa and the Caribbean.  
 As Paul Gilroy sumParL]es tKe QotLoQ oI LdeQtLt\ “provLdes a 
way of understanding the interplay between our subjective experience of 
the world and the cultural and historical settings in which that fragile 
sXEMeFtLvLt\ Ls IorPed” ( ) ,Q otKer Zords LdeQtLt\ Ls aQ 
ongoing process of self-making and social interaction.  
In this way, according to Gilroy, there are three ways of understanding 
identity: 1) identity as informing my sense of self (my subjectivity) as it 
is established with my interaction in social and cultural settings; 2) 
identity as informing my relation to other individual(s), that is, 
informing the lines that approximate and distance the self and the other 
(intersubjectivity); 3) identity as the basis for social solidarity (314). In 
addition, through these negotiations and the imagining of identity one's 
subjectivity is also being established. As Woodward defines: 
“6XEMeFtLvLt\ LQFOXdes oXr seQse oI seOI ,t LQvoOves tKe FoQsFLoXs aQd 
XQFoQsFLoXs tKoXgKts aQd ePotLoQs ZKLFK FoQstLtXte oXr seQse oI “ZKo 
Ze are” aQd tKe IeeOLQgs ZKLFK are EroXgKt to dLIIereQt posLtLoQs ZLtKLQ 
FXOtXre” ()  
 Although an imagined shared identity is flexible and always 
transforming in light of social, cultural, and economic relations, it can 
become a more closed notion when used as a point of departure for 
political mobilization. That is to say that collectively and for political 
purposes identity can be molded. Conversely, subjectivity belongs to the 
realm of one's senses, emotions, and thoughts and, even though in 
constant transformation and adaptation to one's interactions and 
relations with others, it carries less elements of control. That is, the idea 
of collective identity may motivate an individual to interconnect with a 
group renouncing or dissolving his/her individuality (Gilroy 1997: 304). 
However, one cannot renounce one's subjectivity, one's sense of self 
experiencing the world.  
 
1.3 American Identities 
 The complexity of experience, subjectivity, and identity of US-
born and -raised individuals has been the matter for hundreds of stories, 
memoirs, novels, paintings, movies, TV shows, and documentaries. 
Artists and writers have dealt with their hyphenated identities and/or 
addressed tKe ver\ LssXe oI tKe “PeOtLQg pot” 2Qe oI tKe ILrst 
hyphenated identities was the one used by the black population ± the 
African-Americans. The historical and cultural experiences of African-
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American individuals haven been based on concepts and ideologies of 
race, racialism and racism, rendering them a mixture of pain, struggle, 
fight, solidarity, and pride. In a racially dichotomous society 
4
 such as 
the United States, individuals have identified themselves through their 
differences in skin tone, and have, therefore, constructed their 
subjectivities and identities through resistance and assimilation, through 
violent and peaceful social practices. The first decades of the twentieth 
century witnessed the invocation of the ideal of the American nation and 
people ± we, the people. By recalling the rhetoric of the founding fathers 
in moments of instability, an individual was given the chance of group 
identification, a sense of collectiveness, thus diminishing ethnic and 
class borders. The ideal of Americanness as a gathering principle 
influenced the work of artists, writers, and historians. While the people 
was being constructed and represented literally and visually, the limits 
of whiteness and blackness were simultaneously being established. Part 
of the heritage of the ideal of Americanness is identified by Richard 
:rLgKt as tKe “$PerLFaQ part” oI KLs FKaraFter %Lgger 7KoPas LQ Native 
Son (1940):  
 
that part of him which we get from our seeing and hearing, 
from school, from the hopes and dreams of our friends; that 
part of him which the common people of America never talk 
of but take for granted («) :e OLve E\ aQ LdeaOLsP tKat 
makes us believe that the Constitution is a good document of 
government, that the Bill of Rights is a good legal and 
humane principle to safeguard our civil liberties, that every 
man and woman should have the opportunity to realize 
himself, to seek his own individual fate and goal, his own 
peculiar and untranslatable destiny. (Wright 1991: 871) 
 
 7Ke “opportXQLt\ to reaOL]e” oQeseOI to seeN oQe¶s oZQ 
“LQdLvLdXaO Iate aQd goaO” Ls a gXLdLQg vaOXe dear to tKe $PerLFaQ 
culture and inseparable from the ideal of freedom. This American 
LdeQtLt\ Kad Lts IoXQdatLoQ oQ IreedoP aQd tKe reaOL]atLoQ oI oQe¶s 
individuality ± ZKLFK Zere LrrevoFaEO\ eOePeQts oI tKe ZKLte PaQ¶s 
                                                 
4
 Racially dichotomous society is understood as one in which there are two main races, 
black and white, contrary to racially continuous societies in which there is some gradation 
between the two extremes of black and white. For instance, Puerto Rico and Brazil are 
considered racially continuous societies. Notwithstanding, both types of societies can be 
racist and segregate their individuals (Rose 1993). 
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identity. The theme of freedom has also guided literary representations 
of blackness as opposed to whiteness. In this way, black characters were 
left struggling for their - Wright would say - part of the American 
identity.  
 This search for freedom and self-realization took place, many 
times, through violence, once most attempts were regarded as rebellious 
and unlawful. Suppression of any illegal action was legitimate, for peace 
and order ought to be maintained. Wright talks about the common 
destLQ\ oI EOaFN PeQ Ke NQeZ ZKo vLoOated -LP &roZ OaZs “(veQtXaOO\ 
the whites who restricted their lives made them pay a terrible price. 
They were shot, hanged, maimed, lynched, and generally hounded until 
tKe\ Zere eLtKer dead or tKeLr spLrLts EroNeQ” (:rLgKt -857).  
 These acts of violence and the accompanied tension and fear 
sustained racial relations in the United States. Their media and literary 
representation have been means through which racial and gendered 
identities and subjectivities are constructed in the American society. This 
study examines literary narratives as one of the sites where the 
production of cultural identities and the practice and representation of 
racial and gender alterity take place (Morrison 1993). Literature and the 
production of literature are valuable objects of study in the examination 
of social relations, cultural imaginary, and historical changes of a given 
imagined community (Anderson 1991). For Toni Morrison (1993), the 
access to the imaginative, to the creative minds of a period and place is 
achieved through the narratives and texts written at the time. A sense of 
belonging, of fellowships, and union is produced by the narration of a 
common past, and the wishing for and dreaming of a better future for 
everyone. Writers may engage in the writing of memory and/or the 
revision of history, and literature can become a key feature of how 
cultural identities are created and maintained.  
 In Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination 
(1993) Toni Morrison begins by pointing to the vulnerability, in her 
opinion, of a collection of traditional assumptions, accepted by 
KLstorLaQs aQd OLterar\ FrLtLFs FLrFXOated as “NQoZOedge” oI ZKat tKe 
$PerLFaQ tradLtLoQaO OLteratXre aQd FaQoQ are 7KLs “NQoZOedge” LgQores 
the presence of the first Africans, and later of the African-Americans, in 
the construction of the national literature. The main assumption 
establishes Americanness as a way of being and a sentiment that would 
have shaped the characteristics of the national literature ± and this would 
not have been directly informed or influenced by the Africanist presence 
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in the American culture and society. Morrison searches for the social and 
historical origin of Americanness in young America. She asks questions 
about the reasons why the first immigrants ± the pilgrims ± flew to the 
New World; why they abandoned their lives with the desire to start a 
new one; and, more importantly, what they left behind as opposed to 
what promises they dreamed of in the New World. According to 
Morrison, it was the escape from poverty, oppression, social ostracism, 
to name a few, and the search for richness, power, and community that 
shaped the imaginary of those first Americans. In the same breath those 
immigrants also sought a counterpart for their own oppression in their 
newly discovered chance to oppress others, as Morrison argues:  
 
One could move from discipline and punishment to 
disciplining and punishing; from being socially ostracized to 
EeFoPLQg aQ arELter oI soFLaO raQN >«@ 7Ke Eod\ oI OLteratXre 
produced by the young nation is one place it inscribed these 
fears, forces, and hopes. (Morrison 37)  
 
 Following this argument, racialism and the idea of the hierarchy 
of race found in slavery the ideal counterpart for the concept of 
freedom. Specifically in the American context, the construction of 
blackness and enslavement as the not-free, but also the Other, turned out 
to be ideal for the imaginary. 
5
 Africanism, therefore, was the result of 
collective needs to alleviate internal fears and to rationalize the 
exploitation of other human beings.  
 What Edward Said (2004) has termed (the process of) othering - 
by representing an image of the other you can possess it and from that 
construct yourself ± has prevailed in cultural and artistic forms and 
became an influential idea in the United States deliberately controlled by 
certain institutions and people. The development of racialist ideas into 
what one can call common-sense knowledge is a clear example of 
cultural hegemony in place in American society. Morrison sees cultural 
hegemony as part of an intricate system of economic, historical and 
cultural elements happening at once in a society. The theoretical basis of 
racialism and a hierarchy of races was elaborated at the same time 
slaveholders and plantation owners needed a justification for bringing 
their workforce from Africa. However, Morrison stresses that hegemony 
                                                 
5
  Morrison points out the European Africanism with its counterpart in colonial literature. 
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is only effective because it is a reaction against its own productive 
instability. As Said stresses in Orientalism (2004): 
 
My point is to say that we can better understand the 
persistence and the durability of saturating hegemonic 
systems like culture when we realize that their internal 
constraints upon writers and thinkers were productive, not 
unilaterally inhibiting. (Said 14) 
 
 0orrLsoQ ZoXOd agree ZLtK 6aLd¶s KLgKOLgKtLQg oI tKe 
productive quality of hegemonic systems upon artistic creation, for she 
EeOLeves tKat a ZrLter¶s LPagLQatLoQ aQd FreatLvLt\ Ls LQIOXeQFed E\ tKe 
ZrLter¶s tLPe aQd pOaFe E\ a sort oI FoOOeFtLve XQFoQsFLoXs oI a FertaLQ 
soFLet\ 7Ke FoQstrXFtLoQ oI tKe ZKLte PaQ¶s LdeQtLt\ ± what would 
become the American identity ± was elaborated through a discourse 
based on racial and gender difference.    
 This study acknowledges the cultural and social existence of 
races rather than the biological concept of race. Although the latter has 
been scientifically proven to be untrue, its effect, a race effect has been 
felt and experienced in every day life. In this way, as suggested by 
*a\atrL 6pLvaN
s “strategLF esseQtLaOLsP” () tKe FoQstrXFtLoQ aQd 
(self-)definition of racial identity is understood as a political strategy, as 
a means toward agency and social change in spite of its essentialism and 
reduction of subjectivity and of the complexity of human experience. 
 In Visible Identities: Race, Gender and the Self (2006) Linda 
Alcoff states the political importance of identity in the fight against 
racism and sexism. For Alcoff, claims on the pernicious side of 
difference, as represented by group identities, and the incompatibility of 
multiculturalism with unity and universalism tend to repeat conservative 
arguments heirs to the Enlightenment ideal of individual freedom. 
Individual freedom and the power of creativity as the basic human 
condition are deeply ingrained in Western philosophical and political 
traditions. Any threat to the autonomy of the individual is seen as 
constraint. In this way, groups and organizations based on a shared 
identity would on several levels hurt the basic human right of freedom: 
it would imply conformity, intolerance, external imposition, and the 
absence of authentic human action on the level of the individual; and it 
would undermine any attempt of a broader goal such as democracy or 
utopian views of universalism.  
 In the United States, the ideal of the melting-pot illustrates very 
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well a national effort to be seen and constructed as a new nation of 
individuals based on equal rights and democratic values. Ethnic 
differences would be smoothed over resulting in an all-inclusive nation. 
However, as Alcoff point out, these arguments have worked more in 
theory or with slow changes in politics and justice, and it is clear how 
urgent social changes are. The dissolution of difference resulting in a 
neutral universal individual will not bring equality and solidarity among 
people, as it was first thought. It is by accepting difference as a 
constitutive part of human condition that measures towards equal rights 
aQd soOLdarLt\ FaQ Ee taNeQ $OFoII¶s reIOeFtLoQs EegLQ E\ ILrst aFFeptLQg 
the complexity of social identities. On the one hand, there is the 
FoPpOe[Lt\ oI deILQLQg oQe¶s identity as fixed and fully visible. On the 
other hand, we face the fundamental heterogeneity of identity groups. 
Secondly, it is necessary recognition - by experience of political and 
social work - that identities matter; especially in order to fight for a 
political cause. The claim of a unity, of a shared essence and community, 
is necessary for the development and articulation of a political agenda ± 
even if that claim of homogeneity is recognized to be a strategic 
political move and not the actual reality of sameness (Spivak 1996). 
 Perceiving identities as constraint to the individual is mixing 
subjectivity with social identity, for the latter does not necessarily 
preclude self-identity. For Alcoff, the mental processes of constitution of 
the self do not necessarily imply conformity to a social identity. 
Identities of race and gender operate through bodily markers; they are 
constituted through the physical manifestation of difference among 
individuals. These bodily markers account for how one individual 
experiences the world, for they are visible to others and to oneself. 
9LsLELOLt\ deterPLQes Qot oQO\ tKe FoQstrXFtLoQ oI oQe¶s sXEMeFtLvLt\ EXt 
also political and economic status. Bodily markers are signs that operate 
within a system that structures groups of people believed to share a 
number of physical attributes. In this way, it is expected of individuals to 
behave according to notions of identity commonly held to be part of a 
certain group.  
 The conflict between inner and outer social demands as part of 
the modern individual was carefully developed by W.E.B. Du Bois at 
the turn of the twentieth century. For Du Bois, the African American 
individual carries the singularity of having two consciousnesses, of 
being a Negro and of being an American, and this duality ± a double-
consciousness - one could never overcome. His consciousness of being 
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an American citizen would be always counterposed by his consciousness 
of inhabiting a black body, once American citizenship was defined as 
ZKLte 'X %oLs¶ vLeZ oI $IrLFan-$PerLFaQs¶ FoQdLtLoQ aQd e[LsteQFe 
informed the thought and the creation of black writers and intellectuals.  
 A similar experience was described by Frantz Fanon in Black 
Skin White Masks (1967). Fanon discusses the black psyche as a result 
of the nemesis of skin color. In his view, the Negro is always a third 
person: always waiting to act as a Negro. He/she can only be if they 
embrace the Negro past, ancestors, history; for the Negro is the Other 
and that is the only position for the being of a Negro. For Fanon, the 
Negro is not the master of his consciousness: being is unbeing for the 
1egro EeFaXse tKe FoOor oI oQe¶s sNLQ LPpOLes tKat oQe Ls soPeoQe tKat Ls 
Qot ZKo oQe tKoXgKt oQe Zas LQ oQe¶s PLQd ,Q otKer Zords oQe¶s ego 
Kas to e[perLeQFe oQe¶s Eod\ ± oQe¶s FoOor ± to become the someone that 
one is recognized (seen) to be. The Negro is thus trapped in his own 
body by the color of his skin and by what that color means in society 
(Fanon 109-140). In other words, the visibility of bodily markers cannot 
be dismissed because these are the signs prior to any social interaction. 
As Alcoff remarks:  
 
The reality of identities often comes from the fact that they 
are visibly marked on the body itself, guiding if not 
determining the way we perceive and judge others and are 
perceived and judged by them. The road to freedom from the 
capriciousness of arbitrary identity designations lies not, as 
some class reductionists and postmodernists argue, in the 
attempt at a speedy dissolution of identity ± a proposal that 
all too often conceals a willful ignorance about the real-world 
effects of identity ± but through a careful exploration of 
identity, which can reveal its influence on what we can see 
and know, as well as its context dependence and its complex 
and fluid nature. (Alcoff 05) 
 
 Moreover, the visibility of physical markers is the means by 
which individuals not only segregate and oppress each other but also 
manifest unity and resistance. As Fanon named it, the fact of blackness, 
should account for not only reaction to a given oppression, but also for 
political unity and coalitions for action. Additionally, Alcoff stresses 
KoZ raFe Kas aIIeFted tKe “vLsXaO regLstr\” (-194) that operates in a 
given society, that is, how racial markers become more visible through 
learned processes, consequently, how race becomes naturalized in a 
17 
culture.  
 
1.4 Representing African-American Identities 
 At the turn of the 20
th
 century the debate between W.E.B Du 
Bois and Booker T. Washington over political strategies shaped the 
dualism of Black thought in the now familiar categories of militancy/ 
PoderatLoQ protest aFFoPPodatLoQ $OtKoXgK 'X %oLs¶ OegaF\ oI 
double consciousness was appropriated on an equal basis by both 
approaches, Black intellectuals tended to follow one line in their 
analysis of black experience, their criticism of state policies on racial 
issues, and the proposition of their political strategies for the liberation 
of black people. In spite of the positions taken, Black intellectuals, 
writers and artists who engaged in the construction of Black tradition 
were inserted in historically specific modes of (political) discourse ± on 
race, class and gender ± and, as participants, their works reflected such 
time and place.  
 Above all, African-American thought reflected upon the very 
origin of African-American literature in the United States: the writings 
of slaves and ex-slaves in the eighteenth century. The European 
(QOLgKteQPeQt¶s dreaP oI reasoQ aQd tKe $PerLFaQ (QOLgKteQPeQt¶s 
dream of civil liberty grounded these black ZrLters¶ Xrge to Ee Iree aQd 
OLterate 2QFe ZrLtLQg Zas tKe prooI oI oQe¶s LQteOOLgeQFe aQd tKe 
medium through which reason was represented, for slaves and ex-slaves, 
their humanity (and most times followed by their manumission) was 
proved in and through their texts (Gates and McKay: 1996-1997). 
Freedom, therefore, became the theme repeated and revised by 
generations of black writers.   
 In The Souls of Black Folk (1903), W.E.B. Du Bois presents his 
concept of double consciousness as the foundation of the uniqueness of 
being black in the United States. For Du Bois that essential difference 
should be valued for its contribution to the American society and 
country, a contribution that could only enrich an already diverse unique 
nation. For Du Bois, being black was not a reason for shame. On the 
contrary, it was through the discovery and value of those unique 
elements of black culture and soul that the past of oppression could be 
overcome, and with equal contributions from black, white, yellow and 
red cultures built a better nation. 
 In The Future of the American Negro (1899) Booker T. 
Washington states his social philosophy and racial strategy for black 
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advancement. It was a philosophy grounded in the traditional American 
philosophy of self-help and industry and a strategy based on mutual aid 
and education. Washington defended education as the basis for growth 
and prosperity, and praised love and justice in the mutual 
interdependence of whites and blacks, urging blacks to make themselves 
useful to whites in order to gain full civil and political rights, making 
KLPseOI a “XseIXO KoQoraEOe aQd desLraEOe FLtL]eQ” (:asKLQgtoQ )
 
Washington was complimented for his detailed view of the social and 
economic status of the black population and criticized for his 
conservative view of the race problem. For many critics, Washington 
focused on love and justice among all instead of focusing on equality of 
treatPeQt XQder tKe OaZ 7Ke depLFtLoQ oI tKe “XseIXO KoQoraEOe aQd 
desLraEOe” EOaFN FLtL]eQ Pade E\ :asKLQgtoQ LQ PaQ\ ways resembles 
the patience and endurance of black characters in novels like Uncle 
7om¶s &abin, personified in the character of Uncle Tom. As James 
%aOdZLQ Kas Qoted “+e Kas to Ee Ke Ls EOaFN oQO\ tKroXgK KLs 
IorEearaQFe FaQ Ke sXrvLve or trLXPpK” (%aOdwin 1998: 14). 
 'X %oLs a FrLtLF oI %ooNer 7 :asKLQgtoQ pXEOLsKed “7Ke 
6tXd\ oI tKe 1egro 3roEOePs” LQ  argXLQg Ior Pore FrLtLFaO 
systematic and complete scientific studies on the Negro question. For 
Du Bois the problems affecting the Negro population in the United 
States were peculiar in two ways, and any serious study should address 
EotK aspeFts LQseparaEO\ 2Qe sLde oI tKe eTXatLoQ Ls tKat “1egroes do 
not share the full national life because as a mass they have not reached a 
sufficiently high grade oI FXOtXre” tKe otKer sLde Ls dXe to tKe e[LsteQFe 
oI “a FoQvLFtLoQ ± varying in intensity, but always widespread ± that 
people of Negro blood should not be admitted into the group life of the 
QatLoQ Qo Patter ZKat tKeLr FoQdLtLoQ PLgKt Ee” ('X %oLs 2000: 17). To 
put it another way, in regard to the black population in the United States, 
aFFordLQg to 'X %oLs “povert\ LgQoraQFe aQd soFLaO degradatLoQ” are 
complicated because of racism.  
 
Before we can begin to study the Negro intelligently, we 
must realize definitely that not only is he affected by all the 
varying social forces that act on any nation at his stage of 
advancement, but that in addition to these there is reacting 
upon him the mighty power of a peculiar and unusual social 
environment which affects to some extent every other social 
force. (Du Bois 19) 
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 ,Q addLtLoQ 'X %oLs FoQteQds tKat “XQs\stePatLF” 
“IragPeQtar\” aQd “XQFrLtLFaO” sFLeQtLILF stXdLes oQ tKe 1egro TXestLoQ 
have not contributed to the development of measures and policies that 
would engender social change. Instead, scientific research had so far 
repeated same information from previous works, which were in most 
cases based on opinions and not facts ± LQevLtaEO\ tKe researFKers¶ 
biased convictions guided their investigations. That is to say that 
African-Americans were the object of study and objectified even further 
through study and field. 
 Another problem for Du Bois is the lack of contextualization of 
each research ± such as geographical and social aspects of each 
community -, an uncritical choice of the appropriate point of view to 
investigate the problems, and a selection of a specific aspect of Negro 
life without taking the past (the history of slavery) into account. For Du 
Bois, the Negro problem ± a social problem of all Americans ± could 
oQO\ Ee serLoXsO\ addressed ZKeQ tKe “dLsFover\ oI trXtK” Zas agaLQ tKe 
guiding principle of scientific research in academic institutions and 
government bureaus (23-27). Finally, any investigation must combine 
socioeconomic aspects with racial ones.  
 
[to] study the tangible phenomena of Negro prejudice in all 
possLEOe Fases Lts eIIeFt oQ tKe 1egro¶s pK\sLFaO 
development, on his mental acquisitiveness, on his moral and 
social condition, as manifested in economic life, in legal 
sanctions and in crime and lawlessness. So, too, the influence 
of that same prejudice on American life and character would 
explain the otherwise inexplicable changes through which 
Negro prejudice has passed. (Du Bois 25-26) 
 
 'X %oLs¶ reTXest Ior a FoPpOe[ vLeZ oI tKe “1egro proEOeP” 
was echoed by writers and intellectuals throughout the twentieth century 
making Black thought and tradition, at the same time, an unified and 
divided field. On the one side, there are approaches towards the 
celebration of blackness as a unique feature; on the other, there are 
efforts to transcend race as a cultural and social divide. In either case, 
African-American intellectual tradition is rich in its efforts to approach 
society and culture with a careful consideration for their complexity.  
 The memory of the past of slavery and the profound 
consequences of bondage are part of African-American thought and 
tradition, and the slave narratives are placed in the origin of African-
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$PerLFaQ OLteratXre 7Ke $PerLFaQ (QOLgKteQPeQt¶s dreaP oI FLvil 
liberty and later the ideal of the American dream combined with 
LQdLvLdXaOs¶ Qeed aQd desLre oI IreedoP aQd IXOILOOPeQt FoQstLtXted a 
fertile ground for writers. Freedom and the escape from pain became 
themes to be repeated and revised in African-American literature 
(Baldwin 1998; Gates and McKay 1996-97; Franklin and Gates 2001). 
The moral and physical struggle for freedom and what it represented in 
different times in the history of the United States for the black 
population is a constitutive part of African-American identity. The origin 
of this fight for freedom goes back to slavery, to laws that did not 
concede same rights to blacks, to persecution, to racial profiling, just to 
give some examples. From fictional and autobiographical slave 
narratives to tKe “$IrLFaQ $PerLFaQ QoveO” tKere Ls a KLstor\ oI 
achievement and a cultural heritage ± a heritage constructed out of the 
memory of slavery (Mulvey 2004; Fabi 2004).  
 Toni Morrison's life-long commitment to social change and her 
prolific fictional and academic production offer a broad view of the race 
issue in the American society and African-American thought. As 
0orrLsoQ saLd LQ LQtervLeZs “>,@I Ze doQ
t Neep LQ toXFK ZLtK tKe 
aQFestor Ze are LQ IaFt Oost” .eepLQg LQ toXFK ZLtK tKe aQFestor sKe 
adds Ls tKe ZorN oI reFoQstrXFtLve PePor\ “0ePor\ (tKe deOLEerate 
act of remembering) is a form of willed creation. It is not an effort to 
find out the way it really was ± that is research. The point is to dwell on 
the way it appeared and why it appeared LQ tKat partLFXOar Za\” ,Q tKLs 
Za\ sKe LQteQds Ker ZorN to “Eear ZLtQess aQd LdeQtLI\ tKat ZKLFK Ls 
XseIXO IroP tKe past aQd tKat ZKLFK oXgKt to Ee dLsFarded” (0orrLsoQ 
1984: 344; 1984: 385). In Beloved, we could say that with the 
fictionalization of a true story Morrison invites readers to undertake a 
process of creation (the revision of Margaret Garner's infanticide) in 
order to look at the American past. As Morrison said in another 
interview:  
 
 There is a necessity for remembering the horror [of slavery], 
but of course there's a necessity for remembering it in a 
manner in which it can be digested, in a manner in which 
memory is not destructive. The act of writing the book, in a 
way, is a way of confronting it and making it possible to 
remember. (Darling 1994: 247-248)  
 
 7KLs “QeFessLt\ Ior rePePEerLQg tKe Korror” oI sOaver\ Ls 
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FoQstLtXtLve oI ZKat    .arOa )& +oOOoZa\ () terPs “EOaFN deatK” 
aQd “EOaFN d\LQg” () tKat Ls tKe $IrLFaQ-American's lingering and 
knowing ways of dying due to a past of slavery, segregation, race riots, 
racial violence, and oppression. Holloway argues that this notion 
became a significant aspect of African-American identity; because of 
untimely presence of death and suffering in the African-American 
communities, a sensibility developed based on historical facts. This 
FXOtXraO assoFLatLoQ EetZeeQ FoOor aQd deatK QXrtXred a “FooperatLve 
veQtXre oI EOaFN ILFtLoQ aQd EOaFN OLIe” () FXOtLvatLQg d\QaPLF 
understandings with the presence of death and suffering (Cheng 20). 
 
1.5 Black Women's Literature 
 The preface to the 2005 edition of Beloved (1987) illustrates a 
meeting of theory and practice, academia and politics, knowledge and 
experience so important to African-American thought. Morrison tells 
readers the inspiration to her novel: a true story covered by the press at 
tKe tLPe oI 0argaret *arQer¶s esFape IroP sOaver\ LQ .eQtXFN\ aQd tKe 
infanticide of one of her children. Morrison's fictionalization of Garner's 
story becomes a fertile context in which to recover the history of black 
women in the United States. In her words: 
 
In the eighties, the debate was still roiling: equal pay, equal 
treatPeQt aFFess to proIessLoQs sFKooOs« aQd FKoLFe 
without stigma. To marry or not. To have children or not. 
Inevitably these thoughts led me to the different history of 
black women in this country ± a history in which marriage 
was discouraged, impossible, or illegal; in which birthing 
FKLOdreQ Zas reTXLred EXt “KavLQg” tKeP EeLQg respoQsLEOe 
for them ± being, in other words, their parent ± was as out of 
the question as freedom. Assertions of parenthood under 
conditions peculiar to the logic of institutional enslavement 
were criminal. (Morrison 2005: x-xi) 
 
 The process of writing (Morrison's) and of reading become sites 
for this articulation of past and present. The issue of motherhood and 
maternal love involved in the event of Garner's infanticide and its 
aftermath, their meanings under institutionalized slavery, are reworked 
by Morrison in light of current issues (in the eighties) surrounding 
gender and racial inequality. Past and present meet in the fight towards 
equality. After all, the conservatism of the 1980s - following the 
EaFNOasK oQ tKe &LvLO 5LgKts¶ aFKLevePeQts LQ tKe s ± set the 
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background for reflections on the results and effects of the movement. 
The 1960s and 1970s saw the restructuring of academic departments, the 
LQsertLoQ oI ZKat FaPe to Ee FaOOed “PLQorLt\ OLteratXre” LQ FoXrse 
syllabi, and a broader interest in marginal voices and stories. The 1980s, 
however, saw a revival of conservative views and discourses in politics 
and in the academy.  
 ,Q addLtLoQ as 7oQL 0orrLsoQ Kas FOaLPed oI Ker ZorN (“>,@I Ze 
doQ
t Neep LQ toXFK ZLtK tKe aQFestor Ze are LQ IaFt Oost”) , ZoXOd 
like to draw the attention to this  literary tradition - the voices of Black 
women. Authors such as Phillis Wheatley, Frances Harper, and Harriet 
Jacobs were the predecessors of a powerful literary voice that recreated 
and recorded a part of the American history that had been ignored. The 
narrative strategies of Black women had the potential to influence 
social-political attitudes while representing and revising the experience 
of previous generations (Gates 1988; Johnson 1998; Collins 2000). If 
nineteenth- and first part of twentieth-century Black women writers 
Zere gLvLQg voLFe to EOaFN ZoPeQ¶s e[perLeQFe aQd KLstor\ tKe seFoQd 
half of the twentieth century saw Black women writers addressing all 
ZoPeQ (-oKQsoQ ) $s %arEara &KrLstLaQ pXts Lt “:oPeQ oI FoOor FaQ 
no longer be perceived as marginal to the empowerment of all American 
ZoPeQ” aQd aQ “XQderstaQdLQg oI tKeLr reaOLt\ aQd LPagLQatLoQ Ls 
essential to the process of change that the entire society must undergo in 
order to traQsIorP LtseOI” (&KrLstLaQ  ) 
 What Du Bois called the sKared “KLstor\ oI dLsFrLPLQatLoQ aQd 
LQsXOt” aPoQg EOaFN peopOe LQ tKe 8QLted 6tates aQd LQ tKe $IrLFaQ 
continent (Du Bois 2000; 2005) is a founding notion of African-
American sense of identity. Black women writers articulated the black 
woman's experience of violence, discrimination, and insult in ways that 
challenged African-American thought and anti-racist discourse from 
within the tradition.  
 Black women writers departed from their experience in order to 
imagine and forge new realities, new possibilities, new connections. 
Some of their works signal to a realm of experience (and of possibility) 
outside the male eurocentric point of view, to racial and gender 
experiences which are not straightforward and with clear delineated 
borders. On the contrary, writers like the ones whose novels are part of 
this corpus have challenged readers in their depictions of violence and 
suffering in their stories. Also, and because of that, these novels 
recurrently signal to the impossibility of representing the truth of Black 
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identity. Whilst violence and suffering are themes constitutive of the 
African-American shared history and sense of identity, these novels 
insist on the deferral of truth. This deferral can be understood as 
political ± as it clearly is for many of Black women writers and 
intellectuals ± and it can also be approached as a narrative strategy. In 
the idea of deferring truth or meaning, for that matter, lies the potential 
for change and transformation, for what Gilles Deleuze called the 
FreatLoQ oI “QeZ Za\s of thinking and IeeOLQg” ( )  
 By embracing the deferral of truth as a narrative strategy, Toni 
Morrison, Sapphire, and Edwidge Danticat present violence, 
simultaneously, on two levels. On the level of the narrative, that is, on 
the level of the representation of acts of violence and/or violent events. 
And on the level of reading, that is, on the aesthetic encounter with the 
text. The aesthetic register creates a space in these narratives that is 
potentially violent. To put it another way, the aesthetic register carries 
the potential of turning the act of reading into a violent event itself. The 
narrative strategy (of deferral of truth) employed by these authors in the 
representation of violence carries the potential of rupturing the process 
of reading and, consequently, of destabilizing the process of making 
meaning. In this possibility of rupture and transformation inherent in the 
deferral of meaning I center this study. 
 
1.6 Representing Violence and Human Suffering: the Aesthetic 
Register 
 A Foucaultian view of discourse and power would approach 
images of suffering and the power of visuality as a double economy of 
freedom and constraint. On the one hand, we can (re)act freely to an 
image of suffering (a technology of discourse) according to our will. On 
the other hand, our (re)action (our will) would happen within the limits 
oI aQ “aOread\ deILQed FoQte[t oI KLstorLFaO aQd poOLtLFaO poZer” 
(Chouliaraki 50). In this view, the potential of affective encounters to 
defer meaning could not be approached outside representation. Images 
could not be disconnected from content ± in the way done by the media, 
Chouliaraki suggests. Or to put it in traditional aesthetic terms: form is 
aOZa\s FoQQeFted to FoQteQt $s &KoXOLaraNL pXts Lt “tKe aestKetLFs Kas 
been precisely a search in meaning for a higher form of knowledge, for 
ZKat trXO\ FoXQts LQ OLIe” () ,Q tKLs spLrLt tKLs stXd\ pOaFes oQ tKe 
aestKetLF TXaOLt\ oI te[ts tKLs poteQtLaO Ior a dLIIereQt “KLgKer” IorP oI 
knowledge that can be created in the deferral or momentary suspension 
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of meaning. 
 6LPoQ 2
6XOOLvaQ LQ “7Ke $estKetLFs oI $IIeFt 7KLQNLQg $rt 
%e\oQd 5epreseQtatLoQ” () TXestLoQs tKe dLsFLpOLQe oI art KLstor\
s 
current tendencies of analyzing art objects either within their context of 
production or, conversely, through a deconstruction perspective of 
“st\PLe(LQg)” tKe KLstorLFaO LQterpretatLoQ (“ZKLOe stLOO LQKaELtLQg tKeLr 
geQeraO e[pOaQator\ IraPeZorN” () 2
6XOOLvaQ LQterrogates  
 
How could it happen that in thinking about art, in reading art 
objects, we missed what art does best? In fact, we missed that 
which defines art: the aesthetic ± because art is not an object 
among others, at least not an object of knowledge (or not 
only an object of knowledge). Rather, art does something 
else. ,Qdeed art Ls preFLseO\ aQtLtKetLFaO to NQoZOedge >«@ 
Which is to say that art might be well a part of the world 
(after all it is a made thing), but at the same time it is apart 
from the world. And this apartness, however it is theorised, is 
what constitXtes art
s LPportaQFe >«@ , ZaQt to FOaLP tKat 
this excess need not be theorised as transcendent; we can 
think the aesthetic power of art in an immanent sense ± 
through recourse to the notion of affect (125 italics in the 
original). 
 
 For O'Sullivan, although Marxism and deconstruction 
illuminate key elements of the art object and of the encounter with it, 
aIter tKeLr readLQg tKe art oEMeFt “stLOO rePaLQs” () LQ Lts prodXFtLoQ 
oI aIIeFts +e XQderstaQds aIIeFts as “e[tra-discursive and extra-te[tXaO” 
(126) elements of the art object and of experience, for that matter. 
Affects are not related to knowledge or meaning (in the discursive 
seQse) Ior Ke states tKe\ KappeQ oQ a dLIIereQt “asLgQLI\LQg regLster” 
(126). In fact, this operation on a different register is what differentiates 
art from language, or the aesthetic from the discursive. Although 
language and the production of meaning also have an affective register - 
“sLgQLILFatLoQ LtseOI PLgKt Ee XQderstood as MXst a FoPpOe[ aIIeFtLve 
function (meaning ZoXOd Ee tKe eIIeFt oI aIIeFts)” () ± for 
O'Sullivan, art is made up of affects (though not only of them). 
6
 In light 
                                                 
6
 Although O'Sullivan recognizes that, in a way, affects are only meaningful within 
discourse, his focus is on the asignifying register that affects operate. That is, here affects 
are XQderstood as ZKat KappeQs “paraOOeO to sLgQLILFatLoQ” () I will return to this point 
of the importance of making affects meaningful in part one. 
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of Deleuzo-*XattarLaQ tKoXgKt Ke deILQes art as a “EOoF oI seQsatLoQs 
ZaLtLQg to Ee reaFtLvated E\ a speFtator or partLFLpaQt” () That is to 
say that, once O'Sullivan approaches the aesthetic function as affect, the 
art object is understood as an event. In this way, art (affects) have to be 
experienced - the aesthetic experience is an affective experience. This is 
the crux of O'Sullivan's argument: the event that art is operates in a 
different register. The aesthetic quality constitutive of art objects works 
LQ a “deterrLtorLaOLsLQg” regLster () tKat dLsrXpts sXEMeFtLve 
experience. To put it in other words, we could say that the encounter 
with an art object carries the potential for disrupting the participant's 
sXEMeFtLvLt\ 7Ke dLIIereQt (“deterrLtorLaOLsLQg”) regLster LQ ZKLFK tKe 
aesthetic operates, to use O'Sullivan's terms, offer the participant the 
opportunity to switch his/her register to an imaginatively one, to 
momentarily step aside oneself. He summarizes: 
 
Art is less involved in making sense of the world and more 
involved in exploring the possibilities of being, of becoming, 
in the world. Less involved in knowledge and more involved 
in experience, in pushing forward the boundaries of what can 
be experienced. Finally, less involved in shielding us from 
death, but indeed precisely involved in actualising the 
possibilities of life. (130) 
 
 In this transformative experience new modes of being in the 
world are created (O'Sullivan 129; Abel 2007: 34). However, we should 
be wary of this autonomous and important function of art described by 
O'Sullivan. Although not stated clearly, he does not claim that art 
operates only LQ a “deterrLtorLaOLsLQg” regLster <et tKLs Ls tKe TXaOLt\ tKat 
he emphasizes and which he believes is neglected by dominant 
methodologies and practices in the discipline of art history. 
 In literature, we should understand the affective and discursive 
dimensions of the literary text as constantly and inevitably overlapping 
each other. Perhaps here lies the singularity of the act of reading: the 
imaginative function emerges as the reader engages with the text, 
KoZever tKe aestKetLF TXaOLt\ Ls Qot “ZaLtLQg to Ee reaFtLvated” EXt 
depends on the reader's imagination and willingness in order to be 
created. That is also saying that in literature affects are constantly 
pushing to be named. 
 In regard to the theme of violence and suffering, and 
particularly, to the novels analyzed here, I believe the aesthetic quality 
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of operating in an alternative register might render the experience of 
watching the suffering of others in a novel way. Because literature 
operates in a rupturing register, we could think of the potential or the 
opening for sensitivity. If we read O'Sullivan's thesis as a diagnose to 
&KoXOLaraNL
s aQd äLåeN
s FOaLPs oQ tKe vLeZer
s deseQsLtL]atLoQ FaXsed 
by the mass media's mode of address, we could reflect upon some sort 
of transformation or change directed towards the aesthetic experience. 
What is missing (intentionally or not) in the experience of watching the 
suffering of others represented by mass media? For O'Sullivan, a 
“deterrLtorLaOLsLQg” regLster Ls FKaraFterLstLF oI tKe aestKetLF e[perLeQFe 
Conversely, could we think of the absence of such register as intrinsic to 
the media's mode of address (after all art belongs to a different realm)? 
Which brings us to the question: in our experiences and interaction with 
other persons and things, what may engender transformation and 
change? Is it knowledge? Is it emotions? Is it the knowledge constructed 
through sensation? 
 I hope this study can shed some light towards starting to answer 
those questions or, at least, present paths worth taking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
PART I  
 
2. Imagining Pain: Reading, Affect, and the Representation of 
Violence 
 
Strange Fruit 
 
Southern trees bear a strange fruit, 
Blood on the leaves and blood at the root, 
Black bodies swinging in the southern breeze, 
Strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees. 
 
Pastoral scene of the gallant south, 
The bulging eyes and the twisted mouth, 
Scent of magnolias, sweet and fresh, 
Then the sudden smell of burning flesh. 
 
Here is a fruit for the crows to pluck, 
For the rain to gather, for the wind to suck, 
For the sun to rot, for the trees to drop, 
Here is a strange and bitter crop. 
 
     (by Lewis Allan sung by 
Billie Holiday) 
7
 
 
 The powerful lyrics of Strange Fruit evoke the sentience of 
vision, scent, and touch. As a metaphor for lynching and lynched bodies, 
the song verses create a strong image of the sight of bodies hanging. 
Such sight is loaded with the awful smell and texture of a dead human 
body, but a body that is analogous to a fruit that, although strange and 
bitter, can be plucked, gathered, sucked, rotten, dropped. First published 
as a poem by Abel Meeropol under the pen name of Lewis Allan, 
Strange Fruit expressed Meeropol/Allan's horror at lynchings. Later the 
poem was set to music and it was Billie Holiday's performance that 
made the song famous.  
 As a poem, then song lyrics, the verses of Strange Fruit 
illustrate a well-known scene of  American history and condemn its 
                                                 
7
 Billie Holiday and Sonny White are said to have co-written the music to the song with 
Lewis Allan. 
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racism and racial violence. When put side by side with lynching 
photography, the mental imagery gains a visual representation. In spite 
of the immediate efficacy of visual images in conveying scenes and 
people, words and music are powerful means of representation because 
of our very capacity for imagining - the affective force of images can be 
conveyed through verbal language. In the same way one imagines and 
produces verses to evoke a scene of lynching, as readers of and/or 
listeners to those verses, we can almost immediately reach the purported 
scene.  
 In Strange Fruit a narrative presents to the reader (in the case of 
us readiQg tKe O\rLFs) a ZorOd Ze Kave to pLFtXre LQ oXr PLQd¶s e\es 7Ke 
words put in verse give us the knowledge to imagine, but it is what is 
not there, the unwritten part, that allows our picturing of this scene (Iser 
1980). Picturing is not seeing (what is there in front of us), but it is a 
t\pe oI seeLQg tKat LQvoOves LPagLQatLoQ seQsatLoQs aQd “PLssLQg MXst 
ZKat oQe ZoXOd Ee dXe to get LI oQe Zere seeLQg >@” (*LOEert 5\Oe 
quoted in Iser 1980: 136). In this study, I approach picturing as 
containing the affective force of visuality similar to seeing for both are 
(also) processes of imaging (137). 
 $FFordLQg to ,ser “µLPagLQg¶ depeQds XpoQ tKe aEseQFe oI tKat 
ZKLFK appears LQ tKe LPage” () +eQFeIortK Ze are dLsFXssLQg tZo 
different types of cognition: one that accesses the world through 
perception (seeing) and the other through the notion of ideation 
(pLFtXrLQg) “3erFeptLoQ reTXLres tKe aFtXaO preseQFe oI tKe oEMeFt 
ZKereas LdeatLoQ depeQds XpoQ Lts aEseQFe or QoQe[LsteQFe” () 7Ke 
act of reading a OLterar\ te[t FoPELQes tKe “sFKePatL]ed aspeFts oI tKe 
te[t” (Le tKe NQoZOedge gLveQ E\ tKe aXtKor LQ tKe IorP oI ZrLtteQ 
words) to the imagination and creativity of constructing a mental image 
of that knowledge. This consists in what Iser calls the process of 
ideation.
8
 
 Both seeing and picturing are part of the aesthetic experience of 
looking at a work of art, watching a play or a film, and of reading a 
novel, a poem, a play. A classic notion of catharsis is regarded as the 
climax of an aesthetic experience; however, there are other ways of 
being affected in an encounter with art that is not cathartic. If we think 
                                                 
8
 ,ser Xses tKe Zord 
Ldeate
 “as tKe Qearest (QgOLsK eTXLvaOeQt to tKe *erPaQ 
vorstellen' 
which means to evoke the presence of something which is not given. According to 
Lockean tradition, 'idea' corresponds to something which imprints itself on the mind, but 
that is not what is meant by the German 'Vorstellung
” () 
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of aesthetic experience as an encounter loaded with affective force, we 
might open the possibilities of experiencing seeing and picturing as 
beyond the knowledge presented to us in a novel, or in verses, or in a 
sequence of images in a film. In the act of reading, the activity consists 
oI a reader assePEOLQg tKe PeaQLQg oI a te[t LQ a “proFess oI re-creative 
dLaOeFtLFs” (,ser [) 7KLs t\pe oI cognition does not contain the 
restraining quality of perception once the (imagined) object is not 
present. In this way, we could approach the act of reading as an event in 
which the indeterminacy of imagination and creativity render it an 
encounter loaded with affect. In what Iser would also name process of 
ideation I find the possibility of an affective encounter with a literary 
text.  
 In Strange Fruit tKe “aIIeFtLve IorFe oI vLoOeQFe” ($EeO ) 
and here I add the affective force of pain, are part of the aesthetic 
experience of our reading (and picturing) of the lyrics or listening to the 
song. How can the force of violence and of pain be experienced through 
mediation (in this case, the mediation of art)? We know that the 
intention of a writer, artist, or film director may not be successfully 
expressed in his/her work once communication (interpretation) depends 
as well on the reader and/or spectator. Also the possibilities offered by 
an aesthetic encounter are inexhaustible ± and the fact the reader/ 
spectator interprets in one way is his/her acceptance of the infinite 
possibilities (Iser 1980: 126). How is pain and violence expressed in 
literary works? Or should I ask: how is the affective force of pain and 
violence experienced in literary works? 
 The inexpressibility of pain has been contended by writers, 
artists, academics, physicians, and psychologists. The argument goes 
around the idea that a sufferer of physical pain cannot express verbally 
his/her sentience, in this way, making pain a lonely and individual 
experience. According to Elaine Scarry (1985), physical pain is different 
from other psychic and bodily states and events for it has no object. Our 
senses have objects as does desire, fear, hunger, for example. Regarding 
physical pain, however, there is an absence of referential content, and 
this almost prevents it from being rendered in language: objectless, it 
cannot easily be objectified in any form, material or verbal (05). In spite 
of this, someone in the presence of another suffering physical pain 
would recognize it, albeit never being able to fully understand the exact 
bodily sensation and intensity. With the exception of psychiatric 
pathologies, most individuals can recognize physical pain in another 
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human being for cries of pain are recognizable in any human language 
and culture. Also, the intensity of the cry signals the intensity of the 
pain. The question of responding to someone's pain, of helping this 
person, is not necessarily the next step. For whatever reasons, one may 
choose to help, or to ignore, or even to cause more pain.  
 In this chapter I want to challenge the argument of the 
inexpressibility of physical pain in terms of its loneliness and individual 
experience. Undoubtedly the experience of physical pain happens in the 
privacy and the loneliness of one's body. Notwithstanding, the 
representation of that experience and of that body has been culturally 
constructed. It is in the cultural construction of the discourse of pain and 
its representation that I locate this study.  
 I question the limitations of Scarry's thesis through the notion of 
affect.  I believe that affect theory can shed light on the seeing and 
picturing of violence and pain. However, affect theory also has 
limitations once seeing and picturing entail the need of making sense of 
affect. In this chapter, I argue on the potential of the act of reading as a 
site for an affective encounter with violence and suffering. Departing 
IroP :oOIgaQg ,ser¶s tKeor\ oI aestKetLF respoQse , OoFate LQ tKe FreatLve 
process of (re-)imagining the possibility of expressing and 
communicating (through aesthetic mediation) pain and suffering. The 
readLQg oI a OLterar\ ZorN Ls tKXs aQ aFtLvLt\ LQ ZKLFK 6Farr\¶s 
argument of the inexpressibility of pain finds limitations; and it is 
through the affective encounter, that is also part of the aesthetic 
experience of literature, that I argue for the potential of being affected 
by the violence and suffering of others.    
 In order to examine my argument, I have divided this chapter in 
sections. Firstly, I present Scarry's thesis in The Body in Pain: The 
Making and Unmaking of the World (1985). Secondly, I challenge her 
thesis with Wolfgang Iser's phenomenological approach to the act of 
reading (1980) and with the notion of affect. Finally, I discuss Marco 
Abel's (2007) approach to images of violence and suffering in literature 
through their affective force.  
 
2.1 The Inexpressibility of Pain 
 In The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World 
(1985) Elaine Scarry explores the relationship between the opposing 
human activities of creation and destruction articulated on the idea of 
embodiedness. On one side there is the destruction of the physical body 
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aQd oI ZKat 6Farr\ FaOOs “tKe artLIaFts oI FLvLOL]atLoQ” LOOXstrated E\ Ker 
deconstruction of the structures of torture and war. On the other 
(opposite) side there is creation, the production of material culture, 
LOOXstrated E\ 6Farr\¶s aQaO\sLs oI “tKe strXFtXre oI LPagLQLQg” (PaNLQg) 
in the Judeo-Christian scriptures and the work of Karl Marx. Scarry 
approximates the making and unmaking of the body, and thus, of the 
world, in the idea of work and the production of the object of such work.  
 In the first part, Unmaking, Scarry argues about the relation of 
pain and power by showing how the infliction of pain through torture 
and in war not only achieves its effects by making the victim incapable 
of expressing his/her pain but also by the process of destroying language 
(therefore, creation) itself. Pain renders the victim speechless. However, 
when pain finds a voice, Scarry argues, it tells a story in which three 
subjects overlap: the inexpressibility of physical pain; the political 
consequences of pain's inexpressibility; and the nature of both material 
and verbal expressibility, or more simply, the nature of human creation 
() 6Ke FoQtLQXes “>@ paLQ FoPes XQsKaraEO\ LQto oXr PLdst as at 
oQFe tKat ZKLFK FaQQot Ee deQLed aQd tKat ZKLFK FaQQot Ee FoQILrPed” 
(04).  
 Whoever suffers from physical pain has the certainty of it. 
Whoever hears about another's physical pain can never fully grasp what 
the other feels. For the one who suffers pain, it can be amplified by the 
disbelief or doubt of the other, who cannot grasp one's suffering. As 
Scarry puts it, physical pain's unsharability destroys language by its 
reversion to a state prior to language, a state of sounds and cries. 
%eFaXse tKe sXIIerer oI paLQ Ls LQFapaEOe oI XsLQg speeFK a “OaQgXage 
Ior paLQ” Ls Freated E\ tKose ZKo are Qot sXIIerLQg EXt ZKo FoPe to 
speak on behalf of the person in pain. Although expressing another 
persoQ
s dLstress Ls proEOePatLF 6Farr\ argXes tKat tKere are aOso “ver\ 
great reasons why one might want to do so, and thus there come to be 
avenues by which this most radically private of experiences begins to 
enter the realm of pXEOLF dLsFoXrse” () 6Farr\ gLves tKe e[aPpOes oI 
medicine questionnaires devised to help patients express and locate their 
bodily pain, and doctors and nurses helping patients translate pain into a 
tangible condition or disease which could be addressed by medical 
procedures. She also refers to verbal documents such as the ones 
produced by Amnesty International; the transcripts of personal injury 
trials; the poems and narratives of individual artists ± all of these have 
translated pain into speech (09). Also the act of putting one's sentient 
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experience of pain into words comes as a validation or proof of what 
oQe Ls FertaLQ to Ee IeeOLQg 0oreover tKere Ls tKe assXPptLoQ tKat “tKe 
act of verbally expressing pain is a necessary prelude to the collective 
tasN oI dLPLQLsKLQg paLQ” ()   
 By unveiling the structure of torture and the structure of war, 
Scarry shows how the problem of pain is connected to the problem of 
power. Scarry argues that the verbal representation of any given 
phenomenon is directly linked to how it will come to be politically 
represented: the easier to find a language to express a certain distress, 
tKe easLer Lt ZLOO Ee to sXPPoQ ZKat sKe FaOOs “OaQgXage oI ageQF\” (-
18). When it comes to physical pain, the difficulty of articulating it 
leaves it open to misrepresentations, and thus, to political and perceptual 
complications. For instance, Scarry shows how misdescribing torture 
and war is possible because of the inherent difficulty of describing 
bodily pain. Language can be manipulated in ways that the actual 
physical pain and injuries are erased and the story that is told is not 
about that ± even if the central content of the story was the pain and 
injuries inflicted in a body.  
 Scarry draws her examples from speeches made by politicians 
about various twentieth-century wars and battles. I add here the 
descriptions of lynchings found in newspapers 
9
.  
 Often news coverage of lynchings diverts the focus from the 
infliction of physical pain on the lynched victim to the emotional pain 
and psychological distress suffered by the community in which the 
lynching took place. The work of the executioners and the number of 
people the event mobilized take the focus away from the event of 
murdering to the event of keeping the (white) community safe ± and this 
notion of (white) community safety justifies the infliction of pain, 
torture, and murder.  News reports rarely described the motives for the 
lynchings; instead, they centered attention on the procedures. In other 
words, news reports of lynchings based their story on an event of torture 
and murder. The victim's suffering is watched and heard. The agonizing 
pain of the tortured is represented through the focus on the precision of 
the steps of the lynching ritual. An abyss is created here by language: 
the victim, on one side, and the executioners and the crowd that 
watched, on the other, are separated the farthest they can be in their 
sXEMeFtLvLt\ aQd seQtLeQFe 6Farr\ asNs “+oZ Ls Lt tKat oQe persoQ FaQ 
                                                 
9
 -aPes $OOeQ “1otes oQ tKe pOates” Without Sanctuary Lynching Photography in America. 
Eds. James Allen et al. Santa Fe: New Palms Publishers, 2004. 165 ± 201.  
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be in the presence of another person in pain and not know it ± not know 
Lt to tKe poLQt tKat Ke KLPseOI LQIOLFts Lt aQd goes oQ LQIOLFtLQg Lt"” () 
Later in the book Scarry answers this question relating it to the human 
activity of imagining:
10
  
 
If one imagines one human being seeing another human 
being in pain, one human being perceiving in another 
discomfort and in the same moment wishing the other to be 
relieved of the discomfort, something in that fraction of a 
second is occurring inside the first person's brain involving 
the complex action of many neurons that it, importantly, not 
just a perception of an actuality (the second person's pain) but 
an alteration of that actuality (for embedded in the perception 
is the sorrow that it is so, the wish that it were otherwise). 
Though this interior event must be expressed as a conjunctive 
dXaOLt\ “seeLQg tKe paLQ aQd ZLsKLQg Lt goQe” Lt Ls a sLQgOe 
percipient event in which the reality of pain and the unreality 
of imagining are already conflated. Neither can occur without 
the other: if the person does not perceive the distress, neither 
will he wish it gone; conversely, if he does not wish it gone, 
he cannot have perceived the pain itself (he may at the 
moment be experiencing something else, such as his own 
physical advantage, or his own resistance to having to attend 
to another person, but he cannot be perceiving the pain, for 
paLQ Ls LQ Lts esseQtLaO QatXre “aversLveQess” aQd tKXs eveQ 
within technical medical definitions is recognized as 
something which cannot be felt without being wished unfelt). 
(289-290) 
 
 )or 6Farr\ tKere Ls aQ “esseQtLaO QatXre” oI tKe KXPaQ respoQse 
to pain: aversiveness. In this way, it is a problem of perception, a failure 
of imagination, not to  recognize another person's pain. In a fixed 
structure, pain has its natural reaction ± the elimination of it ± therefore, 
any failed attempt at aversiveness is not what it should be. Scarry is 
accounting for one person inflicting pain in another. However, she 
LdeQtLILes tKe perpetrator as “e[perLeQFLQg soPetKLQg eOse” ZKLFK 
prevents the full and right perception of what is being inflicted.  
 In regard to racial violence in the United States, it is the 
historical and racial schema that places black individuals in a position 
                                                 
10
 In order to avoid a misunderstanding of her argument and methodology, I quote the full 
paragraph. 
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Fanon () rLgKtO\ LdeQtLILed as  “EeLQg tKroXgK tKe otKer”(0). In 
this context, Scarry's question can sound naive (or should we say that 
within her methodology and argument against torture and war, it is 
simply coherent?) In news reports of lynchings, 
11
 although the focus 
was on the procedures, the victim's suffering and pain was known by 
whoever was witnessing it. In the practice of lynching, it is precisely the 
fact torturers and executioners know the victim's pain that makes the 
lynching possible. The crowds of people that came to watch (often 
reported in numbers and origin by newspapers) knew what they came to 
witness. Moreover, the acceptance of the practice of lynching as 
synonymous with the practice of justice acknowledges the pain of the 
victim ± and this recognition renders it doable. A person may perfectly 
know the pain of another and decide not to do anything about it, or to 
stop it, or to go on inflicting it. I do not believe it is a question of 
recognition and awareness here, but of the conflation of power and pain 
- when the being of the sufferer is turned invisible at the same time the 
body in pain is made very visible. 
 Invisibility will not require one's sympathy, one's anger, and/or 
one's shame and, for this reason, turning pain invisible is a common 
issue of power and politics. For Scarry, invisibility is present in 
language. The language of agency can be both effective and helpful in 
one's attempts to objectify pain and thus share it with another (as in 
medicine and law), but it can also be used in perverse ways when it 
expresses anything but physical pain and suffering and the distress it 
causes on the victim. The conflation of pain with power can push the 
certainty and actuality of a body suffering to the realm of abstraction 
and doubt, creating a discourse on pain that is not about physical pain 
and suffering.   
 Susan Sontag in Regarding the Pain of Others (2003) addresses 
the notion of invisibility through the media's managing of images of war 
victims. The conflation of pain with power in Sontag's argument links 
invisibility to individuality. Invisibility is achieved in the absence of 
visual recognition when the victims are ours 
12
, that is, our pain and 
suffering is not shown, or when it is, it is shown within a narrative of 
individualization of that victim: who he/she was, his/her family, work, 
friends. However, regarding the recognition of others, their bodies and 
                                                 
11
 Refer to pages 82-84 for examples. 
12
 Sontag refers to the American audience. 
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their faces are never portrayed as individual victims, but as a collectivity 
(a FoOOeFtLoQ oI vLFtLPs oI FasXaOtLes oI EodLes) $s 6oQtag pXts Lt “tKe 
scale of war's murderousness destroys what identifies people as 
LQdLvLdXaOs eveQ as KXPaQ EeLQgs” () 7Ke represeQtatLoQ oI tKe otKer 
as a collectivity erases individuality when it does not grant pain and 
injury as individual suffering. In other words, one is made invisible by 
not being an individual. 
 For Scarry, in the structures of torture and of war we find the 
“deFoQstrXFtLoQ oI FreatLoQ” ,Q tortXre tKe LQLtLaO destrXFtLoQ oI oQe
s 
ability to express sentience is followed (in the continuous infliction of 
pain) by the destruction of one's consciousness. One's subjectivity is 
effaced by the overpowering sentience of physical pain, and the very 
justification of torture renders the individual invisible. In war, that same 
structure acquires greater dimensions when a great number of people 
suffer injuries and destruction reaches the whole of civilization (the 
buildings and places in which life happens). It is also the justification 
given for the attacks and for the war itself that end up rendering that 
place and its inhabitants invisible. Through the infliction of physical 
paLQ aQd LQMXrLes Ze FaQ PaNe “otKer persoQs EeFoPe vLsLEOe to Xs or 
Fease to Ee vLsLEOe to Xs” Ior “Ze PaNe oXrseOves (aQd tKe orLgLQaOO\ 
interior facts of sentience) available to one another through verbal and 
materLaO artLIaFts” (6Farr\ ) $Qd as 6Farr\ FoQFOXdes tKe 
“dereaOL]atLoQ oI artLIaFts Pa\ assLst LQ taNLQg aZa\ aQotKer persoQ
s 
vLsLELOLt\” ()  
 As briefly mentioned above, Scarry draws a parallel between 
the injuries caused in torture and in war. In torture, injuries are done to 
the body and the mind, to consciousness (language and imagination) and 
every sign and extension of one's subjectivity and self. In Scarry's 
Zords “%rXtaO savage aQd EarEarLF tortXre (eveQ LI XQFoQsFLoXsO\) 
self-consciously and explicitly announces its own nature as an undoing 
of civilization, acts out the uncreating of the created contents of 
FoQsFLoXsQess” () ,Q Zar LQMXrLes are doQe to EodLes aQd to FLtLes 
(buildings, factories, houses) -  “tKe PaterLaO sLgQs aQd e[teQsion of 
persoQKood”()  
 In order to understand the connection between the unmaking 
and making of the body, of personhood, of civilization, we ought to 
XQderstaQd tKe LPportaQFe oI PaterLaO FXOtXre LQ 6Farr\¶s tKesLs 2EMeFts 
play a vital role in how we live, and the way we engage in and with 
material culture will inform our representation ± our visibility or 
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invisibility ± in and of the world. The body is the site of pain, and 
through structures of power, one may approximate one's existence closer 
to disembodiedness, and therefore away from pain. One way of doing it, 
for Scarry, is through the production of objects (the end result of a 
work), for our bodiliness and psyche can be projected towards objects.  
 The opposite counterpart of pain is imagining, and in the second 
part, Making, Scarry discusses the structure of imagining, of creation of 
material objects. Scarry constructs her argument on what she terms the 
structure of material making (of the human activity of imagining and its 
creation of material objects) identified by her in the Judeo-Christian 
scriptures and in the writings of Marx.  
 The making of material artifacts establishes, for Scarry, the 
transition from imagining (believing in God in the Hebrew scriptures) 
and an authoritarian order to creating (embodying, materializing God in 
the Christian scriptures) and a more democratic order. In this transition 
the human body is first projected in the artifact (imagining of the object) 
and the remaking of the human body is then reciprocated into an artifact 
(making of the object) (243). In her words:  
 
>«@ tKe PaterLaO artLIaFt Ls a sXrrogate or sXEstLtXte Ior tKe 
human body, and the human body in turn becomes an artifact; 
in each, the object is a displacement of sentient pain by a 
materialized clarification of creation; in each, the object is the 
locus of a reciprocal action. (257)  
 
 The objectlessness of physical pain, Scarry argues, might give 
rise to the imagining and to the making of artifacts and symbols we live 
with and in. Pain is understood as the one form of sentience without an 
external referential object, without self-extension. However, when 
EroXgKt “LQto reOatLoQ ZLtK tKe oEMeFtLI\LQg poZer oI tKe LPagLQatLoQ” 
(which is like other forms of the capacity for self-extension), pain may 
be transformed, self-modified, and even self-eliminated. In other words, 
through imagining the once inexpressible sentience of bodily pain can 
be transformed into an object, a made artifact. And it is in the making of 
an object that pain and imagining also find a common ground: 
 
Far more than any other intentional state, work approximates 
the framing events of pain and the imagination, for it consists 
of both an extremely embodied physical act (an act which, 
even in nonphysical labor, engages the whole psyche) and of 
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aQ oEMeFt tKat Zas Qot prevLoXsO\ LQ tKe ZorOd >«@ :orN aQd 
Lts “ZorN” (or ZorN aQd Lts oEMeFt Lts artLIaFt) are tKe QaPes 
that are given to the phenomena of pain and the imagination 
as they begin to move from being a self-contained loop 
within the body to becoming the equivalent loop now 
projected into the external world. (Scarry 170)   
 
 Because pain is experienced within one's body, one's suffering 
is one's own unless projected outside. Language is destroyed by pain, 
and with it, a possibility of expressing one's sentience, one's 
imagination, one's individuality. However, in the process of creation, 
Scarry allows for the possibility of one's sentience being projected into 
an object. The imagination and then construction of an object requires 
the same proMeFtLQg “LQto tKe e[terQaO ZorOd” - the disembodiment of 
oneself into its projection outside. Referring to Marx's work, Scarry 
returns to her point about structures of power describing how whoever 
has power can be disembodied through the creation and use of objects. 
Like the invisibility of the sufferer of pain who cannot objectify and 
share his/her sentience, some people will not disembody themselves 
through work.  
 It is in this transformation of the private experience of bodily 
pain into imagination aQd LQto a “ZorN” tKat , ZaQt to OoFate P\ 
argument of the use of writing, of stories, of literature, and of (the 
activity and event of) reading as the site of translation, and thus of 
expression, of pain. Reading is an activity constituted of participants, 
symbols, codes, a narrative and stylistic form, and linguistic 
conventions. Texts may require distinct effort and engagement from 
readers, and readers may find distinct information and interpretations of 
the same text. In any case, in the event of reading there is the decoding, 
through words, of the most diverse forms of human sentience, and 
different stories and plots may translate a similar feeling or human 
emotion. Imagining is required as much from the writer and/or teller of 
the story as from the reader. And here I locate a possibility for the 
expression of bodily pain.  
 In Beloved, Push and The Dew Breaker, the sentience of pain 
happens simultaneously in the physical and psychic levels, with effects 
on the individual and on the community to which he/she belongs. 
Although bodily pain ceases with the termination of the violence or 
abuse inflicted ± and scars are the marks of that violence - the psychic 
pain resulting from the violent event has everlasting destructive and 
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denigrating effects. The violent event works in a similar fashion as a 
traumatic event in these narratives. Although characters are fully aware 
of what happened to them ± and narrating that event is part of the 
healing process ± the physical and psychic marks of that event reoccur 
in a manner akin to trauma.   
 ,Q “$ppro[LPatLoQ 6XggestLoQ aQd $QaOog\ 7raQsOatLQg 3aLQ 
LQto /aQgXage” () /XF\ %eQdLQg LdeQtLILes OLPLtatLoQs LQ 6Farr\
s 
argument of the inexpressibility of pain, claiming that physical pain has 
been translated in literar\ QarratLves )or %eQdLQg “paLQ Pa\ LQdeed OLe 
Ee\oQd tKe reaFK oI dLreFt FategorLFaO OaQgXage EXt >«@ Lt Pa\ 
perhaps be approached indirectly through analogy or through particular 
NLQds oI QarratLve represeQtatLoQ” ()  
 Bending explores the notebooks of the French novelist 
Alphonse Daudet searching for a way of understanding the pain and fear 
of a person suffering from syphilis. In this exploration of Daudet's 
writings of his own experience of pain, Bending identifies Daudet's 
uneasiness with moving between  
 
the abstract and the personal, the shift between a language 
that recognizes pain as a disembodied phenomenon about 
which one might converse or write, and what asserts itself as 
the antithesis of that abstraction, a pain felt in one's own 
body, a pain that damages the ability sanguinely to 
communicate its reality. (132-133)  
 
 Bending's analysis of Daudet's notebooks challenges Scarry's 
contention that metaphors to describe pain fall into two categories: one 
tKat “speFLILes aQ e[terQaO ageQt oI the pain, a weapon that is pictured as 
producing the pain; and the second specifies bodily damage that is 
pLFtXred as aFFoPpaQ\LQg tKe paLQ” (6Farr\ ) )or %eQdLQg 'aXdet
s 
descriptions go further than Scarry's categories allow, since restlessly 
searching for analogies and metaphors to capture the experience of 
EodLO\ paLQ $OtKoXgK paLQ
s “LQsLsteQt EodLOLQess” ILQds Qo dLreFt 
representation in words, Bending identifies in Daudet means of 
e[pressLoQ tKat FoQve\ to soPe e[teQt “tKe QatXre aQd tKe LQteQsLt\” oI 
the physical sensation of pain (137). Bending defends writing and 
textuality's abilities to express one's sentience of bodily pain in its 
constant struggles for representation, incessantly moving from 
metaphors to analogies, which is, in great part, the process of literary 
creativity and production.  
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 Wolfgang Iser defines the act of reading as a dynamic process in 
which the reader experiences the text as an event (The Act of Reading 
speFLaOO\ seFtLoQ  “3KeQoPeQoOog\ oI 5eadLQg 7Ke 3roFessLQg oI a 
/Lterar\ 7e[t”) $ te[t Ls Pade oI tZo PaLQ strXFtXraO FoPpoQeQts 
“ILrst a repertoLre oI IaPLOLar OLterar\ patterQs aQd reFXrreQt OLterar\ 
themes, together with allusions to familiar social and historical contexts; 
second, techniques or strategies used to set the familiar against the 
XQIaPLOLar” (,ser  ) 7Ke reader eQgages LQ “tKe aFt oI 
reFreatLoQ” as KesKe tests e[peFtatLoQs aQd LQterpretatLoQs ZKLOe 
reading. Both components of the familiar and unfamiliar are vital to the 
dynamic of the process aQd FoPELQed to a reader¶s LQdLvLdXaO taNe oQ a 
text, render the literary text infinite possibilities, meanings, 
LQterpretatLoQs $OtKoXgK tKe te[t Ls ZKat ,ser QaPes “strXFtXred 
preILgXrePeQt” ( ) ZKat Ls perFeLved LQ a ILrst readLQg PLgKt 
not be perceived in a second one. Or what was perceived by one reader 
PLgKt Qot Ee perFeLved E\ aQotKer oQe ,ser KLgKOLgKts “tKat ZKLFK Ls 
given has to be received and the way in which it is received depends as 
PXFK oQ tKe reader as oQ tKe te[t” () %ecause meaning is not fixed 
LQ a OLterar\ te[t Ze FaQ tKLQN oI a reader¶s eQFoXQter ZLtK a te[t as a 
dynamic process loaded with affect. A narrative's capacity to express 
sentience is argued by Marco Abel (2007) in his studies on the affective 
force of violence. Because of the intersubjective structure of reading we 
could think of affect when we approach the experience of reading a 
novel (and of watching a film, in the case of Abel's work) and how it 
provoNes “speFLILF aIIeFtLve eQFoXQters”  
 
2.2 The Experience of Affect  
 One important dimension of affect studies is the attention to that 
ZKLFK rePaLQs as aQ e[Fess to tKe praFtLFes oI tKe “speaNLQg sXEMeFt” 
(Blackman and Venn 2010: 15). I want to think of the expressibility of 
pain as excess standing outside verbal language. For this reason, 
Scarry's argument has to be challenged in its consideration of what is 
proper communication: the idea that communication is only successful 
when it is verbal.  
 From the perspective of affect studies, perception and 
communication must be thought of as happening outside the boundaries 
of the human self-contained body, or outside human verbal language. By 
considering unconscious levels of expression and communication, the 
importance of affect in relational processes and practices can shed some 
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light on the representation and on the act of watching pain. 
 Affect theory differentiates an affect from an emotion or 
feeling. Brian Massumi (2002) defines both affect and emotion as 
intensity: affect is unqualified and emotion is qualified intensity (27-8). 
Emotion is feeling, that is, a recognized state that emerges from a 
personal experience and is named and owned. Affect, in contrast, is 
unqualified and unrecognizable. It emerges from tKe Eod\ aQd “between 
bodies without the interference or limitations of consciousness, or 
representation: for this reason, its force is, strictly speaking, pre-
persoQaO” (3apoXOLas aQd &aOOard  )  
 7eresa %reQQaQ QaPes aIIeFt as “FarrLers oI eQerg\” ( ) 
aQd “eQergetLF pK\sLFaOLt\ oI Ldeas” () &rXFLaO Ior aIIeFt tKeor\ Ls tKe 
understanding that, although not recognizable and qualified (not 
FoQtaLQed LQ tKe reaOP oI OaQgXage aQd NQoZOedge) aIIeFt “Ls 
aQaO\]aEOe LQ eIIeFt as eIIeFt” (0assXPL ) ,Q sXPPar\ aIIeFt 
theory is a methodoOogLFaO approaFK to a “QoQ-verbal and non-conscious 
dLPeQsLoQ oI e[perLeQFe” pa\LQg FOoser atteQtLoQ to ZKat rePaLQs as aQ 
excess to verbal language and subjective practices (Blackman and Venn 
) aQd attePptLQg to XQderstaQd aQd XQveLO PeaQLQg tKat Ls “Qot tied to 
represeQtatLoQ LQsFrLptLoQ or eQFodLQg” () 
 For Teresa Brennan, the modern and Western idea of a self-
contained individual does not account for an exchange between the 
ELoOogLFaO aQd tKe soFLaO tKat Ls “tZo-Za\” ZKLFK XQderstaQds tKe 
boundaries of one's body as not fixed. Differently, for Brennan, one's 
emotions are not contained within one's body. Instead they are part of a 
“traIILF” EetZeeQ tKe eQvLroQPeQt aQd oQe
s ps\FKe aQd Eod\ () ,Q 
this way, Brennan understands that intersubjective reOatLoQs are “aIIeFt-
rLddeQ” Le “tKe aIIeFt oI tKe oQe FarrLes over LQto tKe otKer” () 
 For Brennan, in the idea of self-containment there is a belief 
that agency is determined by cognition more than emotion. She argues 
that there is a level of emotion influencing individual's behaviour and 
actions (agency) that cannot be accounted for only by cognition. In her 
words, affects are 
 
preeminently social. And they are there first, before we are. 
They preexist us; they are outside as well as within us. >«@ 
what happens when a group gathers is that psychotic affects 
are either intensified or offset (bound and restrained). They 
can be intensified, as with Nazism or a lynch mob. They can 
be restrained as in collective resistance to imperialism and 
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globalization. (65)  
   
 If the force of affect is pre-personal and outside consciousness 
and representation, it could be claimed that one dimension of our 
perception recognizes pain in another person and experiences pain when 
seeing suffering. However, the affect experienced is not necessarily one 
of horror and repulsion for a spectator might feel satisfaction at the sight 
of a person in pain.  Brennan here presupposes a notion of mono-affect 
or hegemonic affect flowing within a group, which is not always the 
case for, in any given situation, individuals may experience varied 
and/or opposing affects in the same arena of flow. In either case, it could 
be said that unconscious awareness may not become an emotion and, for 
that matter, not become significant in terms of behaviour and action.  
 Are we back to Scarry and the impossibility of communicating 
pain? If an affect is not recognized by me as an emotion or a conscious 
awareness, is communication possible? What other ways of cognition 
are at stake here?  
 Papoulias aQd &aOOard poLQt oXt tKat tKe “QoQ-reIOeFtLve spaFe” 
LQ ZKLFK aIIeFt KappeQs “Ls Qot ZLtKoXt LQteOOLgeQFe aOtKoXgK Lt Ls 
characterized by a certain kind of automaticity, this does not equal 
dXPEQess EXt Ls XQderstood to Ee a “dLIIereQt NLQd oI LQteOOLgence about 
tKe ZorOd”” ()  
 Here we have two different approaches to cognition. For Scarry, 
cognition happens within the structure of language, in which human 
language is the system through which things are known and through 
which we can transform the world. Affect theorists, on the other hand, 
would accept the possibility of cognition happening as well outside 
subjective content. Embodied experience may contribute to a type of 
agency that is not the same, but no less important than the agency that 
comes from subjective reflection (Papoulias and Callard). 
 In Scarry there is a preoccupation with critique and 
interpretation, with emotions and subjectivity, with what is represented, 
what is imagined and created, what is displaced into the made object 
and, more importantly, with verbal language. In affect theory there is an 
attempt to get closer to what exceeds the limits of the body, to the 
unspoken and unaccountable by language, to what is unrepresented but 
is, nonetheless, there beneath our perception. Although the referred 
(above) discourses and structures of power are cultural representations, 
and we are looking at literary texts (cultural objects), what affect theory 
is concerned with is how we experience these objects. 
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 In affect studies, Scarry's argument of the inexpressibility of 
pain finds limitations for it does not account for the non-verbal and what 
is unconscious but nonetheless effective and affective; images and 
situations affect us physiologically. However, Scarry could argue here 
that unconscious and physiological levels of awareness do not engender 
social and political change, or, in the case of torture and war, do not 
restrain the perpetrator of pain. Agency is, for Scarry, based on 
predicative cognition. 
 It is important to keep in mind the methodological differences 
of both approaches. One departs from the acceptance of a modern 
subject that is autonomous and self-contained. The other departs from a 
phenomenological view of the subject that is, at the same time, 
autonomous and dependent, immanent and transcendent, and all 
knowledge and constitution of the self happen in the relations of the 
subject with the world. Scarry understands that knowledge and actions 
will be constituted through and after self-reflection. Affect theorists 
understand that there are knowledge and actions that are embodied and 
constituted in pre-reflective ways.  
 &Oare +ePPLQgs
 FrLtLTXe oI aIIeFt tKeor\ LQ “,QvoNLQg $IIeFt 
&XOtXraO 7Keor\ aQd tKe 2QtoOogLFaO 7XrQ” () Ls ver\ XseIXO Kere LQ 
understanding the limitations of the approach. Hemmings argues that the 
affective turn is a wish to go beyond the social and the cultural, and 
Ee\oQd deterPLQLsP aQd pessLPLsP LQ Iavor oI “a Pore prodXFtLve 
IraPe oI PLQd” () ,Q Ker FrLtLTXe sKe FaOOs atteQtLoQ to aQ LPportaQt 
aspeFt oI aIIeFt KoZ LQdLvLdXaOs FaQ Ee “over-assoFLated ZLtK aIIeFt” LQ 
processes of affective transfer (561). 
 Due to their positioning within racial and gender structures, 
some individuals become the object of affective transfer instead of 
attaching their affects freely and autonomously. Hemmings quotes Franz 
)aQoQ¶s desFrLptLoQ oI a OLttOe Eo\¶s reaFtLoQ (“aIIeFtLve respoQse”) to KLs 
EOaFNQess +ere )aQoQ¶s Eod\ “Ls preseQted to KLP vLa tKe ZKLte Eo\¶s 
aIIeFtLve respoQse” () $s )aQoQ () poLQts oXt tKe “gaOa[\ oI 
stereot\pes” KLstorLFaOO\ Freated - cannibalism and the propensity to 
violence, over-sexualized behavior, backwardness, simplicity, free and 
loose behavior, emotional and more humane mind opposite to reason 
and mechanized attitude of whites (Fanon 129) - positions a black 
person within a structure that precedes any individual action from 
KLPKer 7Ke EOaFN persoQ¶s EeKavLor Ls aQtLFLpated ZLtKLQ a raFLaO aQd 
gender imaginary; consequently, he/she learns about him/herself via 
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aQotKer¶s aIfective response. 
 +ePPLQgs draZs atteQtLoQ to tKe IaFt tKat “soPe EodLes are 
FaptXred aQd KeOd E\ aIIeFt¶s strXFtXred preFLsLoQ 1ot oQO\ tKeQ Ls 
affect itself not random, nor is the ability to choose to imagine affect 
otKerZLse” () )or LQdLvLdXaOs posLtLoQed as “oEMeFts oI aIIeFtLve 
dLspOaFePeQt” “oEMeFts oI aIIeFtLve traQsIer” () tKe Ldea tKat aIIeFts 
should not be read but only experienced is not an option. More 
importantly, for +ePPLQgs tKe FKoLFe oI aIIeFtLve tKeor\ Ls “depeQdeQt 
upon their EeLQg tKe sXEMeFt ratKer tKaQ oEMeFt oI aIIeFtLve dLspOaFePeQt” 
(562). Whether or not one wants to make sense of affects, the very 
process of racialization and racism depends on affects being read and 
understood. The discrimination of one by another happeQs ZKeQ oQe¶s 
hate, disgust, or fear is recognized by the victim of discrimination. Also, 
the victim must make sense of it in order to react to it.  
 Here it is interesting to present Susan Sontag's (2003) and 
-XdLtK %XtOer¶s () dLsFXssLoQs oQ LPages of violence and suffering. 
We could think of their arguments as meeting points between affect and 
representation. In Regarding the Pain of Others (2003), Susan Sontag 
attempts to understand how and what meanings are constructed by the 
act of seeing images of suffering and pain. She departs from 
representations of physical suffering in paintings ± from sacred art to 
official commissioned paintings of battles to individual painter's views 
of war, torture and suffering ± and arrives at contemporary Western 
culture and media. For Sontag, news footage and journalistic 
photography talk less about suffering, destruction, and death than they 
do about individualism, whiteness, and imperialism. Subjectivity is 
constituted and constructed by the one who sees; he/she is physically 
away from that environment of destruction and pain, and could feel 
frustrated by images' ability to separate visual perception from 
sentience. Sontag asks if the overwhelming amount of images is capable 
of keeping reactions dormant, and ultimately: are these images 
conveying what happens in those places and to those people (as they 
claim to be doing: for the purpose of historical proof and of reality and 
truth)?  
 Against cultural analysis of The Society of the Spectacle 
(Sontag 95 -101), Sontag contends that these vast repository of images 
ought to haunt us, for being disillusioned, innocent and shocked at 
human destruction and atrocity is not a sign of someone who, Sontag 
reFNoQs Kad reaFKed “PoraO aQd ps\FKoOogLFaO adXOtKood” () 6Ke 
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concludes:  
 
Even if they are only tokens, and cannot possibly encompass 
most of the reality to which they refer, they still perform a 
vital function. The images say: This is what human beings 
are capable of doing ± may volunteer to do, enthusiastically, 
self-righteously. Don't forget. (102) 
 
 )or 6oQtag tKe aZareQess oI “ZKat KXPaQ EeLQgs are FapaEOe 
oI doLQg” oXgKt to ZorN LQ a Za\ tKat Neeps Xs thinking about what 
KappeQs ever\ da\ LQ tKe ZorOd 6oQtag
s “doQ
t Iorget” ZorNs 
FoQverseO\ to tKe “Qever Iorget” grounding the act of memory of 
particular violent events. Sontag reckons that, although ethically 
important, remembering ZorNs as aQ aQtLdote to “aPQesLa” () aQd 
Qot QeFessarLO\ sparN reIOeFtLoQ OearQLQg aQd e[aPLQatLoQ oI “tKe 
rationalizations for mass sXIIerLQg oIIered E\ estaEOLsKed poZers” () 
)or 6oQtag “PoraO LQdLgQatLoQ OLNe FoPpassLoQ” () ZLOO Qot 
engender action or a fight for change; instead, reflecting upon how and 
why those images came into being may work as the initial step towards 
a course of action. 
 The representation of bodily pain and injury in the images 
Sontag mentions operates within a structure of power and knowledge 
formation. Power is conferred to the one who sees but it disciplines all 
bodies: not only those bodies which are constantly visible, but also those 
who are made invisible by being protected in their private spheres, by 
the respect and propriety of media censorship and good taste, and 
ultimately, by their disembodiment as universal and as a mind. The 
deployment of power implicit in this structure disciplines the 
disembodied universal white body through the representation of the 
embodied non-white body. In the discourse and imagery of suffering and 
destruction the non-white other is metonymically linked to exoticism, 
savagery, ignorance, poverty. Whenever a specific context becomes a 
site for such structure of power those words will stand metonymically to 
black, or colonized, or Muslim, or third world peoples. With humanity 
fixed on the white body, the category of other can be easily deployed to 
whatever body stands on the opposite side.  
 Although violence and death are destruction (unmaking), 
photographs and images of violence and war are making for they are 
framed, and framing is selecting, is choosing what will be in and what 
will be out. Moreover, Sontag points to media conventions of propriety 
45 
aQd “good taste” ZKeQ seOeFtLQg ZKat ZLOO Ee sKoZQ tKe PaNLQg aQd 
unmaking of suffering (and of mourning, of pity, and of disgust) still 
abide by conventions of us and them, the exotic others, the uncivilized 
places we fortunately do not inhabit. Also, their epic proportions of 
suffering, famine, and destruction tend to live one numb and inactive for 
there will not be anything one can do to avoid that. The creation of 
exoticism through the suffering of other peoples also increases the 
chasm of worlds in the likes identified by Edward Said. The surreal and 
impossible (because too extreme and gruesome) quality of these images 
creates a sense of them as savages and from another world. In this way, 
nothing can be done (by us) to diminish the pain those individuals are 
feeling. Individuality and individual pain are obliterated and replaced by 
the representation of collective suffering and how suffering constitutes 
those people. Chaos is notably the overall state of those images leaving 
viewers with an overwhelming sentiment that order is impossible when 
that state has been reached. Specially because images representing 
chaotic environments tend to be taken out of context, usually with 
causal facts and chronology erased. We do not learn what led to it, what 
happened before, but only learn how it presently is. Collective suffering 
and chaos become a characteristic of not-here and not-us: 
 
The more remote and exotic the place, the more likely we are 
to Kave IXOO IroQtaO vLeZs oI tKe dead aQd d\LQg >«@ 7Kese 
sights carry a double message. They show a suffering that is 
outrageous, unjust, and should be repaired. They confirm that 
this is the sort of thing which happens in that place. They 
ubiquity of those photographs, and those horrors, cannot help 
but nourish belief in the inevitability of tragedy in the 
benighted or backward ± that is, poor ± parts of the world. 
(Sontag 63) 
 
 Narratives can help us understand, Sontag argues (80), and 
whatever images we choose to represent ourselves and others become 
part oI ZKat Ls FoQstrXFted as “FoOOeFtLve LQstrXFtLoQ”  
 
The familiarity of certain photographs builds our sense of the 
present and immediate past. Photographs lay down routes of 
reference, and serve as totems of causes: sentiment is more 
likely to crystallize around a photograph than around a verbal 
slogan. And photographs help construct ± and revise ± our 
sense of a more distant past, with the posthumous shocks 
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engineered by the circulation of hitherto unknown 
photographs. Photographs that everyone recognizes are now a 
constituent part of what a society chooses to think about, or 
declares that it has chosen to think about. It calls these ideas 
'memories', and that is, over the long run, a fiction. Strictly 
speaking, there is no such thing as collective memory ± part 
of the same family of spurious notions as collective guilt. But 
there is collective instruction. (Sontag 76) 
 
 As Sontag contends, the choice of what is remembered is based 
on the same structure of power and knowledge that aims at maintaining 
the notion of a world divided in Western and Eastern societies and 
peopOes 5egardLQg tKe 8QLted 6tates 6oQtag asNs “%Xt ZK\ Ls tKere Qot 
already, in the nation's capital, which happens to be a city whose 
population is overwhelmingly African-American, a Museum of the 
+Lstor\ oI 6Oaver\"” () 7KLs FKoLFe oI Qot PaNLQg sOaver\ a QatLoQaO 
memory, according to Sontag, walks side-by-side with the acceptance 
that evil does not happen in the United States. In her words:  
 
[Slavery] is a memory judged too dangerous to social 
stability to activate and to create. The Holocaust Memorial 
Museum and the future Armenian Genocide Museum and 
Memorial are about what didn't happen in America, so the 
memory doesn't risk arousing an embittered domestic 
population against authority. (78-79)  
 
 For Sontag, we must act on our capacity to be affected by the 
pain of others. She understands that although we are indeed affected, 
this affection might not become a conscious emotion once we are made 
to feel numb. Sontag believes that there are several elements, controlled 
by discourses of othering, that are responsible for the desensitization of 
individuals. These contribute to one's inability to feel empathy and/or 
other emotions towards other beings. In media studies, the notion of 
compassion fatigue describes the audience's indifference towards distant 
suffering (Moeller 1999; Chouliaraki 2006). Lilie Chouliaraki (2006) 
argues that the viewer sees and hears about human suffering through the 
teOevLsLoQ¶s Pode oI address ZKose LQdLreFt Pessage Ls “\oX FaQQot sa\ 
\oX dLdQ
t NQoZ” () &KoXOLaraNL asNs “EXt FaQ Ze act on what we 
know? ± and this knowing but not being able to act (or not knowing 
ZKat to do) Ls “tKe Post profound moral demand that television makes 
oQ :esterQ speFtators toda\” () $dditionally, the overexposure to 
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human suffering has numbing effects and, instead of cultivating a 
sensibility, human suffering becomes domesticated by the experience of 
watching it on television. For Sontag, our capacity to be human and 
share human feelings towards each other is something to be desired and 
worked towards. 
 Judith Butler in Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and 
Violence (2004) reflects upon the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 and the American responses to suffering and violence. Instead of 
uniting people under a notion of human condition that is universally 
shared, Butler wants to think of unity under the notion of loss. For 
Butler, a notion of “a KXPaQ FoQdLtLoQ tKat Ls XQLversaOO\ sKared” Ls “Qot 
\et tKe Fase” sKe asNs “:Ko FoXQts as KXPaQ" :Kose OLves FoXQt as 
lives? And, finally, What makes for a grieYable life"” (20, italics in the 
original). She believes that it is possible to think of a “Ze” XQder tKe 
QotLoQ oI Ooss oQFe “aOO oI Xs Kave soPe QotLoQ oI ZKat Lt Ls to Kave Oost 
soPeEod\ /oss Kas Pade a teQXoXs “Ze” oI Xs aOO” ()  
 In the context of the aftermath of 9/11, Butler discusses the 
question of vulnerability, grief and mourning of  Americans in 
opposition to the others, who stand as enemies. 9/11 and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq set the re-emergence of the notion of what it is to 
be human, what deaths are considered as loss, and how mourning is 
done collectively through the media coverage and responses to the 
terrorist attacks and to the American government decision to go to war.  
 For Butler, the threat of violence and the interdependency of 
one another posit the body as the site of human vulnerability. Our bodies 
are vulnerable to the touch of another: a touch that can terminate my life 
or provide the physical support for it. The basic condition of being 
human is, thus, the vulnerability of interdependency: how I come into 
the world already in a dependable and dependent relation to other 
people.  
 According to Butler, some bodies will be made unreal by the 
media once they are never present, never seen, and their lives are never 
mourned. Through the absence of images, lives are made less worthy of 
being protected, or even of being grievable. The violence of being made 
XQreaO FaOOed tKe “vLoOeQFe oI dereaOL]atLoQ” E\ %XtOer () oFFXrs prLor 
to physical violence. Through media representations persons are made 
(potential) victims because their lives fall within the categories of lives 
less worthy of protection. In other words, their lives are first derealized 
by discourse. 
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 Lauren Berlant (1999) argues that in the American society the 
more one is identified with bodiliness, the more likely one is placed in a 
historically subordinated group defined by its relation to normativity 
(the bodies that are absent, according to Butler). In the dynamics and 
effects of trauma saturation (via images of suffering and pain) Berlant 
stresses that the voices of the oppressed are muted and commodified by 
sentimental political discourse. In a melancholic recoding, the sufferers 
are represented as, in effect, dead; therefore domesticating the traumatic 
impact of pain upon a non-sufferer audience of spectators.  
 Butler talks about bodies that do not belong to the category of  
human prior to the infliction of pain they might be submitted to. Scarry 
sees the act of inflicting physical pain as the moment of the destruction 
of the self, whereas Butler and Sontag locate the destruction of the self 
in discoXrse prLor to tKe eveQt oI pK\sLFaO paLQ $s %XtOer pXts Lt “,I 
violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective 
of violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives were 
aOread\ Qegated” () 
 If we take HemmLQgs¶ assertLoQ tKat aIIeFt Ls “vaOXaEOe 
preFLseO\ to tKe e[teQt tKat Lt Ls Qot aXtoQoPoXs” () aQd FoPELQe Lt 
ZLtK 6oQtag¶s aQd %XtOer¶s argXPeQts Ze FaQ sa\ tKat Lt Ls tKe PaNLQg 
seQse oI aIIeFt tKat “OLQNs tKe Eod\ to tKe soFLaO”¶ (+ePPLQgs 64). 
Indeed this is what Sontag proposes as response to being desensitized, 
that is, giving meaning to our reactions in terms of how those images of 
absolute cruelty make us reflect and learn about the structures that have 
created them. An affect should be given an interpretative meaning, 
should become an emotion, and this emotion should, in turn, bounce 
back in a way that it affects the body and the mind. It is only within this 
process of affective response and interpretative meaning that one can act 
in the world. Sontag calls for an ethical response to images. Hemmings 
proposes tKe Xse oI “aIIeFtLve states aQd tKeLr eIIeFts” () LQ tKe 
making and giving meaning to our bodies ± meanings that we recognize 
as our own and value. 
 How can we think of affective force of violence and pain within 
social and cultural meaning? In the next section I discuss the proposal of 
aQ approaFK to “vLoOeQt LPages” tKroXgK tKeLr aIIeFtLve IorFe 
 
2.3 The Affective Force of Images 
 
Images have force and do things, but they do not²at least 
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not primarily²bear or represent meaning. Images work by 
their constitutive intensities and affects rather than by 
representing something in a way that may or may not be 
just(ified). Hence the question to ask about an image is less, 
“:Kat does Lt PeaQ"” tKaQ “+oZ does Lt ZorN"” aQd “:Kat 
does Lt do"” (0arFo $EeO ) 
 
 Marco Abel in Violent Affect: Literature, Cinema, and Critique 
after Representation (2007) attempts to write about his chosen subject 
matter, images of violence in literature and film, in a novel way: in 
terPs oI LPages¶ “asLgQLI\LQg LQteQsLtLes” )or $EeO tKe TXestLoQ oI 
what violent images are and what they can do should be kept as a 
guiding principle to studies instead of assuming that violent images are, 
OLNe aQ\ otKer LPage “represeQtatLoQs” aQd tKXs LQterpreted as ZKat 
they represent or mean in our culture. Informed by a postmodern 
aesthetic, Abel works with examples of violent images taken from films 
aQd QoveOs aQd Ke proposes “a FrLtLFaO eQgagePeQt” ZLtK tKese LPages 
“tKat desLres to encounter them on the level of their own reality rather 
tKaQ oQ tKe OeveO oI tKeLr PeaQLQg” () +e asNs “KoZ does oQe ZrLte 
about affect - asignifying forces - if one has been trained to respond to 
literature ± and film ± on the level of representation, meaning, and 
trXtK"” () 
 Abel believes that our desire to turn affect into understanding 
aQd represeQtatLoQ aFts to tKe detrLPeQt oI oXr “FapaFLt\ to respoQd” 
() to “tKe aIIeFtLve IorFe oI vLoOeQFe” () aQd LQ a Za\ to oXr 
capacity to respond to violent art in general. The affective encounters 
provoked by a novel, a film, or a work of art, afford the opportunity for 
transformation, change and creation ± in the face of the unknown, the 
unfamiliar, something new and different may be produced. Abel argues 
in the light of Deleuze's work that judgment ± or any criticism that 
intends to find the truth of an event ±prevents transformation and 
change, for nothing is created but simply understood according to pre-
e[LstLQg poLQts oI vLeZ “>9@aOXe Kas to be produced, not reproduced. In 
contrast, judgment reproduces value based on preexisting (moral) 
ground, thus perpetuating the same modes of existence rather than 
KeOpLQg tKe QeZdLIIereQFe to ePerge” () 
 For this reason, violent events (images of violence, visual and 
textual narratives of extreme violent acts) should be perceived by their 
force or affect instead of immediately making sense of them within a 
discursive dimension. According to Abel, this process of perception and 
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interpretation turns events into something else and something more: 
because we assign a meaning to an event (or any object, for that matter), 
Lt EeFoPes tKe eveQt
s PeaQLQg ,Q KLs Zords “7Ke proEOeP ZLtK tKe 
logic of representation as resemblance is that it always positions the 
responding subject outside the event and so reduces the event to what 
sXEMeFts EeOLeve to Ee tKeLr poLQt oI vLeZ” ()  
 ,QspLred E\ 'eOeX]e¶s ZorN $EeO proposes masocriticism 
13
, 
that is, the logic of suspending judgment, of deferring judgment, so 
violent events can be perceived in their singularity and irreducibility. 
$FFordLQg to $EeO “%\ PasoFKLstLFaOO\ LQteQsLI\LQg tKe PoPeQt oI 
uncertainty (rather than relieving it by providing an answer, however 
convincing) we were collectively forced to give ourselves over to a 
PoPeQt oI vLoOeQFe QaPeO\ tKe vLoOeQFe oI seQsatLoQ” () 7Ke 
embodiment of uncertainty, also referred by Abel as the violence of 
sensation, is a (violent) affective encounter once it confronts  our 
capacity to provide an answer, to respond verbally and to construct 
knowledge. In this way, the violent sensation of uncertainty ± which is a 
moment of violence that can happen within (the moment of violence of) 
the event ± confuses and upsets us, suspends our present and aims for a 
new experience, thus, for the future. In summary, Abel's masocriticism 
EeOoQgs to ZKat 'eOeX]e terPs “tKe reaOP oI tKe LQteOOLgLEOe” ('eOeX]e 
 ) ZKLFK Ls a sLte LQ ZKLFK proFesses oI “reKearsaO dLsgXLse aQd 
redXpOLFatLoQ” aOOoZ Ior tKe ePergeQFe oI “QeZ ways of thinking and 
IeeOLQg aQd aQ eQtLreO\ orLgLQaO OaQgXage” () 7Ke XQFertaLQt\ aQd tKe 
complete surrender of the subject to the experience is, for Deleuze, the 
precondition for something new to be created (1997).   
                                                 
13
 According to Deleuze in Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty (1991), waiting, delay and 
suspense are part of the masochist experience. The suspension of judgment and the open-
eQded EegLQQLQg are FKaraFterLstLF oI tKe PasoFKLst eQFoXQter ZKereLQ “Ke does Qot NQoZ 
at first whether his correspondent is a man or a woman; he is not sure at the end whether 
he is one or two people, nor does he know during the episode what part his wife will play, 
but he is prepared for anything, a true dialectician who knows the opportune moment and 
seL]es Lt” () )or tKe Pasochist to realize his/her desire, he/she depends on the 
acceptance of a partner (who will act according to the directions and guidelines of the 
masochist). The logic of masochism requires education and persuasion of another (the 
partner) through a contracted alliance. Contrary to that is the logic of sadism. Here there is 
oQO\ tKe assertLoQ oI tKe sadLst¶s desLres XpoQ a vLFtLP ZKose OaFN oI FoQseQt aQd 
poZerOess posLtLoQ Ls eQMo\ed aOO tKe Pore E\ tKe sadLst $s 'eOeX]e pXt Lt “7KLs Ls ZK\ 
advertisements are part of the language of masochism while they have no place in true 
sadism, and why the masochist draws up contracts while the sadist abominates and 
destro\s tKeP 7Ke sadLst Ls LQ Qeed oI LQstLtXtLoQs tKe PasoFKLst oI FoQtraFtXaO reOatLoQs” 
(20) 
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 In the second chapter of Violent Affect (“-XdgPeQt Ls Qot aQ 
exit: toward an affective criticism of violence with American Psycho”) 
Abel compares the affective encounters with the violent events of 
American Psycho, the novel and the film. For Abel, a violent affect is 
present in the dynamic of boredom and violence that structures the novel 
American Psycho, by Bret Easton Ellis (1991), but it is absent in the 
ILOP adaptatLoQ dLreFted E\ 0ar\ +arroQ () ,Q tKe ILOP “FrLtLTXe 
logos” (the satirical component) is what the audience encounters and 
respoQds to $EeO sXPParL]es “8OtLPateO\ tKeQ Ze FaQ eQMo\ tKe ILOP 
for its humor, its ridiculing of its characters and their world, and all the 
while remain convinced that we are living in a better world, that we 
have progressed, and that we are neither the perpetrators nor the victims 
oI vLoOeQFe LQ aQ\ IorP” () $OtKoXgK aFNQoZOedgLQg tKat tKe ILOP 
was made surrounded by the critical discourse the novel created 
(inevitably aware of the responses and reception the novel had), Abel, 
nonetheless, posits that the film fell into the trap of most cliché-ridden 
KaELts oI respoQse tKat Ls “LQ sXFK QarratLves aIIeFt LtseOI tXrQs LQto a 
cliché at the very moment it is territorialized onto merely visceral, 
pK\sLFaO ePotLoQs” () :LtKoXt deQ\LQg tKe importance of emotions 
Abel calls for an understanding of an affective encounter as loaded with 
the potential of destabilizing the position of the subject. Instead, in this 
case, judgment remains the primary mode of response and familiarity 
stands in the way of a new mode of existence.   
 Abel's comparison of the potential responses to both novel and 
film are thought of similarly to the desensitizing responses to images of 
suffering Sontag refers to in Regarding the Pain of Others (2003). The 
construction of a familiar plot within a discourse of truth gives the 
viewer a feeling of distance and detachment, of appreciation for what 
one has or for what one does not have (the other's pain and suffering).  
 6oQtag poLQts oXt tKat ZKeQ Zar vLFtLPs are “FOoser to KoPe” 
“partLaO FoQFeaOPeQt” aQd tKe pKotograpKer
s dLsFretLoQ are e[peFted or 
eOse tKe LPages ZLOO Ee “sXppressed LQ tKe QaPe oI proprLet\ or oI 
patrLotLsP” oQFe Lt Ls tKe eQeP\ ZKo “dLspOa\>s@ tKe dead” (6oQtag ) 
Displaying our bodies and victims cause shock and outrage ± what Abel 
QaPes “revoOtLQg aIIeFts” ± nonetheless,  these first reactions are also 
transformed into a narrative.  
 What Abel proposes as a critical engagement with images ± an 
encounter experienced without mediated forms of critique or framed 
within a familiar plot ± eFKoes 6oQtag¶s argXPeQt tKat tKe PedLa¶s 
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mediation cost us the capacity to be affected by images of suffering and 
violence. Returning to Abel's question: are we trapped in our desire to 
turn affective responses into understanding, rationality, representation? 
If the answer is yes, are we, following Sontag's argument, trained to be 
desensitized by violent images and the pain of far others? Abel, 
paraphrasing Deleuze, asks:  
 
the crucial question is not how to judge a body but how to 
find out what else a body is capable of, how a body can exist 
differently: how else can a body enter relationships with 
other bodies whose operative engine is affective force ± with 
the vector of this force (its weight and direction, that is, its 
intensity) determining the capacity of a body to be affected 
by and affect other bodies? (35) 
 
 ,sQ
t tKat ZKat +ePPLQgs proposes E\ assertLQg tKat “aIIeFt 
might in fact be valuable precisely to the extent that it is not 
aXtoQoPoXs” (to tKe e[teQt tKat it cannot be separated from its social 
meaning) (Hemmings 565)? Both Sontag and Butler identify in 
discursive practices of othering the cost of our sensitivity: the cost of 
our ethical response (for Sontag), and of our sense of vulnerability and 
the experience of loss as ways of constructing a notion of community 
(for Butler).  
 I believe affective theory is one way of thinking about the 
inexpressibility of pain. If we could suspend judgment, as Abel suggests, 
in order to experience the force of images and narratives (violent 
events), if we could momentarily approach such events outside their 
discursive dimension, perhaps we would be affected in an unknown, 
therefore, new manner. However, I believe that different texts (events) 
render different affective encounters. The reading of certain texts allows 
for a delayed response, thus, for an opportunity to be also affected by 
the texts structure and style. I believe Iser's notion of ideation as 
inherent in the act of reading allows for the experience of modes of 
embodiment grounded in the potential of affective encounters. Reading 
consists of an activity in which the meaning of the text must be 
assePEOed E\ tKe reader LQ a “proFess oI re-FreatLve dLaOeFtLFs” (,ser [) 
Regarding the affective force of violence, it can operate on the level of 
the narrative and on the process of reading. To put it in another way, in 
violent events, violence operates on the level of plot, themes, characters, 
and on the encounter with the literary work ± a violent encounter 
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towards the reader as he/she engages in the act of assembling meaning, 
exploring an unfamiliar territory that constantly challenges the reader's 
position and response. For Abel, there is something to be gained, to be 
created, in an encounter with violent events. The problematic of 
violence and the horror it can cause is not supposed to be understood, 
“Ee 
resoOved
 E\ asFrLELQg PeaQLQg to soPetKLQg tKat >«@ Ls aQ 
irreducible event in that it cannot be reassuringly reduced to a logic that 
can be said to have brought it aEoXt”()  
 Contrary to that, events mediated by TV news (as pointed by 
Sontag) tend not to leave room for reflection once sensationalist 
journalism is about telling a story, informing the audience, unveiling the 
truth of an event. If violence is supposed to horrify people - and as Abel 
argues, we should be able to be affected by its force - it is the social 
meaning which the various types of violence have that shape our ability 
or inability to respond to it. Social and cultural meanings that, I believe, 
are embedded in the way news is structured and mediated.  
 
2.4 Marco Abel's pedagogical experiment 
 $EeO LQtrodXFes KLs aQaO\sLs oI 'oQ 'e/LOOo
s “,Q tKe 5XLQs oI 
tKe )XtXre”
14
 with his experience of teaching the lecture course entitled 
“9LoOeQFe LQ 7ZeQtLeth-&eQtXr\ $PerLFaQ &XOtXre” LQ tKe IaOO sePester 
of 2011. With a scheduled class on the morning of September 12, Abel's 
and his students' experience are a prelude to his critical analysis of 
DeLillo's essay 
15
 and an example of how representations of the horror 
of violence and suffering would benefit from a deferral of judgment.     
  
 Abel describes the morning after the terrorist attacks when 
stXdeQts FaPe to FOass “aOO too eager to address tKLs vLoOeQt eveQt” () 
aQd e[peFtLQg tKeLr teaFKer to “teOO them ZKat tKe eveQt oI  PeaQ” 
(182 italics in the original). Surprised by his students' request ± and still 
                                                 
14
 An essay about the terrotist attacks of 9/11 commissioned by Harper's Magazine that 
appeared in the December 2011 edition. 
15
 For Abel, DeLillo's narrative strategy of following no narrative in particular but many at 
once (through several different stories related to the attack on the World Trade Center and 
its aftermath) offers the reader a view of reality that is not asserted as real but constantly 
TXestLoQed 7Ke reader Ls LQvLted to “sKape aQd resKape reaOLt\ LQto dLIIereQt LPpressLoQs oI 
equal value, which combine to a speculative series: this happened and this and this and” 
(195). In other words, the stories offer the reader different ways of seeing what happened 
on the event of 9/11 without reducing it to a simple explanation. According to Abel, in the 
essay's lack of a resolution ultimately lies the potential to alter the reader's habitual mode 
of response.  
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stunned by the attacks the previous day ± Abel proposed that they 
togetKer sKoXOd taNe tKe opportXQLt\ to e[pOore tKeLr “FoOOeFtLve inability 
to articulate ± for ourselves as well as to one another ± in coherent 
IasKLoQ tKe “PeaQLQg” oI ” ( LtaOLFs LQ tKe orLgLQaO) $Iter aOO 
they had been reading and discussing depictions of violence in varied 
te[ts tKLQNLQg aEoXt vLoOeQFe (“aEoXt ZKat Lt is, what it does, why it 
KappeQs”) () aQd oIteQ tKeLr respoQses Zere tKat FoPLQg to terPs 
ZLtK sXFK dLverse versLoQs oI vLoOeQFe Ls FKaOOeQgLQg “preFLseO\ EeFaXse 
oI tKe Za\ tKe vLoOeQt LPages IXQFtLoQ aQd are depOo\ed LQ tKese te[ts” 
(183). 
 Abel argued that the fact they did not know how to represent the 
9/11 events in a coherent narrative was itself a way into developing a 
productive response. Moreover, they did not lack a response but had 
aOread\ respoQded E\ tKeLr “FoOOeFtLve seQse oI XQFertaLQt\” (183); and 
that sensation of doubt was an instance of what Abel terms the  violence 
of sensation. What Abel later found out was that this suspension of 
judgment,  of a quick and fixed explanation (that tend to be a product of 
categories that are familiar to us),  
 
shifts one's own intensive investments from one register to 
another ± the violent rush experienced by asserting a stance 
of moral righteousness to the violent vertigo experienced by 
an encounter with one's self as not always already being in 
control (however illusory such a sense of control may 
actually be). It was the difference between these two levels of 
intensity and, perhaps, the very unfamiliarity with the latter 
that instilled in us a very real sense of (one's sense of self) 
being violated precisely because the event itself enforced 
upon us the violence of sensation. (184) 
 
 In other words, the affective state (the violence of sensation) 
induced by one's uncertainty, by one's deferring judgment, might create 
a feeling of violation of one's own control. This unfamiliar state carries 
the potential for new ways of seeing individuals and objects. The 
intensity of the violence of sensation ± the moment of uncertainty - 
might offer a moment for reconfiguring one's most habitual responses, 
for creating something new.  
 However, Abel's brief pedagogical success proved itself fragile. 
The class' frequent sensation of uncertainty in face of violent images 
was now aggravated by their emotional and physical proximity to the 
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violence of 9/11. Fiction was now substituted by reality and, Abel 
reckons, such reality worked upon the students' pressing desires and 
demands for an explanation - which came soon with the president 
George W. Bush's address to the nation. In Abel words: 
 
>«@ a rKetorLFaOO\ poZerIXO speech in which he offered with 
remarkable clarity and force his response to my students' 
initial desire to be told what to make of 9/11. According to 
the president, the matter was, and still is, quite simple: 9/11 is 
nothing more, and nothing less, than a matter of good and 
evil. And while it may be easy to belittle such a seemingly 
simplifying response to the (either merely assumed or real) 
complexity of 9/11, it is impossible to deny the rhetorical 
effect of this declaration, as I quickly witnessed in the 
context of my classroom space. (186) 
 
 Abel says that, after the president's address to the nation, even 
the students who had let themselves participate in the class experiment 
of suspending judgment found conviction in Bush's response. Abel 
remarks that this pedagogical exercise also showed him how 
internalized our familiar modes of response are due to institutional 
processes (187); how difficult it is for any of us not to sXrreQder “to tKe 
rhetorical seduction of the language of judgment that we are all exposed 
to aOO tKe tLPe” () 
 Although I see the benefit of trying to avoid (re)turning to 
common sense modes of response, or falling into the respected liberal 
humanist discourse, in order to see again, I believe Abel's argument 
underestimates the political significance of taking a stance. Surely that is 
part of his masocriticism. For Abel, the ethical stance (what he terms 
response-ability) comes after being moved, after becoming affected, for 
such experience offers the possibility of thinking differently oI “EeLQg 
provoNed to Pove eOseZKere” () +Ls PetKodoOog\ IoFXs oQ tKe 
process of suspending judgment, on the how of images of violence, how 
they are done and how they can move us. As Abel remarks of his 
methodology and his analysis of DeLillo's essay:  
 
>«@ PasoFrLtLFaOO\ IoregroXQdLQg tKe st\Oe ± the ethical 
“KoZ” - of response slows down the impetus to declare what 
an event is. This impetus supposes that an event such as 9/11 
contains an essence, a representational truth that must be 
voiced ± represented ± by the perceiving subject. And since 
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truth, as Nietzsche teaches, mainly operates on a moral 
register, the demand to say what's what is inevitably a 
dePaQd Ior MXdgPeQt Ior aIILrPLQg a “ForreFt” PoraOLt\ ± 
even in the absence of a language explicitly couched in the 
rhetoric of judgment. DeLillo's style of response, his 
aesthetic stance, refuses to hypothesize an essence of 9/11, 
toward which a subject must subsequently assume a clear 
position. Instead of constituting a correct standpoint to be 
defended, DeLillo's reconfiguration of response as an 
aesthetic stance ± as response-ability ± suggests that response 
is about mood, a rhythm, or a capacity to give oneself over to 
the primacy of the event. (217) 
 
 I believe that Abel's emphasis on a mode of response grounded 
on one's affective reactions underestimates what Clare Hemmings 
rePLQds Xs tKat PaNLQg seQse oI aIIeFts Ls ZKat “OLQNs tKe Eod\ to tKe 
soFLaO” () $pproaFKLQg aQ eveQt LQ Lts sLQgXOarLt\ Ls sLgQLILFaQt LQ 
light of viewer's desensitization and the proliferation of hegemonic 
discourses that sound all too discouraging to individuals and groups' 
desires and demands for political and social change, as Sontag and 
Butler remark. Yet that very transformation rendered by a new mode of 
response must be named (represented) in order to sustain desires and 
demands for change. Abel's students eagerly taking side with Bush's 
narrative of good versus evil is an example of how naming their 
affective reactions may become useful as a tool for political action 
(whether efficient or not, or deemed right or wrong). 
 
2.5 Affective Encounters in the Act of Reading 
 When we think of the act of reading ± and the picturing or 
process of ideation inherent in reading ± we ought to acknowledge the 
overlapping levels of engagement, action, and cognition involved in it. 
For Iser,  
 
>«@ tKe reader Ls LQvoOved LQ FoPposLQg LPages oXt oI tKe 
multifarious aspects of the text by unfolding them into a 
sequence of ideation and by integrating the resulting products 
along the time axis of reading. Thus the text and reader are 
linked together, the one permeating the other. We place our 
synthetizing faculties at the disposal of an unfamiliar reality, 
produce the meaning of that reality, and in doing so enter into 
a situation which we could not have created out of ourselves. 
Thus the meaning of the literary text can only be fulfilled in 
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the reading subject and does not exist independently of him; 
just as important, though, is that the reader himself, in 
constituting the meaning, is also constituted. (150) 
 
 This definition of aesthetic experience of a literary work allows 
for the reader's affects to be made sense. Iser's phenomenological 
approach defines a literary work as the meeting of the text and its 
realization (through the engagement of reader). The text is the artistic 
pole of a literary work and its realization is the aesthetic one. For this 
reason, the role of the reader is crucial: without a reader there is no 
literary work but simply a text. It is through a creative engagement with 
the text that the reader produces meaning. Meaning that is in part given 
by the content of the text (the thoughts of the creative writer), in part 
brought to the event of reading by the reader, and meaning that is 
produced through the process of reading. Meaning will be produced in 
the encounter of verbal content and the imagination of the reader. Such 
meaning is not necessarily the meaning intended by the author or 
expected by the reader, or even a whole different interpretation from 
other readers or from a previous interpretation by the same reader. 
Although inexhaustible in its realizations, a text requires of the reader 
his/her effort and ability of deciphering. Constructed according to 
someone else's thoughts, a text requires that a reader brings his/her 
imagination in the act of deciphering what was formulated by the writer. 
In this process the reader also formulates his/her own deciphering 
capacity, that is, the reader brings to the fore an element of his/her being 
of which  he/she is not directly conscious (Iser 135). Henceforth, 
according to Iser, the production of meaning of literary texts entails not 
oQO\ tKe “dLsFover\ oI tKe XQIorPXOated” tKroXgK tKe aFtLve LPagLQatLoQ 
of the reader (the process of ideation), but also the possibility of the 
reader
s IorPXOatLQg KLPKerseOI aQd LQ tKLs Za\ “dLsFover>LQg@ ZKat 
Kad prevLoXsO\ seePed to eOXde >oQe
s@ FoQsFLoXsQess” () ,Q tKe 
possLELOLt\ to “IorPXOate tKe XQIorPXOated” Ze FaQ tKLQN oI tKe eveQt oI 
reading as a process in which the affective force of pain and violence 
can be experienced.  
 Abel proposes a momentary pause between the pre-reflective 
and reflective level of aesthetic experience for there is a lot to be gained 
in such encounter and perhaps the first steps towards transformation. He 
deILQes aIIeFt as “sets oI IorFes tKat FrLtLFaO OaQgXage Kas Qot \et EeeQ 
able to encounter on their own terms without reducing them to the more 
famLOLar dLsFoXrse oI represeQtatLoQ aQd MXdgPeQt” ($EeO ) ,t Ls 
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important to point out that proposing deferral or suspension of judgment 
(meaning) is not to advocate moral relativism. As Abel remarks: 
 
'eIerraO does Qot PeaQ to “step oXtsLde” as LI oQe ever FoXOd 
fully escape judgment's clutches. Rather, to defer, understood 
LQ tKe PasoFrLtLFaO terPs >«@ Ls to suspend. Attending to the 
event's how suspends the event. Asking how the event works 
and what it does creates a suspenseful rhythm that might 
pedagogically function to slow down the rapid speed of 
judgment ± not in order to escape judgment, but in order to 
examine the value of value itself. (Abel 217-218 italics in the 
original) 
 
 In the same spirit, this study approaches deferral or suspension 
of judgment as creating the possibility of seeing again, of being affected 
by what should indeed affect us. By momentarily refraining from giving 
a familiar meaning to a visual and/ or verbal representation of human 
suffering, one may attempt to look at that image (the material and 
mental image) differently for new ways of seeing potentially render new 
responses. After all, the existing familiar ways of seeing and responses 
are tKe oQes Eased oQ tKe “OLEeraO KXPaQLst (QOLgKteQPeQt tradLtLoQ” 
(Abel 213) that made possible those crimes in the first place. 
 As it was presented in this chapter, both Iser's 
phenomenological approach to the act of reading and affect theory 
XQderstaQd tKe LPportaQFe oI a t\pe oI FogQLtLoQ tKat Ls “pre-
predLFatLve” aQd “sXEFoQsFLoXs” (,ser ) ,Q ,ser
s approaFK tKe 
reading of literary texts requires a type of cognition that accesses objects 
through imagination and creativity. Different from perception ± which 
requires the actual presence of the object ± LdeatLoQ “depeQds XpoQ Lts 
>tKe oEMeFt
s@ aEseQFe or QoQe[LsteQFe” () $QaOogoXs to ,ser
s 
definition of the experience of reading a literary text we find the 
importance given by affect theory to the non-verbal and non-conscious 
dLPeQsLoQ oI e[perLeQFe a spaFe tKat “Ls Qot ZLtKoXt LQteOOLgeQFe >«@ 
EXt a dLIIereQt NLQd oI LQteOOLgeQFe aEoXt tKe ZorOd” (3apoXOLas aQd 
Callard 34).  
 In the encounter of these two conceptualizations one may find a 
way for a reading of Beloved, Push, and The Dew Breaker in terms of 
how the deferral of truth LQ vLoOeQt QarratLves IorFes Xs “to gLve 
ourselves over to a moment of violence, namely, the violence of 
seQsatLoQ” ($EeO ) 7Ke dereaOL]atLoQ oI FoQsFLoXsQess dXe to tKe 
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infliction of bodily pain, as Scarry suggests, is translated via the 
aesthetic register into a violent reading experience. By deferring truth 
and meaning, the literary narrative proposes new ways of seeing again 
and, hopefully, engages the reader's imagination and creativity towards 
reflection. 
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3. Imagining Black Pain 
 In this chapter I engage with the articulation of emotions and 
knowledge, that is, the cognitive dimension of emotions. Although affect 
theory aims at an understanding of the inseparable relation between our 
objective and subjective responses - “LQ e[Fess oI FoQsFLoXsQess” 
(Clough 2007: 02) - it remains a difficult concept to be identified and 
discussed. What I try to do here Ls to OooN at tKe “PaterLaOLt\ oI aIIeFt” 
(Ball 2000: 27) and the production of bodily capacities to affect and be 
aIIeFted (&OoXgK) , Xse tKe essa\ “*:7:” ZrLtteQ E\ +LOtoQ $Os Ior 
the exhibition catalog of Without Sanctuary Lynching Photography in 
America (2004), as an example of how the representation of suffering 
holds the potential to affect readers and viewers, and how such 
representation is structured by hegemonic discourses informing affective 
investments and encounters. I follow that discussion with an example of 
how literary representations of suffering can engender different modes 
of response by destabilizing reader's familiar reactions when a 
momentary pause (Abel) and reflection (Sontag) are required.  
 
3.1 Authenticity in the Representation of Suffering 
 When asked to write an essay for the exhibition catalog of 
Without Sanctuary, Hilton Als, a staff writer for The New Yorker, 
TXestLoQed LI KLs LQFOXsLoQ LQ tKe FataOog “as tKe QearO\ aKLstorLFaO 
“O\rLFaO” voLFe” ZoXOd Kave EeeQ sXggested LI Ke Zere Qot “a 1egro” 
$Os asNs “2r aP , “O\rLFaO” aQd aKLstorLFaO EeFaXse , aP a 1egro"” aQd 
Oater Ke sa\s tKat tKere Kave EeeQ tLPes ZKeQ Ke Ls “paLd to Ee a 1egro 
oQ tKe page” ($Os  ) +e OastO\ FoQFOXdes “:K\ does a FoOored 
point of view authenticate them, no matter what the colored person has 
to sa\"” () )or $Os tKe dLspOa\ oI O\QFKLQg pKotograpK\ rePLQded 
him of what it means to be a black man in the United States ± a 
discomfort and frustration he believes is shared by every other 
American.  
In American culture, ideologies of masculinity are articulated 
with discourses of race and nation. The position of the black man lies in 
the tension among ideologies of gender shaping the structures of thought 
and feeling in the work of black male intellectuals ± the notion of race 
man 
16
 -, on the one hand, and the politics of gender at work in 
                                                 
16
 Hazel Carby recalls the emergence of social types, one of which was the race man, as the 
resXOt oI tKe pXrsXLt oI “raFe FoQsFLoXsQess raFe prLde aQd raFe soOLdarLt\” She identifies 
in St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton's work in Black Metropolis in 1945 the first attempt 
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representation of particular male bodies, on the other (Carby 1998).  
 For Als, the photos do not reveal anything about the victims 
“e[Fept tKeLr oEvLoXs paLQ” aQd Lt Ls tKe paLQIXO KLstor\ oI raFLaO terror 
that transforms Als existence and daily life. Ordinary episodes like being 
suspected of robbery, of hijacking a car simply for being a black man in 
the wrong place at the wrong time, or delaying his walking in order to 
avoid being closer to a white woman, whom he believes he might scare, 
are examples of how this painful history has shaped his behavior and 
choices. For Als, the history of lynching photography is a part of the 
history and the meaning of being an African-American man - “too Ead 
ZKeQ vLoOeQt deatKs deILQe ZKo \oX are” ()  
 Als' reactions echoed the feelings of several writers, or as he 
QaPes Lt “O\rLFaO voLFes” ZKo are e[peFted to NQoZ ZKat sXIIerLQg Ls 
to know how racism affects one's life and relationships, and to be able to 
talk and write about it in a compelling passionate way. Als defines such 
requests (in his personal experience a request from white audiences and 
pXEOLsKers) as tKe Ldea oI “EeLQg ZatFKed” as a “QLgger” 
 
In writing this, I have become a cliché, another colored 
persoQ ZrLtLQg aEoXt a QLgger¶s OLIe 6o doLQg ,¶P IeedLQg 
somewhat, into what the essayist George W. S. Trow has 
FaOOed “ZKLte eXpKorLa” ZKLFK Ls deILQed E\ ZKLte peopOe 
exercising their largesse in my face as they say, Tell me about 
\oXrseOI PeaQLQg 7eOO Pe KoZ \oX¶ve sXIIered ,sQ¶t tKat 
what you people do? Suffer nobly, poetically sometimes 
eveQ" 'oesQ¶t sXIIerLQg deILQe \oX" , Kate seeLQg tKLs aQd 
yet it is what I am meant to write, since I accepted the 
assLgQPeQt aP “oI tKe good” aQd ZaQt to NQoZ ZK\ tKese 
pictures, let alone events, have caused me pain. (Als 40) 
 
 The lynchings killed, according to official records, 4,472 
African Americans between 1892 and 1968. In 1890, 75% of lynching 
victims were black. In the beginning of the twentieth century, this 
                                                                                                       
at understanding tKe Ldea oI a raFe PaQ ,Q Ker Zords “
5aFe FoQsFLoXsQess
 tKe\ asserted 

Ls Qot tKe ZorN oI µagLtators¶ or µsXEversLve LQIOXeQFes¶²it is forced upon Negroes by the 
very fact of their separate-subordinate status in American life.' Since emancipation, Drake 
and Cayton argue, black people have had to prove, actively and consistently, that they were 
not the inferior beings that their status as second-class citizens declared them to be: hence 
an aggressive demonstration of their superiority in some field of achievement, either 
individually or collectively, was what established race pride: 'the success of one Negro' 
Zas LQterpreted as 
tKe sXFFess oI aOO
” ( )  
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percentage increased to 90% or more - from 1899 to 1903, of the 543 
recorded deaths, 27 were of whites. The practice of collective lynching 
rLtXaOs reIOeFted a FoPPXQLt\¶s toOeraQFe to FoOOeFtLve vLoOeQFe against 
any individual who was accused of committing an unacceptable offense 
against the community, which ultimately became a form of racial terror 
(Fredrickson 2004: 124; Litwack 2004: 24-25): 
 
Whereas private lynchings symbolized the prowess that 
individual white man enjoyed over all African Americans, 
communal lynching in the New South symbolized the 
FoOOeFtLve doPLQatLoQ oI oQe raFLaO groXp over aQotKer >«@ 
One of the most arresting aspects of communal lynching was 
tKe Era]eQ “FoQIessLoQaO” spLrLt tKat lynch mobs confidently 
exuded in public spaces. Indeed, it is the absence of masks 
that stands out. Invariably claiming that they were defending 
ZKLte ZoPeQ IroP “tKe EOaFN-Eeast rapLst” ZKLte 
Southerners approached the task of public murder with 
astonishing equanimity, confident that neither secular 
authorities nor their Christian God would take offense at their 
deeds. (Evans 2009: 08) 
 
Ivan Evans in Cultures of violence: Lynching and Racial Killing 
in South Africa and the American South (2009) argues that albeit the 
inhumanity of slavery contributed to the practice of lynching of African 
Americans in the New South, a unique characteristic of it was the 
deveOopPeQt oI a “O\QFK FXOtXre” () )or (vaQs tKere are tZo 
important elements of racial violence in the United States, which shaped 
its peculiarity (as opposed to racial violence in South Africa or in other 
countries).   
Firstly, prior to the Civil War, nearly all victims of lynching 
were white men. According to Vron Ware in Beyond the Pale: White 
Women, Racism and History (1992), in its origin, lynching had been 
devised by a Quaker political leader named Charles Lynch, during the 
$PerLFaQ 5evoOXtLoQ to restraLQ FrLPLQaOLt\ LQ a FoPPXQLt\ “ZKLFK 
was two hundred miles away from the nearest court of laZ”() 7Ke 
accused person was given a chance to defend him/herself in a 
community trial, in which a group of people decided what punishment 
was appropriate to the crime. This was a practice common in the South 
and it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that the accused 
ones were killed (170-171).  
The practice of killing untried suspects as a means of political 
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administration developed in the South twenty years after the end of the 
&LvLO :ar “oQe ZKLFK partLFXOarO\ aIIeFted EOaFN peopOe” (). The 
social and economic disintegration of the New South, aggravated by the 
recession, reinforced racialist ideas about black behavior, deprivation 
and pathology ± now informed by scientific theories of racial difference 
± and, by the last decade of nineteenth century, lynchings of black 
individuals had become a regular practice of racial terror.  
Secondly, according to Evans, it was not common for white 
people to punish and/or kill slaves who belonged to other slave owners. 
Slaves who were accused of criPes Zere “FKarged aQd aFTXLtted” LQ 
Southern courts of law. Yet, as both Evans and Ware have shown, a 
practice of lynching as a form of racial terror developed after the end of 
tKe &LvLO :ar 7Ke “rLgKt to O\QFK” EeFaPe aQ LPportaQt IeatXre oI 
Southern white men, and sheriffs and jailers would risk their lives 
whenever they attempted to break and stop lynch mobs. Personal 
eQFoXQters aQd reOatLoQsKLps Zere sKaped E\ a “O\QFK tKreat” aQd Lts 
pervasiveness account for killings of people who were proved to be 
innocent or, even worse, rumours of a crime quickly mobilized people in 
search of a guilty person, who was taken by the lynch mob without any 
evidence of its participation or even presence in the location of the 
alleged crime.  
7KLs sKadoZ\ preseQFe oI “O\QFK tKreat” aQd Lts s\PEoOLsP LQ 
African American literature is well illustrated by Richard Wright in the 
essa\ “+oZ %Lgger Zas EorQ” () :rLgKt LQsLsts tKat KLs LQspLratLoQ 
for the character Bigger Thomas in Native Son (1940) was based on 
many individXaOs ZKLte aQd EOaFN tKe “$PerLFaQ prodXFt” (:rLgKt 
1991: 866) of Bigger Thomases.   
 
Any Negro who has lived in the North or the South knows 
that times without number he has heard of some Negro boy 
being picked up on the streets and carted off to jail and 
FKarged ZLtK “rape” 7KLs tKLQg KappeQs so oIteQ tKat to P\ 
PLQd Lt Kad EeFoPe a represeQtatLve s\PEoO oI tKe 1egro¶s 
uncertain position in America. Never for a second was I in 
doubt as to what kind of social reality or dramatic situation 
,¶d pXt %Lgger in, what kind of test-tXEe OLIe ,¶d set Xp to 
evoke his deepest reactions. Life has made the plot over and 
over again, to the extent that I knew it by heart. (874)  
 
 
The gruelling aspects of lynching rituals ± from justifications to 
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details of how the victims were tortured ± were told in the oral and 
written reports: the practice of severing body parts, including sexual 
organs that became souvenirs to participants and spectators. However, 
one aspect of the rituals, better revealed through the photographs, is the 
presence of crowds of spectators. Both the participants and spectators 
pose as respectable citizens filled with righteousness and satisfaction. 
Lynchings were often advertised a day or two in advance, sometimes 
even to surrounding towns. On some occasions, tickets to the event were 
sold, photographs were taken by a professional photographer (to be later 
sold as postcards), and spectators would fight to get a souvenir, that is, a 
piece cut off the victim's remains. The local press usually covered 
lynchings in detail (Ware 171; Litwack 08-12). 
 The notes on the plates by James Allen in the end of Without 
Sanctuary help to understand how and why the photographs were taken. 
The majority of the photographs were taken for commercial purposes ± 
to be sold as keepsakes and turned into postcards for the audience. The 
pOates aOso reteOO tKe oIILFLaO poOLFe reports aQd OoFaO QeZspapers¶ 
desFrLptLoQs oI tKe reasoQs tKat Oed to tKe PoE¶s Kate 6oPe e[aPpOes 
illustrate the participation of local authorities as well as their incapacity 
to avoid and punish the enraged crowds: 
 
Local and state officials expressed mixed reaction to news of 
the lynching. District Attorney James Davis declared that he 
ZoXOd opeQ aQ LQvestLgatLoQ aQd “do everything the law 
requires to apprehend members of the mob” 2Q tKe otKer 
hand, the California attorney general, referring to the recently 
delayed execution of an accused murderer, stated that the 
“uncontrollable unrest” Zas a QatXraO resXOt oI tKe “apathy of 
the Supreme Court of the United States” ( LtaOLFs LQ tKe 
original) 
 
The Enfaula Democrat reParNed “The mobsters made no 
attempt to conceal their identity... but there were no 
prosecutions.”( LtaOLFs LQ tKe orLgLQaO) 
 
The authorities in North Carolina, alarmed at the scope of the 
PoE¶s vLoOeQFe tooN XQXsXaO steps to pXQLsK Lts Oeaders $Iter 
the governor ordered the National Guard to restore order, 
local officials arrested more that two dozen suspected 
leaders. One of the killers, George Hall, was convicted and 
sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor in the state 
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penitentiary. The New York Times predicted that, by taking 
tKese PeasXres 1ortK &aroOLQa¶s *overQor *OeQQ Zas Qot 
improving his political prospects. (170) 
 
District Judge Caruthers convened a grand jury in June 1911 
to investigate the lynching of the Negro woman and her son. 
,Q KLs LQstrXFtLoQs to tKe MXr\ Ke saLd “The people of the 
state have said by recently adopted constitutional provision 
that the race to which the unfortunate victims belonged 
should in large measure be divorced from participation in 
our political contests, because of their known racial 
inferiority and their dependent credulity, which very 
characteristic made them mere tool of the designing and 
cunning. It is well known that I heartily concur in this 
constitutional SroYision of the SeoSle¶s will. 7he more then 
does the duty devolve upon us of a superior race and of a 
greater intelligence to protect this weaker race from 
unjustifiable and lawless attacks.” ( LtaOLFs LQ tKe orLgLQaO) 
 
$PerLFa¶s QeZspapers, while decrying the savage brutality of 
the lynch mobs, in general gave only a loosely detailed, 
ultimately sympathetic reports that absolved the communities 
and officials of any collusion or guilt. 
>@ 2Qe e[traFt IroP a OoFaO QeZspaper “7Ke Zork of the 
lynching party was executed with silent precision that makes 
Lt appear as a Paster pLeFe oI pOaQQLQg” “:KLOe tKe geQeraO 
sentiment is adverse to the method, it is generally thought 
that the Negroes got what would have been due them under 
process oI OaZ” () 
 
 The extracts above convey some of the various facets of 
O\QFKLQg LQ tKe FoOOeFtLve LPagLQatLoQ IroP a seQse oI “MXstLFe ZLtK 
oQe¶s oZQ KaQds” to tKe EeOLeI LQ tKe sXperLorLt\ aQd tKe LQIerLorLt\ oI 
raFes to a poOLtLFLaQ¶s popXOarLt\ EeLQg at staNe 2Qe¶s sNLQ FoOor Zas 
OLQNed to oQe¶s Iate aQd O\QFKLQgs Zere aQ e[aPpOe oI KoZ black 
became synonymous with danger. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
the practice of lynching became a form of racial terror and lynch victims 
came to be used as symbolic stand-ins for the community and ideals 
they were seen to represent (Evans 9-10). White fear was based on the 
assumption that most lynchings were a response to sexual assault, and it 
was this assumption that made people condone the action of lynch 
mobs, either verbally approving or by remaining silent (Ware 172). 
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However, in many cases, reports of sexual assault were proved baseless 
or XpoQ FOoser e[aPLQatLoQ tKe reports reveaOed oQO\ tKat “a EOaFN PaOe 
had broken the rules of racial etiquette, had behaved in a manner 
construed as a racial insult, or had violated the bar in consensual 
LQterraFLaO se[” (/LtZaFN ) )or 5oEert .Xr] “tKe eIIort to persoQLI\ 
evLO as a PeaQs to PaLQtaLQ KLerarFKLFaO strXFtXres” Ls at tKe Fore oI 
politics in modern society (Kurz 2001). A collective hysteria is thus 
created when evil takes the form of human beings inhabiting or 
transiting in what were once believed to be safe communities (Alonso 
and Fuks 2005). After investigating reports of lynchings, Walter White 
caOOed “tKe 6oXtKerQ ZKLte ZoPaQ¶s proQeQess to K\sterLa ZKere 
1egroes are FoQFerQed” tKe EasLs Ior LPagLQed sLtXatLoQs ratKer tKaQ 
actual sexual assaults. Illusory situations in which innocent white and 
black men were accused and murdered in the name of the sanctity of 
ZKLte ZoPaQKood “+avLQg Freated tKe )raQNeQsteLQ PoQster” :aOter 
:KLte FoQFOXded “tKe O\QFKer OLves LQ FoQstaQt Iear oI KLs oZn 
FreatLoQ” (:KLte  )  
 In the foreword to Without Sanctuary the congressman John 
Lewis draws attention to the importance of displaying the photographs 
as rePePEraQFe aQd LQspLratLoQ to “Xs tKe OLvLQg aQd as \et XQEorQ 
generations, to be more compassionate, loving, and caring. We must 
preveQt aQ\tKLQg OLNe tKLs IroP ever KappeQLQg agaLQ” (/eZLs  ) 
Nonetheless, against the will to remember part of a cruel past in order to 
elicit compassion in those who look at the pictures, other authors ± such 
as Hilton Als  ± do Qot EeOLeve LQ tKe e[KLELtLoQ¶s poZer to FKaQge or stLr 
feelings ± or that such change might be relevant in some way. Brent 
6tapOes FoQFOXdes tKat “tKe XOtLPate eIIeFt oI KavLQg tKese KorreQdoXs 
pictures loose in the culture might be to normalize images that are in 
IaFt KorrLEOe” ()redrLFNsoQ ) :KLOe Ior soPe tKe dLspOa\ oI tKese 
pictures works as some sort of shock therapy against racism and bigotry, 
for others it works as a remembrance and promulgation of pain to black 
people.  
 George M. Fredrickson in a critical review of the catalogue 
Without Sanctuary recalls the arguments of the historian Leon F. 
Litwack about the nature and behavior of the crowd that watched the 
lynchings. For Litwack, the behavior of the audience reveals less a 
PaQLIestatLoQ oI FertaLQ LQdLvLdXaOs¶ LQsaQLt\ aQd EarEarLsP tKaQ a EeOLeI 
in a system that defines one people as less human than others. 
Furthermore, the wish to display these photographs is placed between 
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“FaterLQg to vo\eXrLstLF appetLtes” aQd “perpetXatLQg LPages oI EOaFN 
vLFtLPL]atLoQ” () 1oQetKeOess Ior )redrLFNsoQ (as ZeOO as Ior $Os 
and Staples), /LtZaFN¶s FrLtLTXe (preseQt LQ tKe FataOog) does Qot address 
the issue of the relevance and consequence of exhibiting these 
photographs. For Fredrickson, it is possible that the representation of 
black people as unresisting victims ± “deprLved oI ever\ sKred of human 
dignity, sometimes literally emasculated, and ultimately reduced to dead 
Peat at tKe eQd oI a rope or to asKes” () ± continues to devalue black 
people in the mind of those whites who cannot conceive of such horror 
and brutality on someone who did not somehow deserve it. Despite 
EeOLevLQg LQ tKe Qeed to “rePePEer tKe past” tKe aXtKor PaLQtaLQs KLs 
questioning regarding the efficacy of this catalogue in helping to 
proPote tKe PePor\ oI raFLsP¶s grXesoPe eIIeFts LQ tKe $PerLFaQ 
society.  
 In Without Sanctuary, a racialized subjectivity is brought into 
being through visual representation and verbal narration of extreme 
violent acts. As Hilton Als says, watching the photographs has caused 
him pain. And it is this pain that is asked to be translated, to be written 
about, to be represented in images, in music, in narratives. 
 I want to take this point and go back to Als questioning of his 
collaboration with the catalogue of Without Sanctuary. When Als is 
asked to write about black people's suffering, no one is assuming he has 
experienced physical pain, or that he has had a similar experience to the 
victims of the photographs. However, by asking Als to talk about black 
people's suffering, it is assumed that he can identify with the suffering 
and thus could talk about such experience because he is black ± which is 
the very point he makes regarding authentication. The task (also the job) 
Als accepted and his reaction to it illustrates how pain and suffering 
stand in as tropes for blackness. 
 Karla FC Holloway in Passed On: African American Mourning 
Stories (2003) analyzes stories of death and of dying in the African 
America of the twentieth century arguing about the important role 
pOa\ed E\ ZKat sKe QaPes “EOaFN deatK” LQ KoZ $IrLFaQ-American 
culture both represents itself and is represented. As Holloway puts it, 
black death is a cultural haunting, a collective cultural memory of the 
vulnerabilities of African-Americans inserted in a racial structure that 
LQQXPeroXs tLPes FoQIerred tKeP a “FoOor-coded deatK” () 7Ke 
association of lynching with “EOaFN preseQFe ratKer tKaQ EOaFN FoQdXFt 
LQFXOFated tKLs seQse oI vXOQeraELOLt\ >«@ aQd Lt Zas tKe FoPPoQ 
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understanding of that vulnerability, whether one was directly affected by 
this violence or just afraid of it, that forged a cultural association 
EetZeeQ FoOor aQd deatK” ()  
 , ZaQt to taNe +oOOoZa\¶s tKesLs oI a discourse created 
departing from the memory of a past of suffering and pain, or as she 
LdeQtLILes LQ storLes ZKere “soPe QotLoQ oI raFLaO PePor\ and racial 
reaOL]atLoQ Ls PedLated tKroXgK tKe veLO oI deatK” () aQd Xse +LOtoQ 
$Os¶ te[t as LOOXstratLve oI tKLs “FXOtXraO assoFLatLoQ” ,Q tKe IoOOoZLQg 
discussion, I use the idea of affective attunement and affect aftereffects 
as methodological tools in order to critique the formation of racialized 
subjectivities.   
 
3.2 Constructing Affectivity and Subjectivity 
Raymond Williams in Marxism and Literature (1977/2007) 
proposes two significant concepts that are present in the processes of 
identification: selective tradition and structures of feeling. Williams 
distinguishes three aspects of any cultural process - traditions, 
institutions, and formations - and he identifies tradition as EeLQg “tKe 
Post poZerIXO praFtLFaO PeaQs oI LQForporatLoQ” () +oZever, as he 
stresses, it is not a tradition per se but a selective tradition tKat Ls “aQ 
intentionally selective version of a shaping past and a pre-shaped 
preseQt” () ZKLFK Ls aFtLveO\ at staNe LQ proFesses oI soFLaO aQd 
cultural identification. In terms of African American identities, the 
QotLoQ oI a seOeFtLve versLoQ oI oQe¶s seOI aQd oQe¶s KLstor\ ZKLFK LQ 
turn, is based on a collectivity, is what is criticized by Als, Fredrickson, 
Staples.   
 
0ost versLoQs oI “tradLtLoQ” FaQ Ee TXLFNO\ sKoZQ to be 
radically selective. From a whole possible area of past and 
present, in a particular culture, certain meanings and 
practices are selected for emphasis and certain other 
meanings and practices are neglected or excluded. Yet, within 
a particular hegemony, and as one of its decisive processes, 
this selection is presented and usually successfully passed off 
as “tKe tradLtLoQ” “tKe sLgQLILFaQt past” :Kat Kas tKeQ to Ee 
said about any tradition is that it is in this sense an aspect of 
contemporary social and cultural organization, in the interest 
of the dominance of a specific class. It is a version of the past 
which is intended to connect with and ratify the present. 
What it offers in practice is a sense of predisposed continuity. 
(Williams 1281) 
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It is the QotLoQ oI “predLsposed FoQtLQXLt\” tKat EotKers $Os aQd 
others who criticize the purpose of the exhibition. What is being selected 
is suffering and race as interchangeable signified and signifier that is not 
contextualized but simply authenticated by an individual's skin color. 
The general and collective overpower the personal and private, or better, 
it excludes the personal. Williams continues: 
 
If the social is always past, in the sense that it is always 
formed, we have indeed to find other terms for the 
undeniable experience of the present: not only the temporal 
present, the realization of this and this instant, but the 
specificity of present being, the inalienably physical, within 
which we may indeed discern and acknowledge institutions, 
formations, positions, but not always as fixed products, 
defining products. And then if the social is the fixed and the 
explicit ± the known relationships, institutions, formations, 
positions ± all that is present and moving, all that escapes or 
seems to escape from the fixed and the explicit and the 
known, is grasped and defined as the personal: this, here, 
QoZ aOLve aFtLve “sXEMeFtLve” ()  
  
 Williams brings forth the importance of what exceeds the fixed 
and defined in experience, which he identifies as the subjective. It is 
indeed this sense of movement and what is not yet formed that allows 
for changes and transformations. Because it is still happening, what is 
being lived is difficult to grasp or even to be identified. Nevertheless, 
the movement of the present, of the active experience of the lived 
present, renders small changes. These are, in Williams words, 
 
social in two ways that distinguish them from reduced senses 
of the social as the institutional and the formal: first, in that 
they are changes of presence (while they are being lived this 
is obvious; when they have been lived it is still their 
substantial characteristic); second, in that although they are 
emergent or pre-emergent, they do not have to await 
definition, classification, or rationalization before they exert 
palpable pressures and set effective limits on experience and 
on action. Such changes can be defined as changes in 
structures of feeling” () 
 
 And here I come to what I believe is crucial in my discussion. 
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What Williams names structures of feeling is a notion that allows for an 
analysis of culture and society that moves beyond fixed definitions of an 
ideally defined object of study. It refers to social experiences and how 
structures of feeling are changes still in process and perhaps not yet 
recognized, identified, named, or categorized. It allows for the inclusion 
or tKe draZLQg oI oQe
s atteQtLoQ to “aIIeFtLve eOePeQts oI FoQsFLoXsQess 
and relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and 
feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living 
aQd LQterreOatLQg FoQtLQXLt\” ()   
Kathleen Stewart in Ordinary Affects (2007) proposes an 
approaFK to soFLaOLt\ IoFXsed oQ “IorFes tKat FoPe LQto vLeZ as KaELt or 
shock, resonance or impact. Something throws itself together in a 
moment as an event and a sensation; a something both animated and 
LQKaELtaEOe” () )or 6teZart tKe QotLoQ oI strXFtXred s\stePs “oI 
ZKLFK ever\tKLQg Ls aOZa\s aOread\ soPeKoZ part” IaLOs to desFrLEe tKe 
present because, although they name real and pressing forces, they end 
Xp OooNLQg OLNe “dead eIIeFts” OosLQg tKeLr aFtXaO “LPPaQeQt IorFe” ()   
 
The ordinary is a shifting assemblage of practices and 
practical knowledges, a scene of both liveness and 
exhaustion, a dream of escape or of the simple life. Ordinary 
affects are the varied, surging capacities to affect and to be 
affected that give everyday life the quality of continual 
motion of relations, scenes, contingencies, and emergences. 
They are things that happen. They happen in impulses, 
sensations, expectations, daydreams, encounters, and habits 
of relating, in strategies and their failures, in forms of 
persuasion, contagion, and compulsion, in modes of 
attention, attachment, and agency, and in public and social 
worlds of all kinds that catch people up in something that 
feels like sometKLQg” (-02) 
 
 Stewart compiles brief personal stories in Ordinary Affects in 
order to reflect on how intimate experiences of emotion and public 
feelings circulate connecting bodies and individuals to the world (and 
vLFe versa)  $NLQ to :LOOLaPs
 strXFtXres oI IeeOLQg ordLQar\ aIIeFts “do 
not have to await definition, classification, or rationalization before they 
exert palpable pressures and set effective limits on experience and on 
actioQ” (:LOOLaPs ) +eQFeIortK 6teZart Ls LQterested LQ KoZ 
aIIeFts Pove aQd LQteraFt tKroXgK “EodLes dreaPs draPas aQd soFLaO 
ZorOdLQgs oI aOO NLQds” Qot tKroXgK PeaQLQgs or deILQLte represeQtatLoQs 
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EXt tKroXgK tKe “LQteQsLtLes tKe\ EXLOd aQd LQ ZKat thoughts and feelings 
tKe\ PaNe possLEOe” ()  
 In the same spirit, I want to think of potential modes of 
knowing and relating to things and people that are not easily identified 
as objects or easily named as a structuring force but which are, 
nevertheless, materialized in bodies and interactions. Or better, what 
kinds of forces resonate in bodies and in relationships. However, before 
I move forward, it is important to posit the notion of the cultural politics 
of affect. Similar to Clare Hemmings (2005), Stewart draws attention to 
the cultural uses of affective attunement.  
 
The politics of ordinary affect can be anything from the split 
second when police decide to shoot someone because he's 
black and standing in a dark doorway and has something in 
his hand, to a moment when someone falls in love with 
someone else who's just come into view. Obviously, the 
differences matter. The politics of any surge depends on 
where it might go. What happens. How it plays itself out and 
in whose hands. 
Ideologies happen. Power snaps into place. Structures grow 
entrenched. Identities take place. Ways of knowing become 
habitual at the drop of a hat. But it's ordinary affects that give 
things the quality of a something to inhabit and animate. (15) 
 
 It is the making sense of aIIeFt (+ePPLQgs) or KoZ “Za\s oI 
NQoZLQg EeFoPe KaELtXaO” tKat , ILQd to Ee tKe FrX[ oI tKe Patter LQ P\ 
work, once it is what simultaneously maintains and breaks through the 
practices of racialization and racism. The cognitive force of violent 
affects are deeply ingrained in narratives which display the intricate 
relation between embodiment, affect and knowledge. In the cultural 
politics of racial identities, borrowing from Stewart's terminology, 
“ordLQar\ aIIeFts” resoQate E\ dePaQdLQg LQdLvLdXaOs
 reFognition of 
something shared. Such recognition might be momentary and its 
sensation of distinct forms. But either way, as Stewart highlights,  
 
a charge passes through the body and lingers for a little while 
as an irritation, confusion, judgment, thrill, or musing. 
However it strikes us, its significance jumps. Its visceral 
force keys a search to make sense of it, to incorporate it into 
an order of meaning. But it lives first as an actual charge 
immanent to acts and scenes ± a relay (39). 
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 I want to include Karyn Ball's critique of the academic field of 
trauma studies as a complement to the meeting of Williams' argument 
with the notion of affect. Ball understands that an affective response to a 
situation can be a structure of feeling, that is, it can be a small change in 
tKe OLvLQg proFess oI tKe preseQt ,Q “7raXPa aQd ,ts ,QstLtXtLoQaO 
'estLQLes” %aOO LQtrodXFes tKe FoOOeFtLoQ oI artLFOes Ior tKe voOXPe 
entitled Trauma and Its Cultural Aftereffects (2000) in which she makes 
a brief review of the field of trauma studies at the end of the nineties ± a 
moment in which sKe LdeQtLILes a “reFeQt preoFFXpatLoQ aPoQg FXOtXraO 
critics with the circulation of feelings and moods as a structural 
FoPpoQeQt oI soFLopoOLtLFaO IorPatLoQs aQd FXOtXraO pKeQoPeQa” ()
 For BaOO traXPa stXdLes Ls LtseOI “a soFLaO IorPatLoQ tKat 
PaterLaOL]es a strXFtXre oI IeeOLQg”
17
 that wishes to reflect on the 
“PaterLaOLt\ oI aIIeFt” aQd XQdo tKe EarrLers tKat dLvLde tKe sXEMeFtLve 
and objective dimensions of existence (28). In her discussion of the 
notion of structures of feeling, Ball stresses Williams' criticism at critical 
PetKods tKat dLsPLss tKe “importance of affect when it distinguishes the 
subjective from the objective, experience from belief, feeling from 
thought, the immediate from the general, and the personal from the 
soFLaO” () ,Qstead LQspLred E\ :LOOLaPs %aOO proposes tKat Ze draZ 
our attention to how  
 
residues of the past cling to the present in the form of 
particular moods and emotions that actively circulate and 
may become concentrated, articulated, and organized in a 
variety of interconnected discursive and cultural formations. 
The effects of these formations are subsequently materialized 
in the beliefs and bodies of individuals and groups, in the 
policies of institutions, as well as in the imagery circulated by 
popular culture and the media. (Ball 28) 
 
                                                 
17
 Ball refers to the debate within cultural studies between the proponents of identity politics 
aQd tKe “postKXPaQLst” FXOtXraO FrLtLFs ,Q Ker Zords “I have argued that the apparent 
necessity of studying traumatic memory arose at a recent juncture in cultural studies when 
the multiculturalist proponents of identity politics found themselves at odds with the 
poststructuralist and post-Maxist perspectives that had partially enabled their own 
discourse. Following Williams, I want to name the affective response to this situation a 
“strXFtXre oI IeeOLQg” LQsoIar as Lt geQerated a FertaLQ seOI-preservative recalcitrance 
among those of us who, for historical and personal reasons, were not willing to toss out the 
ePpLrLFaO EasLs oI LdeQtLt\ poOLtLFs so TXLFNO\” () 
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 Ball finds in traumatic memory one way of talking about 
“aIIeFtLve aIterPatK oI oppressLoQ ZLtKoXt reFoXrse to LdeaOLst QotLoQs oI 
FoKereQt LdeQtLt\ aQd “aXtKeQtLF” e[perLeQFe” () ,Qstead oI IoFXsLQg 
on the experience of oppression, Ball focuses on memories and 
acknowledges their rhetorical function as signs that are shaped by the 
FoQtLQgeQFLes oI LQterpretatLoQ ,Q tKLs Za\ sKe proposes tKat “E\ 
highlighting the aftereffects of the past as they play themselves out in 
the cultural sphere, the institutionalization of trauma studies may 
provide cultural critics with a paradigm for attending to structures of 
IeeOLQg” ()  
 Ball acknowledges the significance of narrativization and 
interpretation of past events. In literature we have the fictionalization of 
known stories, of a shared memory and history of a people and of a 
nation. If we take Williams' notion of structures of feeling we could say 
that these known stories and shared memories are fictionalized with 
certain expectations from the audience of readers in the sense of what 
%eQedLFt $QdersoQ Kas FaOOed aQ “LPagLQed FoPPXQLt\”
18
. The issue of 
identity politics plus the revision of history and memory put authors and 
readers ± along with characters ± in the same loop of affect.  
 Ron Eyerman in Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation 
of African American Identity (2001) discusses the articulation of 
African-American identity in the end of the nineteenth century through 
the artistic representations of the memory of slavery. By looking at the 
past, Black intellectuals grounded African-American identity and 
institutionalized it in organizations such as the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), founded in 1909. In 
(\erPaQ
s Zords “,I sOaver\ Zas traXPatLF Ior tKLs geQeratLoQ oI 
intellectuals, it was so in retrospect, mediated through recollection and 
reflection, and, for some, tinged with some strategic, practical, and 
poOLtLFaO LQterest” ().   
 In this way, Eyerman discusses the representation of the 
memory of slavery through the concept of cultural trauma. While the 
terPs ps\FKoOogLFaO aQd pK\sLFaO traXPa LQvoOve “a ZoXQd aQd tKe 
e[perLeQFe oI great ePotLoQaO aQgXLsK E\ aQ LQdLvLdXaO” (\erman 
                                                 
18
 Regarding African American memory and history, W.E.B. Du Bois' The Souls of Black 
Folk helped creating a genealogy for an imagined community. As Hazel Carby has put it: 
“tKroXgK Lts represeQtatLoQs oI LQdLvLdXaOs 'X %oLs¶s EooN aLPs to ErLQg LQto EeLQg a 
community. Imaginatively, he forges a people from his articulation of the material terms of 
tKeLr KLstorLFaO e[LsteQFe” (&arE\  ) 
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XQderstaQds FXOtXraO traXPa as “a draPatLF Ooss oI LdeQtLt\ aQd PeaQLQg 
a tear in the social fabric, affecting a group of people that has achieved 
soPe degree oI FoKesLoQ” () +ere tKe traXPa Ls Qot e[perLeQFed 
directly by any or all members of the community nor is it necessarily 
IeOt $OtKoXgK aQ eveQt Ls estaEOLsKed as tKe “sLgQLILFaQt FaXse” Lts 
traumatic meaning is realized and accepted by its representations and 
mediation in a process that might take time. The cultural trauma is, in 
tKLs Za\ “understood, explained and made coherent through public 
reIOeFtLoQ aQd dLsFoXrse” () ,Q otKer Zords aQ eveQt ZLOO Ee 
represented over and over again until it becomes instilled in the 
collective imaginary. This event, according to Eyerman - here the 
memory of slavery - is constituted by three elements: 1) it is charged 
ZLtK QegatLve aIIeFt ) Lt Ls “represeQted as LQdeOLEOe” aQd ) Lt Ls 
perFeLved as “tKreateQLQg a soFLet\¶s e[LsteQFe or vLoOatLQg oQe or Pore 
of its fundamental cultural presuppositions or groXp
s LdeQtLt\” (-03). 
It is the collective memory of slavery that defines an individual as a 
“raFe PePEer” as 0a\a $QgeOoX Kas pXt Lt 
 Eyerman's understanding of cultural trauma can illuminate my 
argument. Because focused on the mediation and on the imaginative 
reconstruction and creation of the memory of slavery, Eyerman proposes 
that instead of referring to traumatic events, we should refer to traumatic 
affects, for key to cultural trauma is that it requires interpretation of the 
traumatic experience. Because in a cultural trauma the event was not 
experienced directly but, instead, it was mediated through the arts and/or 
tKe PedLa tKere Ls aOZa\s “seOeFtLve FoQstrXFtLoQ aQd represeQtatLoQ” ,Q 
tKLs Za\ FXOtXraO traXPa “aOZa\s eQgages a “PeaQLQg strXggOe” a 
grappOLQg ZLtK aQ eveQt tKat LQvoOves LdeQtLI\LQg tKe “QatXre oI tKe paLQ 
tKe QatXre oI tKe vLFtLP aQd tKe attrLEXtLoQ oI respoQsLELOLt\” () 7Ke 
notions of collective imaginary and of collective memory necessarily 
involve the interaction among individuals and the group. In this dialogic 
process individuals locate themselves, negotiating their position and 
tKeLr FoQtrLEXtLoQ )XrtKerPore tKe Za\ aQ eveQt “Ls rePePEered Ls 
LQtLPateO\ eQtZLQed ZLtK KoZ Lt Ls represeQted” () Lt Ls tKe PeaQs and 
media of representation that connects individuals to the past experience 
(which they might never have experienced) and to its recollection. 
 Returning to Hilton Als, the exhibition Without Sanctuary is 
inserted in the production of a concept of identity ± of American racial 
identities ± informed by the social and cultural aftereffects of the 
national and historical trauma of slavery, the Jim Crow laws, and the 
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.OX .OX[ .OaQ terrorLsP $s Lt Ls FOear LQ $Os¶ te[t aQd LQ tKe IoreZord 
by John Lewis the affective aftermath of racism and racial terror is one 
of the constitutive elements informing American identities. However, 
the polarity of whiteness and blackness is unbalanced in its constraint 
and fixity on blackness. The oppressed and the victim are made highly 
visible as a body (a black body) and the white counterpart is silenced in 
its request to let the victim (in the case of Als, an imagined vicarious 
victim) speak. Als is aware of that as we see in his reaction. As 
mentioned above, Als and Fredrickson feel that the images only 
domesticate what should shock people. Pain and suffering become 
imaginary sites for blackness and, although Als is not denying nor 
underestimating its significance in the construction of African-American 
memory and identity, he is nevertheless questioning its rigidity towards 
blackness. His interrogation at the purpose of the exhibition illustrates 
the idea of affects and emotions that, because structured in racial and 
gendered terms, loses its violent affective force, once there are no 
attempts at destabilizing structures. Pain and suffering become 
unchallenged phenomena in their repeated representation. If the way an 
event “Ls rePePEered Ls LQtLPateO\ eQtZLQed ZLtK KoZ Lt Ls represeQted” 
(Eyerman 12), what Als asks for is a representation of the complexity 
and the wholeness of racism and racial violence; a recollection that 
addresses (or attempts to address) the effects of racial terror and racism 
in the American society. Or borrowing Eyerman's term: how is the 
exhibition of lynFKLQg pKotograpK\ reIerrLQg to tKe “traXPatLF aIIeFts” 
of racial violence and institutionalized segregation? At stake here is the 
question of interpretation of a traumatic event, of viewer's reactions to 
such recollection and mediation, for memory is not located inside the 
PLQd oI LQdLvLdXaOs EXt ratKer “ZLtKLQ tKe dLsFoXrse oI peopOe taONLQg 
togetKer aEoXt tKe past” (5adOe\  )  
 In the interface of memory, cultural trauma and affect, I 
understand interpretation as twofold: there is the rational, logical and 
dialectic dimension and there is the affective and pre-subjective one. 
This notion of interpretation is analogous to the constitution of a 
structure of feeling: the past and the present, the object and the subject, 
the personal and the collective come together. 
 
 
3.3 Affective Encounters, Emotions, and Literary Representations   
 Kathleen Woodward in “7raXPatLF 6KaPe 7oQL 0orrLsoQ 
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7eOevLsXaO &XOtXre aQd tKe &XOtXraO 3oOLtLFs oI tKe (PotLoQs” () 
articulates the affective dimensions of interpretation in her analysis of 
the cultural uses of the emotion of shame in literature and in mass 
culture. Shame, for Woodward, is an emotion experienced by both 
characters and the shamed or ashamed individuals and by the readers 
and those who witness it. While shame is performed in celebrity culture 
used as theme for tabloid news and live television entertainment, 
Woodward identifies in Toni Morrison's novel The Bluest Eye (1970) the 
poteQtLaO Ior “ZKLte readers” EeLQg Poved “to aQ XQderstaQdLQg oI 
racism and thus an insight that is ultimately moral; a cultural poetics is 
at ZorN as ZeOO as a FXOtXraO poOLtLFs oI tKe ePotLoQs” (:oodZard ) 
By contrasting examples from mass media and Morrison's novel 
:oodZard aLPs at aQ XQderstaQdLQg oI sKaPe “as a soFLaO emotion, one 
that is not only interiorized psychologically but also circulates widely in 
FoQtePporar\ FXOtXre” (-213). Woodward wants to understand the 
reOatLoQsKLp EetZeeQ ePotLoQ aQd NQoZOedge ZKat sKe FaOOs “tKe 
FogQLtLve edge oI tKe ePotLoQs” ZLtK focus on traumatic shame, that is, 
“sKaPe tKat FaQQot Ee traQsOated LQto NQoZOedge” ()  
 Woodward initially discusses a passage from Virginia Woolf's A 
Room of One's Own to illustrate her point of how shame can lead to 
knowledge. The passage narrates Woolf's experience at conducting 
research at the British Library and her distress at the realization of how 
much had been written on women by men. Her response to one 
partLFXOar EooN “The Mental, Moral, and Physical Inferiority of Women 
by a Professor von ;” tXrQs Ker dLstress aQd KXPLOLatLoQ LQto aQger  
 
[Anger] referred me unmistakably to the one book, to the one 
phrase, which had aroused the demon; it was the professor's 
statement about the mental, moral and physical inferiority of 
women. My heart had leapt. My cheeks had burnt. I had 
flushed with anger. There was nothing specially remarkable, 
however foolish, in that. One does not like to be told that one 
is naturally inferior of a little man. (Woolf quoted in 
Woodward 215) 
 
)or :oodZard “tKe XQQaPed ePotLoQ oI sKaPe” IeOt E\ tKe 
writer is quickly followed by anger. Woolf's analysis of her emotional 
response (her shame and her anger) to Professor von X's book leads to 
knowledge. She acknowledges and expresses her heated emotional 
reaction and, when her anger subsides, she reflects channelling it 
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towards work - “tKe aQaO\sLs oI tKe XQeTXaO reOatLoQs oI poZer LQ 
patrLarFK\” ()  
 
Shame is brought to consciousness through the medium of 
anger; the treatment of women, which results in the feeling of 
shame, is understood to be unjust. Woolf concludes that the 
attribution of inferiority to women, which is by imputation a 
condition of shame, serves to maintain male superiority. In 
this manner Woolf prefigures contemporary work by feminist 
philosophers who insist on the cognitive dimension of the 
emotions. (216) 
 
Differently, in The Bluest Eye, Woodward does not find “the 
self-reIOe[Lve PodeO oI sKaPe aQd aQger” Qarrated LQ A Room of One's 
Own. The characters in Morrison's novel do not reach an understanding 
“oI tKeLr posLtLoQ LQ soFLet\ LQ terPs oI poZer” tKroXgK tKeLr e[perLeQFe 
oI sKaPe aQd aQger +ere “sKaPe Oeads eLtKer to OaFeratLQg vLoOeQFe or 
to deELOLtatLQg depressLoQ” () aQd sLgQLILFaQtO\ LQ tKe QoveO “sKaPe 
takes on the intense form of racial humiliation or the numbing form of 
pervasive daily racism, resulting either in trauma or chronic 
dLsFrLPLQatLoQ QeLtKer oI ZKLFK FaQ Ee overFoPe” () ,Q sXPPar\ Lt 
Ls tKe raFLaO strXFtXre oI sKaPe tKat PaNes sKaPe “vLrtXaOO\ LPpossLEOe 
to overFoPe” (). 
 &rXFLaO LQ :oodZard¶s argXPeQt Ls KoZ tKe ePotLoQ oI sKaPe 
because part of a racial and gendered structures, can become as well a 
mode of being in the world. In this sense, shame is virtually inherent in 
how one lives and acts in everyday life ± it is tKe eIIeFt oI oQe¶s posLtLoQ 
in racial structure, for instance. Differently from the shame experienced 
E\ :ooOI tKe “pervasLve praFtLFe oI sKaPLQg” () EeFoPes so deepO\ 
ingrained that it is not recognized as a threat to be fought against. Albeit 
shame in Woolf was followed by anger (which triggered a reaction), one 
Pa\ Qot Ee aZare oI sKaPe oQFe sKaPe Pa\ Qot Ee “regLstered as aQ 
LdeQtLILaEOe aQd IeOt ePotLoQ” ,Qstead sKaPe Ls tKe FoQdLtLoQ LQ ZKLFK 
oQe OLves aQd as sXFK Lt Ls “vLrtXaOO\ XQreParNed XQIeOt XQseeQ” () 
The confusion of experiencing everyday racism at the same time not 
XQderstaQdLQg or FoPpreKeQdLQg oQe¶s sLtXatLoQ EeFoPes a Ne\ aspeFt 
oI oQe¶s Pode oI EeLQg LQ tKe ZorOd $s :oodZard argXes tKe traged\ 
of experiencing this split oI oQe¶s FoQsFLoXsQess Ls LOOXstrated E\ tKe 
characters of Cholly and Pecola in The Bluest Eye “,Q a seQse QeLtKer 
character believes him or herself to be inadequate. Pecola, after all, 
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believes that she has finally been granted her wish of blue eyes. Yet, at 
the same time, both know that they are inadequate in the eyes of white 
$PerLFa” ()  
In psychoanalysis, trauma is defined as the numbing and 
shutting down of narrativization (Garland 1998). Psychic confusion, in 
turn, is an effect of trauma because the individual re-experiences 
LsoOatLoQ EroXgKt oQ E\ tKe OoQeOLQess oI PeQtaO FoQIXsLoQ” (%oOOas 
1992: 67). For Woodward neither Cholly nor Pecola are able to narrate 
their trauma - Cholly was forced to rape Darlene and Pecola was raped 
by her father ± EotK rePaLQLQg “tragLFaOO\ LsoOated” () $Qd tKe 
confusion generated by shame disrupts any possibility of reflection and 
(re)aFtLoQ ,Q tKLs Za\ :oodZard FoQFOXdes tKat “tKe FoQIXsLoQ 
entailed in shame is, thus, not only emotional, but cognitive as weOO >«@ 
Both the everyday shame of racism and the traumatic shame, or 
humiliation, which Morrison presents in the world of The Bluest Eye, 
resXOt LQ a paraO\sLs oI aQaO\sLs oQ tKe part oI tKe FKaraFters” ()  
)or :oodZard tKe possLELOLt\ oI “tKe FLrFXOation of shame as a 
OLterar\ e[perLeQFe” OLes LQ tKe roOe oI OLterar\ ZLtQess pOa\ed E\ tKe 
readers (228). The elegiac mood of the final pages of the novel ± its 
FoPpOe[Lt\ aQd “deep seQse oI perspeFtLve” - “Freates a FogQLtLve 
emotional space where shame might be understood differently: as our 
collective failure in this country to live up to our ideals, or at least what 
sKoXOd Ee oXr LdeaOs” () ,PportaQtO\ Ior :oodZard 0orrLsoQ does 
not make the readers feel guilty or responsible for what happened, but 
shame circulates by shifting to the reader's present in which the literary 
ePotLoQ oI sKaPe FaQ Ee XQderstood “as a toXFKstoQe Ior XQderstaQdLQg 
ZKat Ze e[peFt to aFKLeve” ()  
One of the strategies identified by Woodward is Morrison's 
choice of the nine-year-old narrator, Claudia. In this choice of a child 
narrator who cannot understand what happens to Pecola, but who is a 
sensitive witness to her drama, Morrison makes the important point of 
affective attunement. Claudia and her ten-year-old sister, )rLeda “are 
attuned to the moods and emotions that envelope them, but because of 
tKeLr \oXQg age tKe\ do Qot XQderstaQd tKe “PeaQLQgs” oI sKaPe” () 
Here, as Woodward shows, the cognitive dimension of affect is 
illustrated in the choice of a child narrator who learns about her 
surroundings through affect. 
 What I find fruitful in Woodward's thesis is her analysis of The 
Bluest Eye as a space for both the self-reflexivity of emotions and, 
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significantly, for an affective encounter with a literary text or, using her 
Zords “tKe possLELOLt\ oI tKe FLrFXOatLoQ oI sKaPe as a OLterar\ 
e[perLeQFe” () 7Ke reOatLoQ EetZeeQ aIIeFt aQd NQoZOedge Ls 
XQderstood Kere as tKe ELQdLQg oI aIIeFt LQto “QarratLve FKaLQs” () 
The inability to narrate a trauma results in paralysis and isolation; the 
opposite offers the potential for transformation ± the traumatic affect can 
block thought, thus, meaning. For Woodward the literary experience 
may be transformational to the reader who experiences the circulation of 
emotions by being part of the literary drama. The act of reading a 
literary text offers the reader (who is a literary witness) a space for 
reflection and for the experience of the cognitive edge of emotions. 
 Woodward's thesis is on the relation between emotion and 
NQoZOedge speFLILFaOO\ “tKe FLrFXOatLoQ oI sKaPe as a OLterar\ 
e[perLeQFe” () aQd aOtKoXgK sKe poLQts oXt tKe Ne\ eOePeQt oI 
affective attunement as a narrative strategy, she does not clarify the role 
of affect in this relationship. Affect is defined by authors like Teresa 
Brennan (2004) and Brian Massumi (2002) as distinct from emotions - 
emotion is a named affect. So the ability to narrate what happened to 
oneself and, henceforth, to understand one's feelings would constitute 
the transformation of an affect into an emotion. The literary experience 
can offer a reader both the circulation of affect and the circulation of 
emotions. Cognition is distinct in both instances and we can argue that 
affective attunement alone will not bring knowledge. As Clare 
Hemmings (2005) has argued, it is precisely in the making sense of 
affect that lies the potential for transformation and change. For 
Woodward, the literary experience allows transformation precisely in 
the act of making meaning of the narrative. Although traumatic shame 
“FaQQot Ee traQsOated LQto NQoZOedge” () Ior tKe FKaraFters LQ tKe 
QoveO Lt FaQ IXQFtLoQ aestKetLFaOO\ oQ tKe OeveO oI “a FXOtXraO poetLFs oI 
tKe ePotLoQs” () +ere , EeOLeve aIIeFt FoQQeFts ePotLoQ aQd 
knowledge in the reading of literature.  
 6LPoQ 2¶6XOOLvaQ LQ “7Ke aestKetLFs oI aIIeFt tKLQNLQg art 
Ee\oQd represeQtatLoQ” () proposes aQ approaFK to readLQg art 
tKroXgK Lts greatest TXaOLt\ tKe aestKetLF )or 2
6XOOLvaQ art Ls “over aQd 
above its existence as a cultural object” Lt Ls aQd Ls Qot part oI tKe ZorOd 
aQd tKLs “e[Fess” Ls “ZKat FoQstLtXtes art
s LPportaQFe” () +e 
proposes, through the notion of affect, to think of this excess as not a 
traQsFeQdeQt TXaOLt\ oI art EXt as LPPaQeQFe “<oX FaQQot read aIIeFts 
you FaQ oQO\ e[perLeQFe tKeP” () $s 6teZart posLts “>$IIeFt
s@ 
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visceral force keys a search to make sense of it, to incorporate it into an 
order of meaning. But it lives first as an actual charge immanent to acts 
and scenes ± a reOa\” () &oPELQLQg tKLs to O'Sullivan's approach, we 
could say that in the aesthetic experience lies a potential for change for 
such experience offers unique levels of cognition and communication. 
In trauma, the shutting down of narrativization is a strategy of 
survival, an unconscious effort of hiding what cannot be known and 
what should exist only as an affect but not as meaning. In literature, the 
traumatic event erupts as an uncontrollable surge. It is there to be seen. 
Characters and readers must see and confront what was thought 
impossible to have happened, what was deemed inconceivable. 
However, seeing here requires a specific type of cognition, for it is not 
only seeing what is there in front of us, but also, and more importantly, a 
seeing that is felt. In other words, it is seeing and being bodily affected 
by what is there in front of us; it is a visual perception and a sensation, a 
sensed perception. One might feel anaesthetized against pain, that is, 
one is unable of self-recognition and of recognizing the suffering of 
otKers (6oQtag %XtOer $EeO :oodZard) 7KLs QXPELQg oI oQe¶s seQses 
are oI tZo t\pes tKe deseQsLtL]atLoQ oI ZKat $EeO FaOOed “revoOtLQg 
aIIeFts” aQd tKe overOoad oI vo\eXrLstLF pOeasXre ZKLFK aOEeLt FKarged 
with sensation, such affect does not render what Sontag highlighted as 
an ethical response.  
In literature a poetics of emotions might engender modes of 
embodiment capable of affecting and being affected ± affect is carried 
and transmitted aesthetically. In this way, literary narratives work as 
sites for the making sense of the unbearable, the unspeakable that urges 
to become known so that a possibility of existence and of freedom 
become available, Woodward would say, to characters, readers, and to 
the society as a whole.   
I would like to take Woodward's reflections on the cognitive 
dimension of emotions and analysis of The Bluest Eye and think of them 
in terms of Als' essay. For Als, his emotions of shame and anger are 
made to be felt and articulated into words. His emotions are transformed 
into an ethical and political reflection and, like in A Room of One's Own, 
LQto “ZorN” (tKe essa\ ZrLtteQ Ior tKe FataOog) +oZever tKLs ZorN 
requires that Als reflect upon his relation to suffering, more specifically, 
the suffering related to what Holloway called “EOaFN deatK” )or $Os tKe 
job he took implicitly requested his speaking as a representative of black 
people to a white audience. On the one side, affective attunement and 
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identification with the victims of racial violence and crimes are expected 
from Als. On the other side, a white audience is expected to feel 
compassion and horror. As congressman John Lewis stresses: the 
pXrpose Ls Ior peopOe to see OearQ aQd “preveQt aQ\tKLQg OLNe tKLs IroP 
ever KappeQLQg agaLQ” (/eZLs ) ,t Ls LPportaQt to Qote Kere that 
knowledge is expected to be reached through emotions. Firstly the 
emotions of Als and the contributors to the catalog. Secondly, and as a 
consequence of the first, the emotions evoked in the viewers of the 
exhibition and readers of the catalog. In Without Sanctuary, structures of 
tKoXgKt aQd IeeOLQg rePaLQ tKe saPe $Os¶ sNLQ FoOor aXtoPatLFaOO\ 
makes him attuned to the violent affect of racism. However, white 
people are also attuned to racist and violent affects, after all, white and 
black people are part of the same flow of affect whether they choose it 
or not. Crucial here is that these affects are directed towards the victim 
of racism erasing the existence of the oppressor. The making sense of 
the pain those photographs might cause in viewers acts as a possible 
imaginative resolution to racial problems and racial fears. Furthermore, 
blackness becomes a defining element in one's identity/self. The color of 
one's skin supersedes any behavior or action: it does not matter what one 
does but what one is ± in this case, a black man in the United States. 
 $Os reaFtLoQ sKoZs tKat KLs “detoXr tKroXgK tKe past” (+aOO 
2005: 556) does not enable him to produce himself anew, as a new kind 
of subject. On the contrary, his subjectivity is first and foremost 
raciaOL]ed LQ KLs EeLQg “aKLstorLFaO” aQd “O\rLF” ± the cultural uses of 
violence and suffering maintain racial and gender structures. However, 
as Woodward's reflections have shown, the poetics of emotions can 
engender change. Violence, suffering, individual and collective pain 
interact in imaginings of the past and the present of the world of the 
novel with the potential for a new imagining of the future ± the future of 
the novel and the future of us readers. 
 In the second part, I present a brief introduction on Black 
women's literary tradition of representing violence and pain. I follow 
ZLtK tKe aQaO\ses oI tKree ZorNs LQ ZKLFK a “poetLFs oI ePotLoQ” 
operates through the deferral of truth or, in Abel's terms, through a 
momentary suspension of meaning. Different from Woodward's 
argument, in my analyses of Beloved, Push, and The Dew Breaker I 
IoFXs oQ tKe FogQLtLve edge oI aIIeFts partLFXOarO\ oI “vLoOeQt aIIeFts” 
operating in the text and in the act of reading.   
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PART II 
 
4. Black Women's Literary Narratives of Violence  
 In the previous chapters I have presented a methodology that 
approaches violence and suffering in the intensity of the encounter with 
art. This aesthetic experience is perceived as violent - in the space 
created by literature a new mode of being in the world might emerge. As 
I have argued, a Western-centered representation of violence and 
suffering has desensitized audiences, and our ethical capacity to react to 
horror and pain has been questioned (Sontag; Butler; Chouliaraki).  
 In this chapter I present Black women's literature and Black 
feminist criticism as texts and methodologies that endeavor to evade 
binary perspectives but without denying their effect nor pretending to 
transcend them. Some of these literary texts portray the complexity and 
ambiguities of experience imaginatively forging new and/or other 
realities, connections, and possibilities. Complementary to the literature, 
Black feminist criticism aims at reading texts with attention to what 
.LPEerOp &reQsKaZ Kas FoLQed “LQterseFtLoQaOLt\” &ategorLes oI 
identity (race, gender, sexuality, class, religion) are complicated in the 
texts, and reading them intersectionally signals to difference and the 
possibility of new modes of understanding our lives and social practices.  
I believe that Black women's literature, a theory that reads 
intersectionally, and a method that approaches works in their potential 
for violent encounters and intensity all share the need to bring the study 
of affect and pre-subjective levels of cognition to our analysis and 
criticism. I present a brief history of Black women's literature 
19
 and 
Black feminist criticism, pointing out the aspects I find to be relevant to 
my discussion of the representation of violence and suffering. I follow 
with the analyses of Beloved, Push, and The Dew Breaker with focus on 
the fictionalization of violence and pain and the use of the deferral of 
truth as a narrative strategy. That is, in terms of these literary text's 
potential to represent a violent event and, simultaneously, create the 
violence of sensation in the act of reading. As Abel proposes, a reading 
attentive to how the representation of violence renders the text as a site 
for new modes of responding to violence to emerge. 
  
4.1 Black Women's Literature and Black Feminism  
                                                 
19
 My use of the term Black women¶s literature encompasses as well the literature produced 
by black women from outside the United States who share similar themes and experiences.  
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 The black feminist movement in the United States in the final 
decades of the twentieth century has focused in establishing connections 
between the cultural and literary themes and discussions of Black 
thought and feminism from slavery to the present. As an effect of the 
academic institutionalization of African-American studies and the 
greater commercial demand for African-American fiction, Black 
women's literature published in the 1970s herald a new generation of 
Black women writers. The coming of age of writers such as Edwidge 
Danticat and Sapphire was marked by the publishing market availability 
of and the increase in scholarly studies on novels by writers like Toni 
Morrison, Alice Walker, Toni Cade Bambara, and Maya Angelou 
(Griffin 2004: 167-169). These worNs Zere “Fharacterized by striking, 
complicated, nonlinear narratives, beautiful, rich, sensuous language, 
aQd XQFoQveQtLoQaO %OaFN ZoPeQ FKaraFters” () aQd Zere a 
respoQse aQd FrLtLTXe to “PaOe-centered politics of the Black power and 
Black arts movePeQts” () %lack women writers (re)articulated past 
and current themes and discussions in their fictional narratives creating 
a site for the meeting of feminist and literary criticism (Keizer 2007). 
Simultaneously we saw the work of literary recovery - establishing, 
thus, the idea of Black women's literary tradition - and the development 
of theory that articulated Black women's social positioning and the 
literary representations of their experience (Keizer 164; Griffin 168-
169). According to Arlene R. Keizer, the major issues articulated in 
Black women's writings are:  
 
the need for sexual self-determination and economic 
empowerment, the struggle against the psychic of pain of 
racism and sexism, the possibility of coalition across the 
lines of race, gender, sexual orientation and class, and black 
ZoPeQ¶s passLoQate aQd persLsteQt strategLes oI seOI-
formation, self-recovery and self-expression. (Keizer 2007: 
155) 
 
 In this way, Black women writers have exposed the conformity 
to social, gender, and racial roles enforced by white male Western-
centered knowledge. Firstly, in their writings they explore the 
intersection of categories such as race, class, and gender in the 
articulation of their character's existence. For instance, Celie in The 
Color Purple (1982) and Precious in Push are perceived as powerless 
and closely to non-existent or, as in Precious' comparing of herself to 
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vampires in a movie: perceived as invisible, as those who, after the 
photograph is developed, are not there in the image (30). They are 
ZoPeQ EOaFN aQd poor as 0Lster sKoXts at &eOLe “/ooN at \oX <oX 
EOaFN \oX pore \oX XgO\ \oX a ZoPaQ *oddaP <oX QotKLQg at aOO” 
Therefore, within the world view Mister speaks from, her powerlessness 
would grant her existence worthless, close to a nonexistence.  
 Secondly, Black women's literary texts bring to light the 
articulation of knowledge possessed and constructed by the characters 
who live and affirm their existences in the intersection of those 
“FategorLes oI QotKLQgQess” (&KrLstLaQ 90: 20).  For instance, as Celie 
repOLes to 0Lster “,
P pore ,
P EOaFN , Pa\ Ee XgO\ aQd FaQ
t FooN 
%Xt ,
P Kere” aQd as 3reFLoXs
 respoQse to Ker perFeLved LQvLsLELOLt\ 
 
I big, I talk, I eats, I cooks, I laugh, I watch TV, do what my 
muver say. But I can see when the picture come back I don't 
exist. Don't nobody want me. Don't nobody need me. I know 
who I am. I know who they say I am ± vampire sucking the 
system's blood. Ugly black grease to be wipe away, punish, 
NLOt FKaQged ILQded a MoE Ior >«] But I don't care now what 
anybody see. I see something, somebody. (32-33) 
 
 )or %arEara &KrLstLaQ a “persLsteQt PotLI” LQ %OaFN ZoPeQ
s 
OLteratXre Ls “tKe LOOXPLQatLQg oI tKat ZKLFK Ls perFeLved E\ otKers as Qot 
e[LstLQg at aOO” ( ) $Qd ZLtKoXt denying the power of such 
categories, characters like Celie and Precious affirm not only their 
e[LsteQFe EXt aOso as &KrLstLaQ stresses “soPe esseQtLaO trXtKs aEoXt 
tKose “LQteOOeFtXaO” FategorLes ± gender, race, class ± of which all human 
beings partake” () $Oso Lt Ls sLgQLILFaQt to KLgKOLgKt tKat tKe 
construction of such knowledge embraces the intellect, emotions, 
passLoQs aQd tKe seQses “as eTXaOO\ eIIeFtLve Za\s oI NQoZLQg” 
(Christian 1989: 15).  
 'epartLQg IroP tKe argXPeQts oQ tKe “presXPptLve PaOeQess” 
of African-$PerLFaQ stXdLes aQd tKe “presXPptLve ZKLteQess” (9aOerLe 
Smith, 1998: xiv) of feminist studies, Black feminist thought identified 
the interplay of both as suppressing Black women's experiences, which, 
LQ tXrQ OLPLted “oXr XQderstaQding of certain models of cultural and 
KLstorLFaO stXd\ aQd aQaO\sLs” ([Lv) +eQFeIortK a QeZ PetKodoOog\ Zas 
required: one that revised and re-conceptualized contexts, histories, and 
traditions in light of black women's contributions and lives. Such 
reconceptualization was proposed by Barbara Christian in her essay 
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“7Ke 5aFe Ior 7Keor\” () &KrLstLaQ
s ZeOO-known essay sparked a 
controversy 
20
 among African American literary critics and the debate 
reverberated well into the nineties. Her essay was attacked mainly for its 
essentialist aspect and claimed to be antitheoretical, while the two main 
arguments of the essay were: 1) proposing an expanded definition of 
theory, and 2) an articulation of Christian's own critical methodology ± 
one which theorized throXgK OLteratXre “XsLQg tKe NQoZOedge 
represented by writers and their characters as a basis for thinking about 
$IrLFaQ $PerLFaQ OLteratXre as a ZKoOe” (.eL]er  ) 
 &KrLstLaQ¶s argXPeQt Zas tKat tKe NQoZOedge IoXQd LQ %OaFN 
women's texts did not easily fit into the available theoretical 
frameworks; such incompatibility or difference ought not silence or 
dLsPLss sXFK NQoZOedge 7Ke LQsXEordLQatLoQ oI tKe “sXEaOterQ 
NQoZOedge” () to prevaLOLQg Podes oI tKLQNLQg PeaQt tKat a QeZ 
critical methodology was required even if that meant an essentialist one. 
What Christian proposed was an interrogation of the prevailing narrative 
conventions, histories, and traditions.  
 In the same manner, Black feminist thought questions the 
ability of hegemonic master narratives to explain identities marked with 
the historically constructed meanings of subordinated positions. 
Connected to that questioning was the assumption that the categories of 
analysis (for instance, of gender, race, sexuality) were mutually 
dependent cultural and social constructions. Studying these categories 
meant reading them instersectionally and using strategies of reading 
simultaneity. The various studies that deploy black feminist criticism as 
methodology show how the dominance of one category masks the 
operation of other categories and how they interconnect.  
 Black women's literary texts reflected the lives, communities 
and experiences of black women and families, what Karla F.C. 
+oOOoZa\ FaOOs “tKe FXOtXraO Za\s oI NQoZLQg” aQd tKe Za\s sXFK 
knoZOedge Ls IraPed LQ OaQgXage (+oOOoZa\ ) 7Kese “FXOtXraO 
Za\s oI NQoZLQg” aQd KoZ NQoZOedge Ls FoQstrXFted aQd 
                                                 
20
 Christian's essay challenged the turn towards continental theory initiated in the late 1970s 
by theorists  such as Robert Stepto, Henry Louis Gates, Hortense Spillers, and Mae 
Henderson, among others (Griffin 2004: 167). These theorists brought insights from 
Poststructuralism into the study of African American literature. Christian argued that the 
privilege given to European Poststructuralism ignored the existing theorizing of Black 
thought and tradition, and created a bias regarding what constituted theory. Furthermore, 
for Christian, this favoring towards formalistic theorizing acted in detriment of politics 
(168). 
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communicated signal to types of cognition and of communication that 
are not necessarily grounded in Western-centered systems of thought. 
 Reading these texts is a process in which the word is shared by 
reader, author, narrator, and characters. In this collective construction of 
meaning, the story and the character's sense of self are weaved together. 
These texts and reading experience are distinct from black men's texts, 
ZKLFK are Ior +oOOoZa\ FoQFeQtrated oQ “tKe poZer oI FreatLve 
aXtKorsKLp” aQd “LQdLvLdXaO Za\s oI EeKavLQg” () 6Ke adds  
 
The massive emotional purges in black males' literature, the 
activity attached to those emotions, their passions, and the 
EeKavLors tKat aFFoPpaQ\ tKeP IoFXs tKeLr ZorNs oQ “aFtLQg 
oXt” eveQ ZKLOe dLstaQFLQg tKe aXtKorLaO aQd tKe QarratLve 
response (voices) from the emotional and spiritual pressure 
ZLtKLQ tKe te[t ,Q FoQtrast a FoOOeFtLve “speaNLQg oXt” E\ aOO 
the voices gathered within the text, authorial, narrative, 
characters, and even the implicated reader, is the responsive 
strategy in black women's literature. (11) 
 
 Black women's literature is identified as a discrete tradition that 
requires not only intertextual relationships between categories of 
experiences and the use of narrative strategies that will give voice to 
such intersection, but also methods and analytic tools capable of 
perceiving and understanding, for instance, gendered spheres of 
NQoZOedge $s +oOOoZa\ poLQts oXt “tKe PetapKors tKat LdeQtLI\ EOaFN 
traditions of literary theory are those that reach outside of Western 
KLstor\ Ior tKeLr soXrFe” () ,Q %OaFN ZoPeQ
s OLterar\ tradLtLoQ EeLQg 
black and being a woman is a unity that foregrounds the imagination 
and creativity of writers; through literature its spiritual unity is 
recovered and celebrated. Furthermore, the process of writing in the 
English language also requires a process of revision due to the 
sociocultural history of the English words. Holloway argues that the 
history of the English language would be repressive to any creativity 
from oppressed subjects. For the possibility of ownership of the word 
and authorship of the texts, Black women writers had to re-make the 
words, thus the language ZorN “LQ FXOtXraO aQd geQdered Za\s tKat 
XQderPLQe” tKe KegePoQ\ oI tKe ZKLte- and male-centered discourses 
(27). Because of the rigidity of oppression and the discipline of racism, 
literacy walks hand-in-hand with memory and creativity with revision. 
The ambiguity of racial identity, the uncertainty of life, and the 
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instability of constructing one's self converge in a narrative that points to 
the importance of memory. Also, writers endeavor to imagine a space 
where fantasy, language, and reality meet other than the dominant mode 
of binary categories. In such spaces the role of the reader is crucial.  
 The reader's attention is directed to the act of reading from the 
very grammatical structure of the narrative, the narrator's use of words 
and punctuation, to being implicated in the world narrated in the stories. 
Writers create an intimacy between the narrator and the reader, who 
could be given permission to read one's diary or letters, or who could be 
implicated in the narrative itself. For example, in the final paragraphs of 
The Bluest Eye tKe repetLtLve Xse oI tKe proQoXQs “Ze” aQd “oXr” 
suggests the reader's complicity in Pecola's demise: 
 
All of our waste which we dumped on her and which she 
absorbed. And all of our beauty, which was hers first and 
which she gave to us. All of us ± all who knew her ± felt so 
wholesome after we cleaned ourselves on her. We were so 
beautiful when we stood astride her ugliness. Her simplicity 
decorated us, her guilt sanctified us, her pain made us glow 
with health, her awkwardness made us think we had a sense 
of humor. Her inarticulateness made us believe we were 
eloquent. Her poverty kept us generous. Even her waking 
dreams we used ± to silence our own nightmares. And she let 
us, and thereby deserved our contempt. We honed our egos 
on her, padded our characters with her frailty, and yawned in 
the fantasy of our strength. (162-163)    
 
  Claudia (the narrator) understands how she and her community 
were complicitous in Pecola's descent into madness. However, the final 
paragraphs of the novel direct that awareness towards the reader as well. 
“$OO oI Xs ± aOO ZKo NQeZ Ker” rePLQds tKe reader oI KLsKer 
participation in this story and it exposes how familiar what happened to 
Pecola is in society as a whole. In the novel, the reader ventured into a 
space: 
 
where economic depravity dictates when and how people 
love, where taboos of rape and incest traumatize and sabotage 
black girlhood, where racism in the larger world shapes and 
constrains the options men and women have to imagine 
themselves as a whole, acceptable human beings, and where 
people both in and outside the community exploit the most 
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vulnerable. (McKenzie 2004: 223) 
 
 As McKenzie points out such space is not unfamiliar to the 
reader. Also, the way Morrison writes the conclusion of the novel shifts 
the reader's role of spectator to participant inviting him/her to come to 
terms with his/ her complicity in the demise of innocent and vulnerable 
children. The reader experiences the text's aesthetic and cultural politics. 
By not being a passive experience, we could also think of how such 
reading experience might invoke types of cognition and understanding 
that open space for affect and emotions; consequently, encompassing the 
unity of mind and body and the interdependence of the individual to 
his/her community. 
 As Holloway stresses, the Hegelian privilege and value given to 
objective consciousness illustrates the focus of Euro-American thought. 
In Holloway words:  
 
Within these parameters, any kind of collective, even a 
metaphorical one, loses value when viewed as an alternative 
to the subject's willingness to objectify its experience. In this 
comparison, a collective consciousness ± the enterprise of a 
successfully collaborative group of subjects ± is not a 
commodity of significant value (31). 
 
 Holloway stresses that the Hegelian notion of objectivity and 
oEMeFtLve FoQsFLoXsQess vaOXed as “tKe eQterprLse oI a sXFFessIXOO\ 
LQdLvLdXated sXEMeFt” () stood as tKe paraPeter to ZKLFK aQ\ sXEMeFt 
should objectify his/her experience. Individuality was valued in 
detriment of collectivity and these binary oppositions would inform the 
Euro-American mode of thinking. Holloway points out that in Black 
women's literature such oppositions are obliterated. Polarities are 
reconstrXFted ZLtK IoFXs XpoQ tKeLr FoOOaEoratLve FoQstLtXtLoQs “tKe 
communication between author and character, reader and text (subject 
aQd oEMeFt)” () ,Q tKLs Za\ tKe FKaOOeQge to tKe :esterQ (+egeOLaQ) 
notion of polarity happens in several fronts.  
Firstly, one must acknowledge the privilege and value given to 
rationality and objectivity in detriment to an experience that is sensually 
felt and shared collectively. Whatever way such sharing and perception 
might take, one must accept the pre-personal and affective level of 
experience and the knowledge that is constructed by it ± a knowledge 
that, in some instances, is constructed collectively.  
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Secondly, the engagement of the reader with the text and the 
stor\ EeLQg toOd Ls part oI tKe “FoOOaEoratLve FoPPXQity of author, 
FKaraFter aQd reader LQ %OaFN ZoPeQ ZrLter
s te[ts” (+oOOoZa\ ) 
)LQaOO\ ZKat +oOOoZa\ FaOOs tKe “reIraFtLve pXrpose” () oI OLteratXre ± 
tKe poteQtLaO to LPagLQatLveO\ aOter “tKe FoXrse oI oXr Ldeas FoQFerQLQg 
experiences that are (for e[aPpOe) FXOtXraO or geQdered” () ± is a 
quality of literary texts that enable hegemonic literary criticism methods 
to be challenged. Farah J. Griffin (2004) remarked that growing up 
reading African-American fiction facilitated her dreams, gave her 
visions, and sparked her imagination; and the fact that such reading 
“eQFoXraged tKe LPagLQatLoQ” () sKoXOd Ee Nept LQ tKe IoreIroQt oI 
our minds. For Griffin, those literary texts carry the potential for the 
reader
s LPagLQLQg oI “a radLFaOO\ dLIIereQt IXture and engaging in 
strXggOes to ErLQg tKose vLsLoQs LQto EeLQg” aQd Ior aOOoZLQg readers to 
LPagLQe “a past XQreForded LQ tKe KLstor\ EooNs Qot a roPaQtLFL]ed or 
gOorLILed past EXt a Pore FoPpOLFated oQe >«@ aQd a IXtXre >«@ ZortK 
struggling for or strXggOLQg agaLQst” ()  
These characteristics identified by Holloway and Griffin work 
in a similar fashion to the potential of creating new modes of response 
advoFated E\ $EeO
s QotLoQ oI aestKetLF eQFoXQters ZLtK “vLoOeQt 
eveQts”  
 
4.2 Black Women's Writing and the Representation of Violence 
 Black women writers and intellectuals grounded their works in 
the experience of being black and female in a society that denigrates 
women of African descent. The commonality of this experience suggests 
that certain themes will be constant in their texts. One prominent theme 
in Black women's literature is the legacy of struggle against sexism and 
racism. The vulnerability to racism and poverty and to rape as a gender-
specific form of sexual violence is constitutive of tKese ZrLters¶ 
sensibility. This is a core element of Black women's writings and Black 
feminist thought (Hill Collins 2000: 406-408).   
 Valerie Smith (1998), Patricia J. Williams (2000), and Ladelle 
McWhorter (2009) 
21
 have shown how the tremendous violence and 
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 Smith and Williams set to read the news coverage intersectionally whereas McWhorter 
does not. Her reading of racial and homophobic violence and murder is grounded on 
)oXFaXOt¶s ZorN oQ QorPaOL]atLoQ 0F:Korter FrLtLFL]es “LQterseFtLoQaO aQaO\ses” Ior tKe\ 
do Qot FaptXre “tKe FoPpOe[Lt\ oI tKe poZer reOatLoQs EroXgKt to OLgKt Kere” )or 
0F:Korter “LQterseFtLoQaO aQaO\ses teQd to IoFXs aQaO\tLF atteQtLoQ prLParLO\ oQ LdeQtLtLes 
rather than on institutions, discourses, and disciplinary regimes; but even when they do 
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crimes committed against individuals of minority groups tend to get lost 
in the coverage of facts. News reports progressively move from the 
monstrosity of the crime to the description of the facts required before 
“e[perLeQFe gets to Ee OaEeOed trXtK” (:LOOLaPs ) 7o pXt Lt LQ aQotKer 
way, the experience of violence and physical pain (that, at times, escape 
our comprehension) are broken into stories: from examinations on the 
victim's past and morality, his/her family background, personal 
relationships, and any sort of association, to the lawyer's professional 
credibility. These stories tend to mitigate the spectator's initial 
experience of shock, gradually transforming outrage and fear into 
understandable (acceptable) facts. Moreover, these stories connect 
ideological constructions of race, gender, class, and sexuality 
complicating anti-racist and feminist responses to rape and abuse against 
women (Smith).      
 As I have argued earlier, in media coverage the suffering of 
others and the representation of violence have maintained the same 
positions of domination and subordination of individuals and groups 
because narrative here is used to reduce experience. Differently, the 
potential displacement rendered by art could destabilize the ideology 
and arbitrariness of categories once the shock of violence would appeal 
to common humanity of us all (Butler). The theme of struggle in some 
black women's literary texts is presented via extreme acts of violence 
and endurance of pain that challenge comprehension. In these literary 
narratives, the experience of violence and pain are not reduced to 
objective descriptions nor offer easy resolutions.       
 Abel proposes a momentary suspension of judgment, a 
momentary pause before transforming an experience of violence into a 
representation of violence. In this act lies the potential for new ways of 
being in the world. Black feminists have argued that Black women's 
literature creates spaces where conventional binarisms are destabilized 
and reveals how their interrelation not only produce relations of power, 
but also operate as sites for social change (Holloway, Smith). In these 
spaces new ways of being in the world are forged. However, as Barbara 
Christian stressed, analysis and criticism of Black women's literary texts 
reTXLre a QeZ Za\ oI readLQg 7Ke prevaLOLQg “IorPs oI LQTXLr\ aQd 
                                                                                                       
venture beyond accounts of identity construction, they still implicitly assume that racism, 
sexism, and heterosexism could and do operate sometimes in isolation from one another. 
My contention here is that in the tweQtLetK FeQtXr\ tKe\ do Qot” () ,Q spLte oI tKeLr 
methodological choices, their claims regarding the media coverage of facts are similar.    
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FrLtLFaO deILQLtLoQs” sXEordLQate %OaFN ZoPeQ ZrLters
 “LPagLQatLve 
sXEstaQFe” (+oOOoZa\ ) Ior %OaFN ZoPeQ Kave tKeorL]ed LQ “QarratLve 
forms, in stories, riddles and proverbs, and in the pOa\ ZLtK OaQgXage” 
(Smith 22).  
 Both Abel's and Black feminists' methodologies incorporate the 
significance of affective levels of experience. The prevailing domain of 
reason and thought, of mind in detriment of body, are in both arguments 
pointing to the failure of understanding and sensitivity because 
rationality is the domain of discipline and binary categories of 
experience. Black feminist criticism and Black women's literature ask 
Ior “aQ aFNQoZOedgPeQt oI tKe Qeed to sKLIt tKe paradLgPs Ze FoQstrXFt 
to XQderstaQd tKoXgKt” (+oOOoZa\ ) $s 0F.eQ]Le KLgKOLgKts LQ 7oQL 
Morrison's novels:  
 
[they] challenge the reader to move from familiar to 
unfamiliar interpretations of life and living. Rendering the 
novel through a lens of complex narrative aesthetics, she 
invites readers into the cultural politics of race, gender, class, 
age, and even religion to entertain new readings of the text of 
tKeLr oZQ OLves tKe QatLoQ aQd tKe gOoEaO FoPPXQLt\ >«@ 
Inside the space of her novels is a form of uneasy rest, 
therefore, encouraging readers to return to their lives with 
new ways of making meaning of them. (231) 
 
 Challenging the reader to encounter unfamiliar representations 
aQd FreatLQg a IeeOLQg oI dLsFoPIort (“XQeas\ rest”) are eOePeQts tKat 
welcome the reader's affective investments. If we approach the process 
of feeling as intrinsic to the process of thinking, modes of thinking that 
divide the mental and sensual responses we have cannot account for 
one's experience and knowledge. It is necessary to create a space in 
which a new mode of thinking can challenge and displace the prevailing 
oQe )or &KrLstLaQ LQ “5aFe Ior 7Keor\” tKat poteQtLaO Ior dLspOaFePeQt 
was one of the most important qualities of the literary text. 
 I refer to Christian's well-known essay and the controversy 
generated by it in order to illuminate, once again, the argument on the 
potential of art to affect us. In other words, to emphasize that the 
encounter with a literary narrative can be a violent event loaded with the 
potential of creating a new mode of experience. As it has been argued in 
this study, a new mode of experiencing violence and suffering ± a mode 
capable of sensitization and change ± necessarily requires the 
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acceptance of ways of knowing that are pre-subjective and/or collective. 
Once again, one that embraces the intellect, emotions, passions, and the 
seQses “as eTXaOO\ eIIeFtLve Za\s oI NQoZLQg” (&KrLstLaQ  )  
 Although criticized for an essentialist position, Christian's 
proposal of a critical methodology theorized through literature, 
emerging from the texts and characters, points towards the potential of a 
new mode of experience. Such methodology, I believe, can contribute 
significantly to the themes of violence and suffering in literature. In 
Black women's narratives, pain is felt physically and psychically (for 
example, racism and the threat of racial terror are predominantly 
psychic). If we recall Sontag and Butler's arguments, hegemonic 
discourses are failing us regarding our ethical capacities to be affected 
by outrageous, horrific and traumatic scenes. Perhaps the question 
should be rephrased: how can we create new modes of being in the 
world that are constituted by our rational and sensual experiences, our 
psychic and physical constitutions? One possibility is challenging the 
hegemonic experience and perception of violence and suffering by 
creating a narrative that presents such experience in its complexity and 
ambiguity.  
 Before moving to the literary texts I would like to explain my 
methodological choices. I do not want to draw any comparison nor 
appO\ 'eOeX]LaQ tKoXgKt to %OaFN ZoPeQ¶s OLteratXre $OtKoXgK , EeOLeve 
they both position themselves against the limitations, therefore, 
conformity of white male Western discourse, I recognize that their 
searches for freedom and autonomy originate from very distinct places 
and present distinct agendas.  
 I believe an approach to violence and pain that embraces affect's 
potential for displacements and mobility can shed new light on the 
representation of suffering. In addition to that, this study stresses the 
LPportaQFe oI &Oare +ePPLQgs
 () argXPeQt tKat aIIeFt Ls “vaOXaEOe 
preFLseO\ to tKe e[teQt tKat Lt Ls Qot aXtoQoPoXs” () aQd sKoXOd tKXs 
be given an interpretative meaning. In other words, we should use 
“aIIeFtLve states aQd tKeLr eIIeFts” () LQ tKe PaNLQg oI PeaQLQgs Ze 
recognize as our own.  
 Furthermore, it is perhaps important to remember that the logic 
of suspension (of judgment) depending on a virtual partnership 
arrangement are aspects present in WolfgaQg ,ser¶s tKeor\ oI tKe aFt oI 
reading. Put differently, Marco Abel's masocriticism claims the same 
element of intersubjectivity present in the aesthetic experience of 
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reading literature.  
 Also I concur with Barbara Christian's (1987) and Namita 
Goswami's (2008) assertions on the actual contribution of Black 
ZoPeQ
s ZrLtLQg aQd FrLtLFLsP tKat “pre-dates deconstruction, 
postcolonial theory, second-wave feminism, French Feminism, as well 
as $IroFeQtrLFLt\” (*osZaPL ) %otK aXtKors argXe tKat %OaFN 
women's ZrLtLQg aQd FrLtLFLsP Zere aOread\ deaOLQg ZLtK “IorPs oI 
readLQg ZrLtLQg aQd tKeorL]LQg” oI (“PaMor”) aFadePLF dLsFoXrse () 
In Christian's words:  
 
[the Western dualistic frame of thought] sees the rest of the 
world as minor, and tries to convince the rest of the world 
that it is major, usually through force and then through 
language, even as it claims many of the ideas that we, its 
“KLstorLFaO” otKer Kave NQoZQ aQd spoNeQ aEoXt Ior so OoQg 
For many of us have never conceived of ourselves only as 
somebody's other. (43)        
 
)or *osZaPL tKe FoQtrovers\ geQerated E\ “7Ke 5aFe Ior 
7Keor\” IaLOed to perFeLve tKat “PLQorLt\” dLsFoXrse Zas FaOOLQg LQto 
TXestLoQ ZKat FXOtXre Ls aQd LQ tKLs Za\ FKaOOeQgLQg “tKe dLsFLpOLQar\ 
boundaries that are both premised on and create that very understanding 
oI FXOtXre” () 5atKer tKaQ EeLQg aQ LQstaQFe oI LdeQtLt\ prLde “tKe 
sheer audacity of the in-spite-of-it-all” ““PLQorLt\” dLsFoXrse Freates 
sender and receiver in a future community where the present 
impossibilities of giving and receiving are transformed into the very 
FoQdLtLoQs oI possLELOLt\” () ,I Ze taNe *osZaPL
s assertLoQ aQd tKLQN 
of the use of the deferral of truth as a narrative strategy by Black 
women writers, we could think of it as a force to challenge eurocentric 
vLeZs oI FXOtXre to KeraOd a “IXtXre FoPPXQLt\” aQd to reZrLte KLstor\ 
In summary, here violence and suffering are approached as 
shock as “soPetKLQg tKat does Qot speaN” ('eOeX]e  ) aQd 
simultaneously, as something that is felt in the materiality of bodies 
holding everlasting effects on individual psyches and whole 
communities. In this way, literary narratives can become a site for 
aesthetic encounters with violence and pain in which readers may be 
confronted by the violence of sensation that forms of thought, of 
imagination, and of creation are capable of. As Claudia, the narrator in 
The Bluest Eye, FoQFOXdes LQ tKe preOXde to tKe stor\ “7Kere Ls reaOO\ 
nothing more to say ± except why. But since why is difficult to handle, 
94 
one must take refuge in how” (04). In the representation of violence and 
sXIIerLQg , EeOLeve “dLIILFXOt to KaQdOe” FaQ Ee traQsOated as poZerOess 
once explanations and justifications have not stopped the infliction of 
pain nor have they changed the position of the oppressed. Perhaps the 
force of change lies in the how.  
Looking back at the process of creation of The Bluest Eye, Toni 
Morrison reckons her intention was to tell a story that would move 
people ± ZKLFK LQ Ker opLQLoQ Zas XQsXFFessIXO Ior “PaQy readers 
rePaLQ toXFKed EXt Qot Poved” (The Bluest Eye iv). Morrison thought 
that in order to reach that she would have to construct a narrative that 
opeQed spaFes Ior aIIeFts to Ee sKared ZLtKoXt OeadLQg “readers LQto tKe 
comfort of pitying [Pecola] rather than an interrogation of themselves 
Ior tKe sPasKLQg >oI 3eFoOa
s PLQd soXO aQd Eod\@” (Lv) ,Q tKese spaces 
lies what Peter Brook proposed as a literary narrative's potential to 
“ErLQg LPagLQatLoQ EaFN to a sXEMeFt tKat Kas EeFoPe tKe propert\ oI 
ideoOog\” (%rooNs  ) $s :oodZard Kas e[aPLQed LQ The 
Bluest Eye, the emotion of shame is brought to be part of the reading 
experience of the novel. The different levels in which shame appears 
conflate in order to create a new experience, or better, a new way of 
experiencing racial hatred and self-loathing.  
Instead of seeking a particular answer (to the why), what is 
proposed Kere Ls approaFKLQg tKese QarratLves “as opeQLQg Xp ILeOds oI 
dLsFXssLoQ” ZKere PaQ\ possLEOe PeaQLQgs are pXt EeIore Xs (0a\ 
20 ) 7KLs Ls ZKat $EeO proposes as aQ approaFK to “vLoOeQt 
LPages” ,t Ls aOso ZKat :oodZard FOaLPs 0orrLsoQ dLd E\ ePpOo\LQg 
shame as an emotion in The Bluest Eye. And finally, it is what I believe 
is done in Beloved in the question of judging Sethe's infanticide and the 
presence of pain as a violent affect waiting to be named; in Push in the 
conflation of sexual violence and sexual pleasure; and in The Dew 
Breaker in the afterlife of the torturer's actions and history. Of course, it 
should be said that a focus on affect, although translating the 
representation of violence and pain into other terms ± or, at least, 
allowing a rearticulation of it on another plane ± it ends up introducing 
“QeZ proEOePs aQd QeZ TXestLoQs” (Beasley-Murray and Moreiras 
2001: 04).  
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5. Beloved 
 Beloved is set during the Reconstruction era in 1873, in 
Cincinnati, Ohio. It is centered in a house, 124 Bluestone Road, where a 
mother, Sethe, and her 18 year-old daughter, Denver, share their home 
with a ghost. In the present of the story, Sethe's older sons, Howard and 
Buglar, had run away when living in a haunted house became 
unbearable. Denver likes the ghost and believes, like the others, that it is 
the ghost of her older sister, the baby girl her mother killed in order to 
save her from slavery. Eighteen years earlier, Sethe escaped Sweet 
Home, the plantation she lived in Kentucky, pregnant of Denver and 
after having sent the children ahead of her. After a traumatic escape, 
Sethe arrived at 124, which was, at the time, the house of her mother-in-
law, Baby Suggs. With Denver on her arms, she was finally reunited 
with her children.  
 Before her escape and arrival at 124 Sethe was violated. 
Anticipating the slaves' plan to escape, schoolteacher (Sweet Home's 
new master) and his nephews choose to frighten Sethe stealing her baby 
daughter's milk from her body. Sethe then reports to Mrs. Garner and 
ends up severely whipped by schoolteacher as punishment. Scarred and 
hurt, without her children and feeling abandoned by her husband, Halle, 
Sethe runs away. During her escape Sethe delivers her child with the 
help of a white girl, Amy Denver, and crosses the river with the help of 
Stamp Paid. At last safe with her family, Sethe spends the next twenty-
eight days recovering and healing from the beating with Baby Suggs' 
help. She meets other women, her neighbors, and life begins to settle 
down peacefully and safely. However, schoolteacher discovers where 
she is and breaks into 124 determined to take Sethe and her children 
back to Sweet Home. For Sethe, going back to slavery is unthinkable 
and she decides to kill her children before schoolteacher could take a 
hold of them. She only had time to kill her older girl before they entered 
the woodshed in the back of 124. The murder became a crime ± 
destruction of property (the slaveholder owns the child) - and Sethe is 
arrested. She took baby Denver with her to jail and left her two boys 
with their grandma. After a short while, Sethe was released from prison 
due to requests and pressure from women and abolitionists in the 
community. Life is resumed with Baby Suggs and her children but 124 
EeFoPes a “spLteIXO” pOaFe (Beloved 03). The murder of the older 
daughter disrupts living in 124: the women would go on living a life in 
isolation from the community, focusing on the present and trying not to 
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remember the past. Baby Suggs falls into debilitating depression and 
dies ten years later. 
 On the day the novel begins Sethe receives a visit from one of 
the former Sweet Home men, Paul D, who, after escaping prison, kept 
moving around unable to settle in one place. Paul D's presence sparks a 
new possibility of life for Sethe and Denver: he chases the ghost away 
from the house and the three begin to fashion a new family. Sethe begins 
to feel glimpses of courage to make life plans and let herself feel again. 
However, this brief contentment is interrupted with the arrival of a 
mysterious woman. She called herself Beloved ± the single word written 
on the baby girl's tombstone ± and seemed to know nothing about 
herself and her life previous to arriving at 124. She arrived weak and 
sick but stayed after recovering. Life in the house begins to change due 
to Beloved's attachment, devotion, and obsession with Sethe. Both 
mother and daughter believe her to be the embodiment of the baby ghost 
and enjoy her presence in the house: Sethe feels redeemed and Denver 
finds friendship and companionship. Paul D is gradually driven out of 
the house by Beloved, until the day he learns about the infanticide and 
leaves Sethe for good. 
 The love and loyalty of the three women turn their isolation into 
madness until Denver realizes they need help to stop her mother's 
physical and psychological deterioration. It is with the help of black 
women in the community that Beloved is sent out of 124 for good. She 
disappears and is gradually forgotten by everyone. The story ends with 
Paul D's return to 124 to find Sethe mourning Beloved. He offers her a 
partnership for a life they can build together.  
 Beloved is a third person narrative interwoven with flashbacks 
narrated by the major characters. Through these fragments we learn 
about the events of the past and how 124 and its inhabitants came to be 
haunted. We learn about their past as slaves in a thought to be 
benevolent kind of slavery practiced by the Garners. Sweet Home 
becomes an abusive and violent place when the widowed Mrs. Garner 
asks her brother-in-law, schoolteacher, to help her run the farm. We also 
learn about their arrivals at 124, their struggle not to remember the past 
of slavery, and how the life they had reconstructed with freedom turned 
into violence, death, and isolation. 
 As the literary criticism on the novel has pointed out, Beloved 
eQgages tKe tKePe oI oQe oI $PerLFaQs “paLQIXO ZoXQd” tKe PePor\ oI 
“tKe great soFLaO ZroQg oI tKe eQsOavePeQt oI $IrLFaQs” (0F.a\ 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03). The story of the inhabitants of 124 explores issues of black identity, 
self-love, and self-hatred generated by racial and gender violence 
experienced by black people under slavery. The material and 
psychological effects of slavery ± the dirtiness of slavery (Beloved 295-
296) - left life in 124 suspended. Unyielding in their decision to not 
remember the brutal and inhuman experience of slavery, Baby Suggs, 
Sethe, Paul D, and Stamp Paid practice a kind of existence that 
diminishes their selfhood once feeling is interrupted. As Nellie Y. 
McKay notes, in Beloved tKe “aFt oI rePePEerLQg Zas rLsN\ sKaPeIXO 
aQd daQgeroXs” () ,Q addLtLoQ 0F.a\ poLQts oXt tKat 0orrLsoQ
s 
FoQFerQ ZLtK “proFess as prodXFt” traQsOates LQ tKe IoFXs “oQ tKe KeaOLQg 
process that returns dignity to a people from whom it had been 
unceremoniously stripped. But only in remembering, recounting, 
listening to, and accepting their individual and collective pasts does 
KeaOLQg taNe pOaFe” () +eaOLQg LQ Beloved is a process both the 
characters and the readers undergo in order to exorcise the ghost of 
Beloved out of 124. In psychoanalytical terms, by reclaiming their pasts 
the characters can heal their psychic wounds. Through the act of 
reading, readers can imagine and reconsider the collective and national 
wounds of a shameful past.  
 In an interview Toni Morrison said that one of her goals in 
writing novels was to translate the historical into the personal. In her 
Zords “, doQ
t ZaQt to ZrLte EooNs tKat \ou can close... and walk off 
and read another one right away ± like a television show, you know, 
ZKere \oX IOLFN tKe FKaQQeO” ('arOLQg  ) ,Q Beloved, I suggest, 
her intention of causing a momentary pause for reflection or, borrowing 
from Abel's terminology, for a suspension of judgment, is achieved in 
the violent encounter of the reader with Sethe's crime.  
 Sethe's decision to murder her children in order to save them 
IroP sOaver\ “a Iate sKe FoQsLdered Zorse tKaQ deatK” (0F.a\ ) 
poses to the reader the dilemma of how to judge Sethe's action. While 
Beloved does not present a moral justification for Sethe's crime in spite 
of the inhumanity of slavery, the reader is left to ponder whether her 
crime was worst than a mother's turning her children to a living death.  
 According to Ashraf H. A. Rushdy (1999), Morrison was 
careful to establish a context for the infanticide (47-48). We learn in the 
story that Sethe's mother had killed all the children fathered by white 
PeQ ZKo raped Ker “6Ke tKreZ tKeP aOO aZa\ EXt \oX” (Beloved 62), 
Nan, Sethe's grandmother tells her. Also, later in the story we learn 
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about Ella's past - who is the woman that initiates the exorcism of 
Beloved:  
 
It was Ella more than anyone who convinced the others that 
rescue was in order. She was a practical woman who believed 
there was a root either to chew or avoid for every ailment. 
Cogitation, as she called it, clouded things and prevented 
action. Nobody loved her and she wouldn't have liked it if 
they had, for she considered love a serious disability. Her 
puberty was spent in a house where she was shared by father 
aQd soQ ZKoP sKe FaOOed “tKe OoZest \et” ,t Zas “tKe OoZest 
\et” ZKo gave Ker a dLsgXst Ior se[ aQd agaLQst ZKoP sKe 
measured all atrocities. [...] Whatever Sethe had done, Ella 
didn't like the idea of past errors taking possession of the 
present. (Beloved 301-302)  
 
Ella had been beaten every way but down. She remembered 
the bottom teeth she had lost to the brake and the scars from 
the belt were thick as rope around her waist. She had 
delivered, but would not nurse, a hairy white thing, fathered 
E\ “tKe OoZest \et” ,t OLved ILve da\s Qever PaNLQg a soXQd 
The idea of that pup coming back to whip her too set her jaw 
ZorNLQg >«@ (Beloved 305) 
 
 For Rushdy, the larger framework Morrison put around Sethe's 
LQIaQtLFLde ZorNs to deIer MXdgPeQt oI “aQ aFtLoQ ZLtKoXt reIereQFe to 
the terms of its enactment ± the wrongness of assuming a transhistorical 
etKLF oXtsLde a partLFXOar KLstorLFaO PoPeQt” () +oZever tKLs FoQte[t 
does not offer a justification for Sethe's action. Instead, for  Rushdy, 
0orrLsoQ teOOs tKe stor\ “tKroXgK tKe e\es tKat aFFXse aQd ePEraFe 
tKroXgK a perspeFtLve tKat FrLtLFL]es ZKLOe Lt reMoLFes” ()       
 The violent event of killing her child poses a dilemma and one 
of uneasy resolution: the reader must learn the different versions of the 
crime and listen to the different voices that claim the story of what 
happened in the woodshed with the arrival of schoolteacher.  
 For the inhabitants of 124 a resolution is reached when they 
reclaim their memories and, consequently, exorcise Beloved. Or as 
0F.a\ Kas poLQted oXt a resoOXtLoQ Ls reaFKed ZKeQ 6etKe “aFFept(s) 
her action and take(s) responsibility for it by recognizing why it 
happened and by understanding it in a framework larger that one of 
LQdLvLdXaO FoQFerQ” (0F.a\ ) )or tKe reader a resoOXtLoQ FaQ Ee 
reached, hoped for, or simply remain suspended. 
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 Beloved has been read, interpreted, and studied through the 
lenses of different methodologies and criticism. For instance, the 
materialization of the murdered child in Beloved has been explained in 
psychoanalytical readings through the notion of the return of the 
repressed (Henderson 1999; Christian, McDowell, and McKay 1999: 
204). It has also been read in light of Caribbean storytelling and folklore 
which believes that people, who die in brutal manners that are not 
understandable to them, come back as children (Christian, McDowell, 
and McKay 1999: 204). Because Toni Morrison engages many cultural 
references and blends different modes of thought in her texts, the 
reading of Beloved is a rich and challenging experience. As Nellie 
0F.a\ sXggests oI 0orrLsoQ
s ZorN tKe reader FaQ “Neep dLggLQg 
deeper aQd deeper >«@ aQd ILQd tKe saPe LssXes deaOt ZLtK  LQ so Pany 
ways and from so many different cultural references that she destabilizes 
our tendencies toward safe one-dLPeQsLoQaO PeaQLQgs” (&KrLstLaQ 
McDowell, and McKay 207). In Beloved tKe “FXOtXred Oa\erLQg” () 
that constitutes the narrative defers a final meaning and offers the reader 
the possibility to fill in the gaps with his/her own culture and ways of 
thinking.  
 I locate my analysis of Beloved in the interaction of the reader 
with the theme of violence. I focus on the violent event of Sethe's 
murdering of her child in the first part of my discussion, and on the 
effects of violence in the constitution of selfhood, in the second part. I 
approach this latter point through the notion of invisibility (of how 
individuals are made invisible in practices of violence) and how that 
invisibility is sustained by the deferral of meaning.  
 I believe the encounter with violence in Beloved is loaded with 
what Marco Abel names the violence of sensation. In Abel's perspective, 
a text that is aesthetically and thematically violent holds the potential to 
FoQIroQt tKe reader
s FertaLQt\ “%\ PasoFKLstLFaOO\ LQteQsLI\LQg tKe 
PoPeQt oI XQFertaLQt\” ($EeO ) tKe reader Ls gLveQ tKe FKaQFe to 
engage with different levels of cognition in his/her process of making 
meaning. For Abel, this experience of a momentary suspension of 
judgment is the precondition for the creation of new modes of being in 
the world.  
 I center my attention on one movement of suspension: the 
deferred judgment on Sethe's act due to the narrative's articulation of 
notions of love, freedom, and violence. Because violence overtook 
freedom and resignified love, it is only through the recovery of the past 
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that characters and, thus, readers can begin to forge new meanings. 
 Debora McDowell draws attention to how tKe aFt oI “re-
PePor\” LQ Beloved, signifies tKat “ever\ revLsLtatLoQ oI aQ aFtXaO 
event recreates and re-members, puts back together that which was, but 
that putting back together doesn't bear a uniform relation to what was 
there before: memory is a creatLve proFess” (&KrLstLaQ 0F'oZeOO aQd 
McKay 210). To put it in other words, when the third person narrator 
gives voice to the characters, who tell us of their memories, the reader is 
not only learning how they have become who they are and how they 
have been affected by being destitute of freedom and of control over 
one's own body and mind. The reader is also following the character 
forging her own self. The act of re-memory is a creative process for the 
character is creating herself at the very moment she is remembering her 
past. In the process of re-membering not only the past is reinserted into 
the present but also the fractured self is healed through the telling of past 
stories. In Beloved, re-membering is part of the process of healing 
painful wounds and the path to fashioning a sense of self.  
 
5.1 The Choices of Margaret Garner and Sethe 
 The story of Margaret Garner was reported thoroughly by 
newspapers at the time and Garner became a symbol for the abolitionist 
cause. In a speech celebrating the twenty-third anniversary of West 
Indian Emancipation, Frederick Douglass called upon what he believed 
Garner symbolized:  
 
>«@ ,I Ze ever get Iree IroP tKe oppressLoQs aQd ZroQgs 
heaped upon us, we must pay for their removal. We must do 
this by labor, by suffering, by sacrifice, and if needs be, by 
our lives and the lives of others. 
Hence, my friends, every mother who, like Margaret Garner, 
plunges a knife into the bosom of her infant to save it from 
the hell of our Christian Slavery, should be held and honored 
as a EeQeIaFtress” (TXoted LQ 5XsKd\  )  
 
 At the time it happened, Margaret Garner's story represented the 
extreme measures a victim of racist ideology under the institution of 
slavery would take to escape it. Although news reports gave different 
details of the story - probably motivated by the exoticism of it (Rushdy 
42) - most accounts say that on 27
th
 January, 1856, at Cincinnati, Ohio, a 
fugitive slave killed her child after being found by the slaveholder and 
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officials. They had arrived at a scene of a woman holding a bloody 
knife, a small child with her throat cut, bleeding to death, and other 
three scared and injured children. A report by the American Anti-Slavery 
6oFLet\ LQ  desFrLEed “7Ke ZoPaQ avoZed KerseOI tKe PotKer oI 
the children, and said that she had killed one and would like to kill the 
tKree otKers ratKer tKaQ see tKeP agaLQ redXFed to sOaver\” (0a\  
26). The story circulated in newspapers and people followed Margaret 
Garner's trial with expectations and puzzlement - “For once, reality 
sXrpassed tKe ZLOdest tKoXgKt oI ILFtLoQ” () 5eports desFrLEed tKat 
during the trial Garner seemed serene and conscious of her situation. To 
most people's surprise, she did not regret her action, instead, she stated 
that her intention was to kill her four children and then herself. She was 
charged for murder and sent to prison. Accounts of an interview with 
5ev 3 & %assett LQ MaLO report tKat ZKeQ asNed “LI sKe Zas Qot e[FLted 
aOPost to PadQess ZKeQ sKe FoPPLtted tKe aFt” *arQer repOLed “1o >@ 
I was cool as I now am; and would much rather kill them at once, and 
thus end their suffering, then have them taken back to slavery and be 
murdered by piece-PeaO” (0a\ )  
 Newspapers coverage of the case seemed to convey the public's 
sympathy with the story of a mother's selflessness and love, 
simultaneous with their surprise and disbelief of her determination, 
sanity, and remorselessness. 
  Garner's choice of murdering her children in order to save them 
from slavery, or as Morrison's put it, the act of claiming her own 
freedom (Beloved xi), subverts  Western epistemology by blending 
freedom and reason with the negativity of death (Holloway 1990; Gilroy 
1993; Cheng 2001). This narrative in which death is the true escape 
from slavery is an example of black cultural production of narratives 
tKat aestKetLFaOO\ aQd tKePatLFaOO\ pXt stress “oQ paLQ aQd sXIIerLQg oQ 
dLssoQaQFe aQd tKe QegatLve” (*LOro\ ) 7Ke LPagLQatLve 
appropriation of the history of slavery has engaged the African-
Americans' experience of fear and vulnerability, the lingering and 
knowing ways of dying due to the daily presence of violence in their 
lives (Holloway 71-79), and the relationship between terror and 
memory, between the desire to forget a painful past and the impossibility 
of forgetting it (Gilroy 217). In Gilroy words:  
 
The turn towards death also points to the ways in which black 
cultural forms have hosted and even cultivated a dynamic 
rapport with the presence of death and suffering. This has 
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generated specific modes of expression and some vernacular 
philosophical preoccupations that are absolutely antagonistic 
to the enlightenment assumptions with which they have had 
to FoPpete Ior tKe atteQtLoQ oI tKe EOaFN pXEOLF >«@ ,t Ls 
integral, for example, to the narratives of loss, exile, and 
journeying which, like particular elements of musical 
performance, serve a mnemonic function: directing the 
consciousness of the group back to significant, nodal points 
in its common history and its social memory. The telling and 
retelling of these stories plays a special role, organizing the 
FoQsFLoXsQess oI tKe “raFLaO” groXp soFLaOO\ aQd strLNLQg tKe 
important balance between inside and outside activity ± the 
different practices, cognitive, habitual, and performative, that 
are required to invent, maintain, and renew identity. These 
have constituted the black Atlantic as a non-traditional 
tradition, an irreducibly modern, ex-centric, unstable, and 
asymmetrical cultural ensemble that cannot be apprehended 
through the Manichean logic of binary coding. (Gilroy 198) 
 
 The story of Margaret Garner and the fictionalization of that 
event by Toni Morrison are examples that disrupt enlightenment 
rationality, which approaches death as negativity and legitimates slavery 
and brutality. The choices of Margaret Garner and Sethe require new 
ways of thinking about what agency means for individuals stripped of it. 
Under the institution of slavery freedom is found in death (Cheng 20-4), 
therefore, Garner's and Sethe's action also illustrate their power to assert 
their human agency.  
 As Gilroy proposes referring to the work of Frederic Douglass 
and to the story of Margaret Garner: “tKe sOave aFtLveO\ preIers tKe 
possibility of death to the continuing condition of inhumanity on which 
plantation slavery depeQds” (*LOro\ ) 7Ke FKoLFe oI deatK Ls seeQ E\ 
Gilroy as the slave's act of self-assertion in a context in which he/she is 
devoid of will. In other words, under the extreme conditions of slavery, 
distinctions between emotions and the notion of survivaO “e[Feeds oXr 
vernacular understanding of agency, of what it means to take control of 
oQeseOI aQd oQe
s sXrroXQdLQgs” (&KeQg ) $ELdLQg E\ tKe saPe OogLF 
Garner's and Sethe's choices are translated as an act of will and a choice 
of freedom.  
 Furthermore, as Mae G. Henderson (1999) argued, Sethe's 
action should also be interpreted as her radical opposition to 
sFKooOteaFKer
s dLsFoXrse )or +eQdersoQ LQ tKe stor\ tKe “ZKLtePaOe 
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perspeFtLve” () represeQted E\ sFKooOteaFKer aQd tKe sKerLII tKat FaPe 
to arrest 6etKe FoQstrXFts a QarratLve oI tKe LQIaQtLFLde ZKere “tKe 
ZoPaQ sFKooOteaFKer Eragged aEoXt” Kad “goQe ZLOd dXe to tKe 
mishandling of the nephew who'd overbeat her and made her cut and 
rXQ” (Beloved 176). For the sheriff, the event should teach a OessoQ “$OO 
testimony to the results of a little so-called freedom imposed on people 
who needed every care and guidance in the world to keep them from the 
FaQQLEaO OLIe tKe\ preIerred” ()  
 Sethe's action competes with these narratives for she 
“reFoQstLtXtes Ker KXPaQLt\” (+eQdersoQ ) E\ sKLItLQg sFKooOteaFKer
s 
aQd tKe sKerLII
s QarratLves oI “ZLOdQess FaQQLEaOLsP aQLPaOLt\ 
destrXFtLveQess” () to a QarratLve oI PotKerKood aQd EOaFN PaterQaO 
Oove +eQdersoQ sXPParL]es “$ stor\ oI oppressLoQ becomes a story of 
liberation; a story of inhumanity has been overwritten as a story of 
KLgKer KXPaQLt\” () ,Q tKLs Za\ Ior +eQdersoQ 6etKe sXEverts tKe 
dominant white/male discourse and reconstitutes her self within the 
context of black women's experLeQFe aQd pOaFes “herstor\” () ZLtKLQ 
the larger framework of racial history in the United States.  
 Although Sethe's counter-narrative represents a radical 
opposition to the master's discourse and an assertion of her humanity, I 
disagree with Henderson's argument that Sethe reconstitutes her self 
with this counter-narrative. As we see in the novel, Sethe's substitutes 
the master's discourse for the black maternal love metaphor as the basis 
Ior Ker seQse oI seOI +er vLeZ tKat Ker FKLOdreQ Zere “tKe Eest thing she 
Zas” aQd tKat Ker MoE Ls to Neep Ker FKLOdreQ “aZa\ IroP ZKat , NQoZ Ls 
terrLEOe” (Beloved 194) is also problematic because, as we see in the 
novel (and I will return to this point shortly), Sethe is continuingly 
defined by external elements.   
 For Gilroy, Cheng, and Holloway, the murder committed by 
Margaret Garner and Sethe belong to narratives in which their decision 
is a refusal to concede legitimation to slavery, and a step out of the 
LQtersXEMeFtLve depeQdeQFe tKat “+egeO
s metanarrative of poZer” 
(Gilroy 60) would confer to the slave. In these narratives, Garner and 
Sethe are the ones possessed of "consciousness that exists for itself", 
while, in Beloved, schoolteacher becomes the representative of a  
"consciousness that is repressed within itself" (61). For Gilroy, the 
choice of death instead of slavery is the opposite of the rationality and 
the logic characteristic of modern Western thought ± present in Hegel's 
allegory in the slave's preference of servitude over death. Sethe's agency 
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lies in her positive choice of death as the discontinuity of servitude, 
oppression, and violence. As the narrator reminds us, worse than what it 
“tooN to drag tKe teetK oI tKat saZ XQder tKe OLttOe FKLQ” (Beloved 295) of 
Sethe's baby was  
 
what Baby Suggs died of, what Ella knew, what Stamp Paid 
saw and what made Paul D tremble. That anybody white 
could take your whole self for anything that came to mind. 
Not just work, kill, or maim you, but dirty you. Dirty you so 
bad you couldn't like yourself anymore. Dirty you so bad you 
forgot who you were and couldn't think it up. And though she 
[Sethe] and others lived through and got over it, she could 
never let it happen to her own. The best thing she was, was 
her children. Whites might dirty her all right, but not her best 
thing, her beautiful, magical best thing ± the part of her that 
Zas FOeaQ >«@ $Qd Qo oQe QoEod\ oQ tKLs eartK ZoXOd OLst 
her daughter's characteristics on the animal side of the paper. 
>«@ 6etKe Kad reIXsed ± and refused still. (Beloved 295-296) 
  
5.2 The Force of Invisibility and Pain 
 For Sethe, the dirtiness of slavery would, borrowing from 
Elaine Scarry's terminology, unmake the consciousness of her children. 
Unable to know, remember, and imagine who you were/are renders a life 
not only without thought but also without feeling. This unmaking of 
consciousness and, consequently of the world, inflicted by the violent 
practices and imprisonment of slavery renders life unlivable. Sethe 
realizes she is made invisible when she overhears one of schoolteacher's 
lessons.  
 
I couldn't help listening to what I heard that day. He was 
taONLQg to KLs pXpLOs aQd , Keard KLP sa\ “:KLFK oQe are \oX 
doLQg"” $Qd oQe oI tKe Eo\s saLd “6etKe” 7Kat
s ZKeQ , 
stopped because I heard my name, and then I took a few 
steps to where I could see what they was doing. 
Schoolteacher was standing over one of them with one hand 
behind his back. He licked a forefinger a couple of times and 
turned a few pages. Slow. I was about to turn around and 
keep on my way to where the muslin was, when I heard him 
sa\ “1o Qo 7Kat
s Qot tKe Za\ , toOd \oX to pXt Ker KXPaQ 
characteristics on the left; her animal one on the right. And 
doQ
t Iorget to OLQe tKeP Xp” (Beloved 228) 
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 Sethe walks away confused and nauseated by what she has 
heard. Uncertain of what they meant with left and right columns, she 
asNs 0rs *arQer tKe PeaQLQg oI “FKaraFterLstLFs” “>@ $ FKaraFterLstLF 
Ls a IeatXre $ tKLQg tKat
s QatXraO to a tKLQg” (Beloved 231). In this 
moment, Sethe understands why she had been measured by 
schoolteacher and also why she had to take her children away from 
Sweet Home, even if without her. We could say that this is Sethe's 
realization of how powerful those lists are and how doomed she and her 
children are under those definitions. Sethe tells Beloved:  
 
So I sent you all to the wagon with the woman who waited in 
the corn. Ha ha. No notebook for my babies and no 
measuring string neither. What I had to get through later I got 
through because of you. Passed right by those boys hanging 
in the trees. One had Paul A's shirt on but not his feet or his 
head. I walked right on by because only me had your milk, 
and God do what He would, I was going to get it to you. You 
remember that, don't you; that I did? That when I got here I 
had milk enough for all? (Beloved 233) 
 
 The fragment above illustrates two sides of being made 
invisible. On the external side, Sethe is fully aware of her position 
within a system that will never let her be who she is, no matter how 
much she tries or how empathetic her master is. Sethe is made invisible, 
as Susan Sontag pointed out, by having her individuality erased.  
 On the internal side, invisibility is rendered by the depth of 
racism and the institution of  slavery: Sethe's own belief that her 
existence lied in the milk she was carrying. The traumatic violation of 
having her milk stolen by schoolteacher's nephews, and her obsessive 
belief that her milk was the most valuable thing about herself, unable a 
construction of a sense of self away from the characteristics on the 
pupils' lists. Sethe is struggling with a past (her past) that is narrated 
through schoolteacher (that is, white/male historical) discourse  
(Henderson 84-91). To put it in another way, she lacks a discourse of her 
own and, until she claims her own history (by narrating her painful 
memories), a sense of self remains in suspension.  
 This two-dimensional invisibility is constructed by the 
historical blending of the discourses of slavery and racism. The 
sociologist Orlando Patterson in Rituals of Blood: Consequences of 
Slavery in Two American Centuries (1998) proposed that the origin for 
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what he believes to be a contemporary dissonant behavior and attitude 
troubling gender relations amongst African-American men and women 
is in slavery and the following racial segregation of Jim Crow. For 
3attersoQ “>@ tZo aQd a KaOI FeQtXrLes oI poZerOessQess se[XaO 
degradation, male emasculation, childhood neglect, legal nonexistence 
(in which being raped by anyone Euro-American was not a crime), and 
general racist oppressLoQ” () OeIt tKeLr Post devastatLQg LPpaFt oQ 
gender roles. While Patterson examines different sources of American 
census data and sociological and medical researches in order to find 
patterns and continuities, here I want to center on his initial review of 
the effects of slavery in the self-fashioning of subjectivity and identity. 
Patterson defines slavery as: 
 
>«@ TXLQtesseQtLaOO\ aEoXt oQe persoQ assXPLQg tKroXgK 
brute force and the legalized violence of his government, 
absolute power and authority over another. The slave was 
reduced in law and civic life to a nonperson. He or she was 
socially dead as a legal entity (a person with independent 
capacities or rights or powers) and as a civic being (a 
recognized member of the sociopolitical order). As a person 
in law and civil society, the slave did not exist but instead 
was a mere surrogate of the master. (Patterson 1998: 27) 
 
 Under this system not only personhood was unattainable, 
turning one invisible to the law and civil society, as Patterson points, but 
also one was unable to forge a sense of self. Similarly in the novel, 
although Baby Suggs lived in the benevolent Sweet Home, and later free 
for years, she never knew who she was. 
 
>«@ 6ad as Lt Zas tKat sKe dLd Qot NQoZ ZKere Ker FKLOdreQ 
were buried or what they looked like if alive, fact was she 
knew more about them than she knew about herself, having 
never had the map to discover what she was like. 
Could she sing? (Was it nice to hear when she did?) Was she 
pretty? Was she a good friend? Could she have been a loving 
mother? A faithful wife? Have I got a sister and does she 
favor me? If my mother knew me would she like me? 
(Beloved 165) 
 
 Slavery, in Beloved, is destructive in every possible manner for 
it not only violates one's body and rights but it, significantly, violates 
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one's mind and its ability to imagine and create meaning. We could think 
of invisibility here in terms of an individual's virtual existence in a 
world in which emotions are not a constitutive part of their being. For 
instance, mothers learn to not get attached to their children, relationships 
are understood as pairing up without a prospect of continuity, the idea of 
having family members and relatives is rendered impossible for the 
slaves practice forgetting people's faces, voices, scent, and gestures. If 
one cannot recall with one's mind's eyes, it means one cannot long for 
that presence.  
 In the novel, loving as a slave, according to Paul D, meant 
protecting yourself and loving small (Beloved 191). 
 
Picked the tiniest stars out of the sky to own; lay down with 
head twisted in order to see the loved one over the rim of the 
trench before you slept. Stole shy glances at her between the 
trees and chain-up. Grass blades, salamanders, spiders, 
woodpeckers, beetles, a kingdom of ants. Anything bigger 
wouldn't do. A woman, a child, a brother ± a big love like that 
would split you wide open in Alfred, Georgia. (Beloved 191) 
 
 Paul D's advice to love small ± to love a little and to channel 
your affection towards things that you cannot keep closer to you like 
stars and insects ± and his practice of putting his memories and past in a 
tobacco tin work as coping mechanisms for a person deprived of 
IreedoP )or 3aXO ' NQeZ tKat IreedoP PeaQt EeLQg “LQ a pOaFe ZKere 
you could love anything you chose ± Qot to Qeed perPLssLoQ Ior desLre” 
(Beloved 191). 
 This unwilling submission of one's feelings and affection to the 
control of another was characteristic of institutionalized slavery in its 
effort to render meaningless familial ties like husband-wife and mother-
child relationships. The constant threat of absence leaves the self 
suspended, always deferred, awaiting to be forged by another. This 
process of obliteration of self-created meaning is also characteristic of 
racist encounters as discussed by Clare Hemmings under the notion of 
affective encounters. 
 In Beloved sOaver\ Kas Pade tKe seOI a “Qo seOI” (Beloved 165) 
and Toni Morrison creates a narrative in which the impact of slavery 
upon the forging of the self are also played in affective exchanges in 
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embodied encounters 
22
. For example, Sethe's reaction to overhearing 
sFKooOteaFKer
s OessoQ FoQve\s Ker aZareQess oI Ker “oEMeFtKood” eveQ 
though she does not immediately understand the meaning of the word 
“FKaraFterLstLFs” 
 
I commenced to walk backward, didn't even look behind me 
to found out where I was headed. I just kept lifting my feet 
and pushing back. When I bumped against a tree my scalp 
was prickly. One of the dogs was licking out a pan in the 
yard. I got to the grape arbor fast enough, but I didn't have 
the muslin. Flies settled all over your face, rubbing their 
hands. My head itched like the devil. Like somebody was 
sticking fine needles in my scalp. I never told Halle or 
nobody. (Beloved 228) 
 
 +ere PeaQLQg Ls reaFKed aIIeFtLveO\ “pOa\ed oXt on the body, 
and is played out with tKe ePotLoQs” ($KPed  ) 7Kat Ls tKere 
are different levels operating simultaneously in the construction of 
meaning in Beloved. The fragment above illustrates Sethe's making 
sense of her self within institutionalized slavery. Because she is 
positioned as an object of affective displacement, she awaits for the 
other to defined who she is. As I have pointed out, Sethe's infanticide 
                                                 
22
 Sara Ahmed in Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (2000) presents 
a concept of embodiment as lived experience with other bodies in which identity is 
constituted through and in encounters. Her definition of meetings and encounters is similar 
to what Hemmings and Abel term affective encounters. It does not necessarily presuppose 
the meeting of huPaQ EeLQgs EXt “a FoPLQg togetKer oI at Oeast tZo eOePeQts” () 
Ahmed identifies surprise as a IeatXre oI tKe eQFoXQter Ior Lt “Ls prePLsed oQ tKe aEseQFe 
oI a NQoZOedge tKat ZoXOd aOOoZ oQe to FoQtroO tKe eQFoXQter or to predLFt Lts oXtFoPe” 
(08). She states that while attempting to read another body, a subject may be frustrated by 
the impossibility of reading a given body. When unable to recognize a body, a subject will 
place that strange body against other already recognized as strange bodies. In other words, 
it is part of the nature of encounters with embodied subjects the impossibility of fixing 
meaning, for a thought to be fixed meaning in one situation may be disrupted in another.  
 Importantly, because the particularity of one's body is achieved by its encounter with 
another body and/or other bodies, one's inability to be affected resides in the maintenance 
of the integrity of such body and, therefore, one's self remains intact. Looking at what does 
Qot EeOoQg to Pe reaIILrPs P\ seQse oI EeLQg “LQ-pOaFe” aQd “at KoPe” () $ sLPLOar 
construction was pointed out by Susan Sontag about how discourses of this-is-how-they-
are and/or how-they-live are constructed to explain what has happened to the distant other. 
Such discourses help define the familiar against the strange bodies. Ahmed names 
“straQge EodLes” tKe EodLes tKat are FoQstrXFted as repXOsLve aQd straQge or as )aQoQ 
desFrLEed oI tKe EOaFN Eod\ tKe Eod\ “seaOed LQto tKat FrXsKLQg oEMeFtKood” ()aQoQ 
quoted in Ahmed 54). 
109 
could be interpreted as a counter-narrative to the dominant and 
oppressive master's discourse. By resignifying schoolteacher's narrative 
of wildness and animality into a narrative of black maternal love, Sethe 
asserted her mind and stopped schoolteacher. Nonetheless, as I have 
also stated, this counter-narrative does not work as an end to the impact 
of the master's discourse in Sethe's life. I also want to argue that the 
impact of slavery suspends meaning, thus living, in the story. 
 Pain overwhelms the characters' lives as an everlasting affect. 
Here pain works as affect: present as deep depression and in the loss of 
colors (Baby Suggs), inside a tobacco tin (Paul D), and as a ghost in the 
lives of the women of 124. And what is significant here is that pain 
remains as affect by the very choice of Baby Suggs, Paul D, and Sethe. 
This acceptanFe oI aQ “XQOLvaEOe OLIe” (Beloved 204) is a reflection of 
the devastating and demoralizing effect of the violence of slavery. It is 
only with the arrival of Beloved and her destructive presence, that Paul 
D and Sethe are forced to make sense of their past and, therefore, of 
who they are. As Barbara Christian suggested, the process of re-memory 
in Beloved works as the creation of herself as one that is not a 
commodity (Christian, McDowell, and McKay 218). Sethe is not her 
milk and only when she allows the past to be remembered that she 
begins to imagLQe aQd Iorge a seOI oXtsLde tKe EeOLeIs aQd “straQgeQess” 
she has been positioned.   
 Although meaning is suspended, it does not mean there is no 
knowledge. Elaine Scarry argued that the infliction of pain destroys 
consciousness, consequently hindering the imagining of one's 
sXEMeFtLvLt\ $s sKe pXt Lt tKe LQIOLFtLoQ oI paLQ “>@ (eveQ LI 
unconsciously) self-consciously and explicitly announces its own nature 
as an undoing of civilization, acts out the uncreating of the created 
FoQteQts oI FoQsFLoXsQess” (6Farr\ )  
 What we see in Beloved is that the infliction of pain indeed 
destroyed imagination and creation. For some characters, existence 
becomes a type of default living in which imagining (thus 
remembering) has no space in their lives. For others, like Halle, 
witnessing the infliction of violence against another person (Sethe) 
destro\ed KLs FoQsFLoXsQess $s 3aXO ' teOOs 6etKe “,t EroNe KLP 
6etKe >«@ <oX Pa\ as ZeOO NQoZ Lt aOO /ast tLPe , saZ KLP Ke was 
sLttLQg E\ tKe FKXrQ +e Kad EXtter aOO over KLs IaFe” (Beloved 82). 
Watching schoolteacher's nephews steal Sethe's milk paralyzed Halle's 
senses deteriorating his mind and soul to the point of madness. At last 
110 
knowing why Halle did not meet her as arranged, Sethe is wary of not 
letting her brain ask for more of the past.   
 
>«@ LI sKe FoXOd MXst PaQage tKe QeZs 3aXO ' EroXgKt aQd 
the news he kept to himself. Just manage it. Not break, fall or 
cry each time a hateful picture drifted in front of her face. 
Not develop some permanent craziness like Baby Sugg's 
friend, a young woman in a bonnet whose food was always 
full of tears. Like Aunt Phyllis, who slept with her eyes wide 
open. Like Jackson Till, who slept under the bed. All she 
wanted was to go on. As she had. Alone with her daughter in 
a haunted house she managed every damn thing. (Beloved 
115)   
 
 Furthermore, in Beloved the termination of physical violence 
offers no respite - pain continues as affect. Everlasting effects of 
violence corrode the lives and relationships of its victims. While 
physical pain ceases with the healing of injuries turned into scars, it 
becomes an enduring affect that disables one's capacity to feel. That is 
to say that pain remains as affect. Initially in the form of a ghost 
KaXQtLQg   XQtLO Lt “LQsLsts LtseOI EaFN LQto reaOLt\” LQ tKe IorP oI 
Beloved (Holloway 1990: 522).  
 While bodily pain was the only sensation they allowed 
themselves to feel and to heal from, their grief was put into the place of 
undesirable emotions along with passion, desire, and love. Baby Suggs, 
Sethe, and Paul D knew how to heal their body and turn their pain into 
scars, but they did not know how to heal anything else. Slavery had 
taught them how to live an unlivable life for, as Baby Suggs reminded 
6etKe “7Kere Ls Pore oI Xs tKe\ droZQed tKaQ tKere Ls aOO oI tKeP ever 
lived from the start of time. Lay down your sword. This ain't a battle; 
Lt
s a roXt” (Beloved 287). 
 Scarry argues that physical pain destroys language, therefore, 
one's imagination and ability to feel. As illustrated in the fragment 
above, that is also true in Beloved. However, when turned into affect, 
pain forces creation (re-memory) for the choice of numbness, or an 
isolated existence in a haunted house, proves unsustainable. Affect 
erupts in a desperate cry to be named - Beloved arrives unrelentingly 
asking to be named and to become the center and control of life in 124.  
 The dirtiness of slavery had suppressed the creation of oneself. 
However, destruction should be understood differently from Scarry's 
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thesis. In Beloved the self was not destroyed by violence. It was 
violence that obliterated its existence in the first place. Language and 
work could not mediate and/or reconstruct what was destroyed by 
torture, whipping, and the violation of one's body. Instead, the process of 
re-memory forges a self and a mode of being in the world that never 
knew how to exist outside the discourse of schoolteacher.  
 For Scarry, the activities of torture and war destroy the self and 
civilization; and only through imagination (work) that what was once 
inexpressible can find existence again. For Morrison, in Beloved, 
violence operates in the prevention of any form of creation and, 
therefore, of existence. Here we should be wary of Scarry's 
understanding of existence and subjectivity. According to her notion, the 
subject exists only through language and can, thus, be destroyed once 
that language is unmade (by violence). However, in Beloved, this notion 
of subjectivity is challenged by the continuing effect of pain. Although 
refusing to be placed on the animal side of the list, Sethe struggles to 
conceive of herself as not a commodity, as not the milk of her baby. In 
spite of choosing to not remember the past, pain is never eliminated. It 
exists as affeFt LQ tKe “XQspeaNaEOe tKoXgKts XQspoNeQ” (Beloved 235).  
 Pain exists in the spite of 124, in the questionable existence of 
%eOoved LQ tKe PaQ\ voLFes tKat teOO tKe stor\ LQ tKe te[t LQ tKe “dead 
1egro
s grLeI” paFNed LQ ever\ “KoXse LQ tKe FoXQtr\” (Beloved 06). 
Making sense of such pain initially meant madness. Beloved acted as a 
mediator between affect and emotion. Saying her name - “%eOoved sKe 
P\ daXgKter 6Ke PLQe” () “%eOoved Ls P\ sLster” () ± 
LQvaOLdates tKe “XQOLvaEOe” OLIe 6etKe aQd 'enver had. Meaning that had 
previously escaped the characters in their refusal to make sense of their 
pain is now named. Before the arrival of Beloved, we could think of 
pain as disembodied, without form or meaning, that is, as affect. 
Beloved's presence acts as powerful force insisting that Sethe represents 
tKe “XQspeaNaEOe tKoXgKts XQspoNeQ” LQ OaQgXage %\ LQsLstLQg tKat 
Sethe's tells her (their) story, affect is transformed into feeling.  
 In Beloved this process of narrating re-memories was nearly as 
painful and difficult. In the beginning of the story, Paul D's arrival 
signaled a new possibility, a new mode of being in the world in which 
feeling is part of being. Although Paul D sent the ghost out of the house, 
it came back in the form of Beloved. Feeling, then, enslaved them: 
Sethe's initial enjoyment of Beloved's company and love turn into 
possessiveness and Sethe's complete devotion to Beloved's whims and 
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desires; Denver's care, friendship, and loyalty becomes neurotic 
protection and jealousy. As Rushdy summarizes:  
 
Beloved is more than just a character in the novel, though. 
She is the embodiment of the past that must be remembered 
in order to be forgotten; she symbolizes what must be 
reLQFarQated LQ order to Ee EXrLed properO\ “(ver\Eod\ 
knew what she was called, but nobody anywhere knew her 
name. Disremembered and unaccounted for, she cannot be 
lost because no one is looking for her, and even if they were, 
KoZ FaQ tKe\ FaOO Ker LI tKe\ doQ
t NQoZ Ker QaPe"”(5XsKd\ 
41) 
 
 Through the act of re-memory pain that lingered as affect for 
eighteen years and materialized itself in the form of Beloved is given 
meaning in the process of narrating the past. These narratives initially 
seemed to have the destructive power of unmaking the self because 
remembering for Sethe was not an act of imagining and self-creation.  
The ubiquity of schoolteacher's lesson that returns years later in Paul D's 
judgment of her decision to kill her children - “<oX got tZo Ieet 6etKe 
Qot IoXr” (Beloved 194) - translated into a suspension of living and of 
meaning because she was still fashioning a life and a sense of self in 
light of that invisibility.  
 As I have said above, isolation and invisibility become 
unsustainable. Beloved arrives at 124 asking for an explanation (a 
narratLve) aQd “EeFoPes tKe LQFarQated PePor\ oI 6etKe
s gXLOt” 
(Rushdy 47). Only when Sethe confronts her action and accepts her 
responsibility for it, while also recognizing the reasons for the 
infanticide within the larger framework of the impact of slavery upon 
the lives of her family and community, that she is able to mourn her 
daughter and healing occurs. Meaning here is constructed in terms of the 
individual position and role within the family, community, and history. 
The invisibility rendered by slavery and racism has to be confronted in 
the dialogical relationship between individual and collective; and the 
sense of self fashioned in its relationship with the other, but outside the 
discourse of the other, for Sethe has to narrate her own history and 
create her own discourse. 
 In Beloved, meaning is suspended, deferred, in the issue of 
judging Sethe's infanticide and, as a consequence of that, in the use of 
pain as affect impeding sensation and feeling from nurturing a sense of 
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self and freedom. 
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6. Push 
In Push we read the story of Claireece Precious Jones, told by 
herself, in her journal and through her poems. Precious, as she likes to 
be called, is an 18 year-old pregnant black girl from Harlem. She is 
obese, illiterate and has been expelled from school for her pregnancy 
has started to show. This is her second baby by her father. In 1983, she 
Zas tZeOve aQd Kad /LttOe 0oQgo a gLrO ZLtK 'oZQ¶s s\QdroPe ZKo Ls 
raised by her maternal grandmother. This second child is a boy, Abdul. 
Precious has been raped by her father since she was three and abused in 
every manner by her mother, whom she lives with. After Abdul is born, 
Precious learns she is HIV positive but fortunately her children do not 
have the virus.  
7Ke stor\ EegLQs ZLtK 3reFLoXs¶ IrXstratLoQ aQd aQger at being 
expelled from school for being pregnant, what she reckons to be unfair 
since she has done nothing wrong: 
 
0\ QaPe Ls &OaLreeFe 3reFLoXs -oQes , doQ¶t NQoZ ZK\ , aP 
teOOLQg \oX tKat *Xess µFaXse , doQ¶t NQoZ KoZ Iar ,¶P 
gonna go with this story or ZKetKer Lt¶s eveQ a stor\ or ZK\ 
,¶P taONLQ¶ ZKetKer ,¶P goQQa start IroP tKe EegLQQLQg or 
right from here or two weeks from now. Two weeks from 
now? Sure you can do anything when you talking or writing, 
Lt¶s Qot OLNe OLvLQg ZKeQ \oX FaQ oQO\ do ZKat you doing. 
6oPe peopOe teOO a stor\ µQ Lt doQ¶t PaNe Qo seQse or Ee trXe 
%Xt ,¶P goQQa tr\ to PaNe seQse aQd teOO tKe trXtK eOse 
ZKat¶s tKe IXFNLQg Xse" $LQ¶ eQoXgK OLes aQd sKLt oXt tKere 
already? (03-04) 
 
Precious is at 9
th
 grade at school but she should be at 12
th
. 
$OtKoXgK “aOO tKe pages OooN aOLNe” () to 3reFLoXs Ker grades are good 
and teachers compliment her behavior and performance in class. She is 
always seated in the last row of desks and remains silent during the 
whole period of classes. She is ostracized and bullied by the other 
students and reacts aggressively asserting herself by beating and 
threatening whoever assaults her. 
 
Everyday I tell myself something gonna happen, some shit 
OLNe oQ 79 ,¶P goQQa EreaN tKroXgK or soPeEod\ goQQa 
break through to me ± ,¶P goQQa OearQ FatFK Xp Ee QorPaO 
change my seat to the front of the class. But again, it has not 
been that day. (05) 
115 
 
:KeQ 3reFLoXs¶ seFoQd pregQaQF\ starts to sKoZ tKe KLgK 
school principal, Mrs. Lichenstein, suspends her for being pregnant and 
Ior Ker attLtXde oI “totaO XQFooperatLoQ” () /ater 0rs /LFKeQsteLQ 
FoPes to 3reFLoXs¶ KoXse to oIIer KeOp aQd to LQIorP sKe Kas 
recommended Precious to an alternative school, Higher Education 
Alternative/ Each One Teach One. This is a school for girls focused on 
improving their reading and math skills so they can take the G.E.D. 
(high school equivalency). At Each One Teach One, Precious meets 
Blue Rain (Ms. Rain), the teacher, and makes friends for the first time 
with her classmates. She learns how to read and write and part of her 
FOass ZorN Ls to ZrLte aEoXt oQe¶s past aQd oQeseOI LQ a MoXrQaO ,Q tKLs 
journal the students also exchange messages with Ms. Rain ± messages 
that are corrected for syntax and spelling mistakes, but also replied by 
the teacher, thus, establishing a space for conversation. 
 At Each One Teach One Precious finds the support to break 
aZa\ IroP Ker PotKer¶s KoXse aQd eQd tKe pK\sLFaO aQd ps\FKoOogLFaO 
abuse. After her second child is born and her mother threatens to kill her, 
Precious moves to Advancement House ± a place for battered women 
with babies or, as Precious describes it a ½ way house: a place you stay 
“ò Za\ EetZeeQ tKe OLIe \oX Kad aQd tKe OLIe \oX ZaQt to Kave” () 
There she is able to take care of Abdul, who stays at a nursery while 
Precious attends school. 
From early on in the story Precious tells us about her wish and 
need to break away from the life she has ± sometimes in the form of her 
daydreaming and fantasies of being a loved and desired girl like in 
music videos. Yet Push is neither a sentimental narrative nor a victim's 
narrative of her dismal condition. Precious is a loving witty girl aware of 
the abuse she has suffered at home and at school, and in search of a way 
out of her current life. Her welfare money is collected by her mother, 
who lies to the inspectors about raising Little Mongo, as she has the 
custody of Precious and her grandchild. Precious is doubtful of anyone's 
sincerity and efforts to help her: Mrs. Lichenstein's recommendation of 
Each One Teach One; the police at the hospital inquiring about the 
father of her baby and her denunciation of being raped by her father; 
Ms. Rain and the social services' counselor asking Precious to remember 
her past. Her automatic reaction is to remain silent and ignore questions 
asked. Precious believes that this is the smartest thing to do and the only 
way to avoid being characterized, typified, in files saying what she is 
(07).  
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I wonder what exactly do file say. I know it say I got a baby. 
Do it say who daddy? What kinda baby? Do it say how pages 
the same for me, how much I weigh, fights I done had? I 
don't know what file say. I do know every time they wants to 
fuck wif me or decide something in my life, here they come 
wif the mutherfucking file. Well, OK, they got file, know 
every motherfucking thing. So what's the big deal, let's get it 
on. (28) 
 
In order to enter the G.E.D class a student should be able to read 
on a eighth-grade level. Although Precious was on ninth grade, as she 
informed the placement test instructor at Each One Teach One, she 
failed the test, which was no surprise to her. 
 
For me this nuffin' new. There has always been something 
wrong wif the tesses. The tesses paint a picture of me wif no 
brain. The tesses paint a picture of me an' my muver ± my 
whole family, we more than dumb, we invisible. One time I 
seeQ Xs oQ 79 >«@ ZeOO soPe oI tKeP Zas peopOes aQd soPe 
of them was vampire peoples. But the real peoples did not 
NQoZ Lt tLOO Lt Zas part\ tLPe >«@ 6o Lt
s ILve oI 
eP sLttLQg oQ 
the couch; and one of 'em sitting on the couch; and one of 
'em git up and take a picture. Got it? When picture develop 
(it's instamatic) only one person on the couch. The other 
peoples did not exist. They vampires. They eats, drinks, wear 
clothes, talks, fucks, and stuff but when you git right down to 
it they don't exist. 
I big, I talk, I eats, I cooks, I laugh, I watch TV, do what my 
muver say. But I can see when the picture come back I don't 
e[Lst >«@ , NQoZ ZKo , aP , NQoZ ZKo tKe\ sa\ , aP ± 
vampire sucking the system's blood. Ugly black grease to be 
wipe away, punish, kilt, changed, finded a job for. 
>«@ tKe peopOe ZKo sKoZ Xp ZKeQ tKe pLFtXre FoPe EaFN 
and they are pritty people, girls with little titties like buttons 
and legs like long white straws. Do all white people look like 
pictures? No, 'cause the white people at school is fat and 
cruel like evil witches from fairy tales but they exist. Is it 
because they white? If Mrs. Lichenstein who have elephant 
stomach and garbage smell from her pussy exist, why don't I? 
Why can't I see myself, feel where I end and begin. [...] My 
fahver don't see me really. If he did he would know I was like 
a white girl, a real person, inside. He would not climb on me 
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from forever and stick his dick in me 'n get me inside on fire, 
bleed, I bleed then he slap me. Can't he see I am a girl for 
flowers and thin straw legs and a place in the picture. I been 
out the picture so long I am used to it. But that don't mean it 
doQ
t KXrt >«@ What tess say? I don't give a fuck. I look bitch 
teacher woman in face, trying to see do she see me or the 
tess. But I don't care now what anybody see. I see something, 
somebody. I got baby. So what. I feel proud 'cept it's baby by 
my fahver and that make me not in picture again. (30-33)   
 
The aQgst oI EeLQg desFrLEed LQ sFKooOs¶ aQd soFLaO servLFes¶ 
ILOes Ls a FoPPoQ aQd reFXrreQt oQe at 0s 5aLQ¶s FOass 3reFLoXs¶ 
classmates know too well the consequences of what such files say about 
them. That is, the representation of themselves, due to a life of physical 
violence and all types of abuse, signify what form of help will be made 
available to them, as well as directions for their future. Here the story of 
tKese gLrOs¶ OLves Qot oQO\ deILQes (redXFes) ZKo tKe\ are EXt aOso oIIers 
a dismal view of their potentials and future. Memories and telling their 
history seem like submitting to views the girls in Ms. Rain's class refuse 
to aFFept as tKeLrs or Eetter as trXe /LNe -erPaLQe ZrLtes LQ “+arOeP 
%XtFK”  
 
I never told that part of my story before because I hate to see 
tKeLr sTXare e\es OLgKt Xp ZLtK “2K tKat
s ZK\ , XQderstaQd 
now! I see -” 1o <oX doQ
t see %eIore , Zas sQatFKed oXt 
the air like a butterfly, wings torn off me. BEFORE any all 
that I had slid my fingers up the sweet stink of another child 
and knelt down to lick her thighs. Men did not make me this 
way. Nothing happened to make me this way. I was born 
EXtFK” (Life Stories. Our Class Book appendix) 
 
The readers are confronted by Precious and her classmates' 
voices and by the teachers, nurses, and counselors' voices and 
diagnostics. Violence and subjugation are at the core of the stories 
informing the control and stigma of these girls' lives. However, they 
refuse to accept the fate of victims of violence or their fate so far. The 
often accepted view of the effects of a lifetime of domestic, mental, and 
sexual abuse is challenged by these girls' voices and verdicts on abuse 
and victimization. Although being victims and consciously aware of the 
effects of violence and suffering, in their narratives they are empowered 
as subjects and agents of their stories.  
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,Q tKeLr QarratLves aQd espeFLaOO\ LQ 3reFLoXs¶ ageQF\ aQd tKe 
construction of subjectivity does not operate in a movement from 
feeling to knowing, from what was expressed emotionally and 
physically to verbal (written) expression. Instead, it is impossible to 
differentiate where feeling and knowing start, where affect terminates 
and language begins.  
Precious must learn how to read and write in order to 
understand what was written about her, the what-she-is. Although she 
already wondered and knew what was said, Precious urges to read those 
files. She steals her counselor's file and, with the help of Jermaine, is 
able to read, on her own, the descriptions of her personality and of her 
capabilities and working skill.  
 
I have just finished a session with Claireece Precious Jones. 
Precious, as she likes to be called (I guess so bitch it's my 
name) is an eighteen-year-old African American female. 
According to her teachers at Each One Teach One where she 
attends school she is a (I don't know what that word is!) p-h-
e-n-o-m-e-n-a-O sXFFess >@ “7Ke FOLeQt taONs aEoXt Ker 
desire to get her G.E.D. and go to college. 
“7Ke tLPe aQd resoXrFes Lt ZoXOd reTXLre Ior tKLs \oXQg 
woman to get a G.E.D. or into college would be considerable. 
Although she is in school now, it is not a job readiness 
program. Almost all instruction seems to revolve around 
language a-c-” (-erPaLQe speOOLQg QoZ) “T a-kwi-si-tion 
aFTXLsLtLoQ” (“:Kat tKat"” , asN “<oX NQow, to get. 
/aQgXage aFTXLsLtLoQ to get soPe OaQgXage”) “7Ke teaFKer 
Ms Rain, places great emphasis on writing and reading 
books. Little work is done with computers or the variety of 
multiple choice pre-G.E.D. And G.E.D. Workbooks available 
at low cost to JPTA programs. 
“3reFLoXs Ls FapaEOe oI goLQg to ZorN QoZ >«@ ,Q NeepLQg 
with the new initiative on welfare reform I feel Precious 
would benefit from any of the various workfare programs in 
existence. Despite her obvious intellectual limitations she is 
qXLte FapaEOe oI ZorNLQg as a KoPe atteQdaQt” (“$ KoPe 
attendant? I don't wanna be no mutherfucking home 
attendant! I wanna be -” “+86+” -erPaLQe sa\) 
“7Ke FOLeQt seePs to vLeZ tKe soFLaO servLFe s\steP aQd Lts 
proponents as her enemies, and yet while she mentions 
independent living, seems to envision social services, AFDC, 
as taNLQg Fare oI Ker Iorever” (-120) 
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She comes to know herself through the discourse of social 
services and counseling, which, although intent on helping her, defines 
and stigmatizes her experience. This is another point in which readers 
might be frustrated by the narrative. Readers might share similar views 
and prospects that could empower and help her. One's familiar response 
or point of view might be similar to the social services' habitual way of 
addressing the help needed from pensioners. However, Precious shifts 
that knowledge each time she tells us about her past. Significantly, as 
she makes sense of the violence she has suffered and her pain, the reader 
is given more and more meanings,  creating a complex and irreducible 
e[perLeQFe oI se[XaO aEXse $s $EeO LPportaQtO\ rePLQds Xs “6peaNLQg 
'for' others too often serves as a disguise for speaking one's own point of 
vLeZ tKXs eradLFatLQg tKat ZKLFK Ls otKer” () &oQverseO\, what 
Precious' narrative does is to suggest that readers (and social services) 
need to transform their frame of familiar response; that, although intent 
on helping and empowering Precious, this discourse is placing the 
singularity of her existence within a structure of othering.    
In Push, violence, abuse, and subjugation bewilder characters 
and readers. Precious struggles with trust and is confused by her 
mother's complicity regarding the sexual abuse happening at her home; 
by the school's denial and dismissal of domestic abuse; by her teacher's 
denial of her illiteracy and his lies regarding her good grades and 
compliments to the principal; by the hospital and police deciding not to 
LQvestLgate tKe Fase oI rape aQd LQFest IXrtKer E\ tKe QeLgKEor¶s FKoice 
of ignoring her pregnancies and the beatings from her mother. A 
multidimensional system of violence and subjugation is revealed to 
readers at the same time that Precious herself is capable of narrating 
what has happened to her. As she writes about her past, she is able to 
react to such violence and subjugation. In this process of making 
meaning and having the power to describe herself, the complex 
interrelation of mind and body, reason and feeling are exposed. In the 
narrating of her history of rape and abuse we find the split of these 
opposites impossible. Precious is tricked by her own body when raped 
by her father. She is simultaneously terrorized and repelled by the act, 
capable of dissociating herself from the present moment, and along with 
the bodily pain she also feels sexual pleasure. 
 
This time I know Mama know. Umm hmmm, she know. She 
bring him to me. I ain' crazy, that stinky hoe give me to him. 
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Probably thas' what he require to fuck her, some of me. Got 
to where he jus' come in my room any ole time, not jus' night. 
He climb on me. Shut up! he say. He slap my ass, You wide 
as the Mississippi, don't tell me a little bit of dick hurt you 
heifer. Git usta it, he laff, you is usta it. I fall back on bed, he 
fall right on top of me. Then I change stations, change bodies, 
I be dancing in videos! In movies! I be breaking, fly, jus' a 
dancing! Umm hmm heating up at the stage at the Apollo for 
Doug E. Fresh and Al B. Shure. They love me! Say I'm one 
of the best dancers ain' no doubt of or about that! 
“,
P goQQa Parr\ \oX” Ke Ee sa\LQg +Xrr\ Xp QLgger sKXt 
up! He mess up dream talkin' 'n gruntin'. First he mess up my 
life fucking me, then he mess up the fucking talkin'. I wanna 
scream. Oh shut up! Nigger, how you gonna marry me and 
you is my daddy! I'm your daughter, fucking me illegal. But I 
keep my mouf shut so's the fucking don't turn into beating. I 
start to feel good; stop being a video dancer and start coming. 
I try to go back to video but coming now, rocking under Carl 
now, my twat jumping juicy, it feel good. I feel ashamed. 
“See, see,” Ke sOap P\ tKLgK OLNe FoZEo\s do Korses oQ 79 
the he squeeze my nipple, bite down on it. I come some 
Pore “See, you LIKE it! You jus' like your mama ± you die 
Ior Lt” +e pXOO KLs dLFN oXt tKe ZKLte FXP stXII pour out my 
hole wet up the sheets. (24-25) 
 
I try to forget I got baby in me. I hate borning the first one. 
No fun. Hurt. Now again. I think my daddy. He stink, the 
white shit drip off his dick. Lick it lick it. I HATE that. But 
then I feel the hot sauce hot cha cha feeling when he be 
fucking me. I get so confuse. I HATE him. But my pussy be 
poppLQg +e sa\ tKat “%Lg 0aPa \oXr pXss\ Ls poppLQg” , 
HATE myself when I feel good. (57-58)  
 
I tell counselor I can't talk about Daddy. Daddy sick me, 
disgust me, but still he sex me up. I nawshus in my stomach 
but hot tight in my twat and I think I want it back, the smell 
of the bedroom, the hurt ± he slap my face till it sting and my 
ears sing separate songs from each other, call me names, 
pump my pussy in out in out in out awww I come. He bite me 
hard. A hump! He slam his hips into me HARD. I scream 
pain he come. He slap my thighs like cowboys do horses on 
TV. Shiver. Orgasm in me, his body shaking, grab me, call 
me Fat Mama, Big Hole! You LOVE it! Say you love it! I 
wanna say I DON'T. I wanna say I'm a chile. But my pussy 
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popping like grease in frying pan. He slam in me again. His 
dick soft. He start sucking my tittie. 
I wait for him get off me. Lay there stare at wall till wall is a 
movie, Wizard of Oz, I can make that one play anytime. 
Michael Jackson, scarecrow. Then my body take me over 
again, like shocks after earthquake, shiver me, I come again. 
My body not mine, I hate it coming. 
Afterward I go bafroom. I smear shit on my face. Feel good. 
Don't know why but it do. I never tell nobody about that 
before. But I would do that. (111-112)  
 
The extracts above illustrate the recurrence and intensity of 
3reFLoXs¶ traXPa 7Ke epLsodes oI se[XaO vLoOeQFe are Qarrated ZLtK a 
combination of fantasy and reality ± Precious' dissociation and the 
reality of the rape and/or beating. Bodily sensations confuse her and a 
startled reader is made to refrain from drawing the obvious conclusion: 
that rape is horrific, painful, and traumatic. We, readers, must suspend 
our judgments and conclusions momentarily, perhaps secretly hoping 
her confusion will end, or perhaps hoping other episodes in the narrative 
will focus solely on the violence and horror of rape. Yes, rape here is 
horrific, painful, and traumatic, but not only that - there is an element of 
sexual pleasure. Precious names it as orgasm, which poses new 
questions and brings uncertainty to a theme thought to be very definite 
(on its negativity). 
Additionally, it is through rape and incest ± the only sexual 
experiences Precious has had ± that she forges her views on love, sex, 
and pleasure. When she wonders about having a romantic relationship 
she calls her physical sensations as something she would like to feel 
again with a lover. 3reFLoXs¶ vLeZs oQ Oove se[XaOLt\ aQd pOeasXre 
challenge notions of normalcy when rape and incest do not seem to have 
a fixed signified (Levinson 2001). Her experience of sex (one of 
violence, abuse, and dissociation) is a source of knowledge complicated 
by sensations and affect. Here rape and incest also come to signify what 
is unacceptable in the American discourse of morality and normalcy 
(sanity). The confusion generated by the victim's sexual pleasure in the 
act of rape is a feature of Precious' narrative. On the one hand, she is 
influenced by acceptable and normative standards of heterosexuality and 
romantic views of sex coming from the music videos and TV shows she 
watches. On the other hand, her own experience of sexual abuse exceeds 
conventional narratives of not only rape but also of love and hate, of 
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pleasure and desire.  
The re-signification of rape, sexuality, and love here do not 
stem strictly from Precious' agency, but also from forces that push 
Precious about without fixing the meanings being created. There are no 
resolution nor the reinstating of binaries. At the same time we follow 
Precious' attempts at forging her own destiny, we also follow the re-
signification of meanings. We follow her relentless struggle against 
being defined by what is written on files as she writes about her 
experience ± one that calls for new words, new meanings, once the ones 
available to Precious and to readers cannot represent what has happened 
to her. There is the frustration of an explanatory narrative. Readers are 
not offered an end in which Precious' mother is punished or somehow 
forgiven. Neither a resolution regarding her father, whom we learn died 
of aids after Abdul was born. 
By reading Precious' journal and poems we are forced to 
confront individual feelings (Precious' and ours) and affective 
investments involved in our constructions of the world. The literary text 
becomes a site wherein readers are able to put themselves imaginatively 
in the character's place (Brooks 2009) and, hopefully, allowing for a 
reflection that, as Morrison intended, would move readers.      
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7. The Dew Breaker 
 The Dew Breaker is Edwidge Danticat's imaginative world of a 
former government sanctioned torturer and his victims during Duvalier 
dictatorship in Haiti. 
23 
 The title refers to the protagonist who was a 
choukèt lawoze ± translated from Creole by Danticat as dew breaker 
(Danticat 2010: 11). In Haitian Creole it refers to the men that would 
“EreaN LQto \oXr KoXse 0ostO\ Lt Zas at QLgKt  %Xt oIteQ tKe\
d aOso 
come before dawn, as the dew was settling on the leaves, and they'd take 
\oX aZa\” (The Dew Breaker  131). It was the president himself who 
QaPed KLs prLvate PLOLtLa “aIter tKe P\tKLF ILgXre oI tKe 7oQtoQ 
Macoute, a bogeyman who abducted naughty children at night and put 
tKeP LQ KLs NQapsaFN >@” (The Dew Breaker 216). In this story, it refers 
to a Tonton Macoute in charge of arresting, torturing, and killing 
civilians who were against the dictator.  
 The narrative alternates between its present time set in modern-
day Brooklyn, New York, a short trip to Florida, and in Haiti in the 
1960s. The novel is structured in nine nonlinear chapters; as Danticat 
Kas reParNed oI Ker LQteQtLoQ tKLs EooN Ls “QeLtKer a QoveO Qor a stor\ 
FoOOeFtLoQ EXt soPetKLQg LQ EetZeeQ” ('aQtLFat  ) ,Q eaFK 
chapter, readers are presented the story of a character through an 
ordinary episode in his/her life, which is interrupted as the next chapter 
begins. This fragmented structure is pieced together by seemingly small 
details that, when connected by the reader, unite the title protagonist and 
his actions to all the other characters and their stories. 
 7Ke ILrst FKapter “7Ke %ooN oI tKe 'ead” Ls Qarrated E\ .a 
We are introduced to the title protagonist, his wife, Anne, and his 
daughter, Ka ± the Bienaimé family. Both father and mother had 
immigrated from Haiti but had always refused to or offered incomplete 
information to answer Ka's questions about their past lives and the 
family they had left. In the present time of the narrative, father and 
daughter are on a trip to Florida, where Ka is delivering one of her 
sculptures to a client. It is a sculpture of her father ± .a
s “sLQgOe sXEMeFt 
                                                 
23
 The Duvalier dictatorship began in 1957 and lasted 30 years. The first 15 years were under 
tKe presLdeQF\ oI )raQooLs “3apa 'oF” 'XvaOLer $Iter KLs deatK LQ  KLs soQ -eaQ 
&OaXde 'XvaOLer aOso NQoZQ as “%pEp 'oF” EeFaPe presLdeQt 8Qder tKeLr regLPes tKe 
private militia known as Tonton Macoutes were responsible for abductions, tortures, and 
killings of thousands of civilians. Even after Jean Claude Duvalier was ousted in 1986 
(and forced into exile), Tonton Macoutes threatened the population and attempts at general 
elections, leading a military regime until 1990. In December that year, Jean Bertrand 
Aristide became Haiti's first democratically elected leader. 
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tKXs Iar” () ± which does not please him for he believes to be 
unworthy of it. One morning, he disappears with the sculpture and after 
revealing to Ka why he threw it in a lake, he tells her the real reason he 
left Haiti: 
 
“.a , doQ
t deserve a statXe” Ke sa\s agaLQ tKLs tLPe PXFK 
Pore sOoZO\ “Qot a ZKoOe oQe at Oeast <oX see .a \oXr 
IatKer Zas tKe KXQter Ke Zas Qot tKe pre\ >«@ , Kave Qo 
choice EXt to asN “:Kat are \oX taONLQg aEoXt"” 
I immediately regret the question. Is he going to explain why 
he and mother have no close friends, why they've never had 
anyone over to the house, why they never speak of any 
relatives in Haiti or anywhere else, or have never returned 
there or, even after I learned Creole from them, have never 
taught me anything else about the country beyond what I 
could find out on my own, on the television, in newspapers, 
in books? Is he about to tell me why Manman is so pious? 
Wh\ sKe goes to daLO\ 0ass" >«@ (-21) 
 
 Ka's father tells her he was never in prison but working in the 
prison, and that his face was cut by a prisoner, whom he killed as he had 
killed many other people. Confused and shocked at his revelations, she 
asks:  
 
 “$Qd tKose QLgKtPares \oX Zere aOZa\s KavLQg ZKat Zere 
tKe\"”  
“2I ZKat ,” Ke sa\s “\oXr IatKer dLd to otKers” 
Another image of my mother now fills my head, of her as a 
young woman, a woman my age, taking my father in her 
arms. At what point did she decide that she loved him? When 
did she know that she was supposed to have despised him? 
“'oes 0aQPaQ NQoZ"” , asN 
“<es” Ke sa\s “, e[pOaLQed aIter \oX Zere EorQ” >«@ “.a 
no matter what, I'm still your father, still you mother's 
husband. I would never do tKese tKLQgs QoZ” (-24) 
 
 The belief that what is in the past is over and that the present is different 
- “, ZoXOd Qever do tKese tKLQgs QoZ” - is the novel's greatest moral 
dilemma posed to the reader. Could the torturer ever be forgiven and 
redeemed from his past actions? Is it possible to reinvent oneself far 
away? How does one place violent acts and murders in the past and 
move on, or better, can one place them in the past and move on? Ka 
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listens to her father's narrative of his life and she ponders upon her 
mother's role in this:  
 
“0aQPaQ KoZ do \oX Oove KLP"” >«@ “, doQ
t NQoZ 
.a”>@ “<oX aQd Pe Ze save KLP :KeQ , Peet KLP Lt 
made him stop hurt the people. This is how I see it. He a seed 
thrown in rock. You, me, we make him take root” (-25) 
 
 Learning about her father's secret somehow escapes Ka's 
understanding; and her mother's narrative of their miraculous encounter 
is no better explanation. She is forced to rewrite her narrative of her 
parents' immigration to the United States from a vision of how novelty 
could be threatening to one that offered unimaginable comfort to both of 
them. 
 Ka's family reappears in the narrative twice again: in the fourth 
aQd LQ tKe ILQaO FKapters ,Q tKe IoXrtK FKapter “7Ke %ooN oI 0LraFOes” 
the three of them are attending Christmas Eve Mass - “tKe oQO\ tLPe sKe 
aQd Ker KXsEaQd aQd daXgKter ever atteQded FKXrFK togetKer” (The Dew 
Breaker 73). It is an episode from the past, before Ka learned of her 
father's past. During mass Anne is thinking about how they have 
managed to keep their secret and forge whole other identities when they 
decided to come to New York.  
 
>«@ sooQ aIter Ker KXsEaQd Kad opeQed KLs EarEersKop Ke
d 
discovered that since he'd lost eighty pounds, changed his 
name, and given as his place of birth a village deep in the 
mountains of Léogâne, no one asked about him anymore, 
thinking he was just a peasant who'd made good in New 
<orN +e KadQ
t EeeQ a IaPoXs “deZ EreaNer” or tortXrer 
anyway, just one of hundreds who had come done their jobs 
so well that their victims were never able to speak of them 
again. (76-77) 
 
 We hear of Anne's guilt for her role as accomplice to her 
KXsEaQd “,t Zas aOZa\s OLNe tKLs Ker OLIe a peQdXOXP EetZeeQ 
forgiveness and regret, but when the anger dissipated she considered it a 
small miracle, the same way she thought of her emergence from her 
oFFasLoQaO epLOeptLF seL]Xres as a NLQd oI resXrreFtLoQ” () :e OearQ 
that Anne's narrative of miracle was her compromising to her partner, 
then husband and father of her child. It was her effort to find and 
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maintain hope and be in charge of her life, as opposed to the lack of 
freedom and the constant threat of violence and death back in Haiti.  
 Danticat has pointed out the specific dilemma posed to Haitians 
living under the Duvalier dictatorship: to be either exiled or killed 
(Danticat 2010: 09). In this context, death also meant freedom for it 
“preveQted oQe IroP EeLQg EaQLsKed” () 7Ke FKoLFe EetZeeQ OeavLQg 
one's family and hometown in self-exile not always seemed better than 
to stay and die. As Danticat remarks, these were options forced upon 
peopOe ZKo Zere “so ZeatKer-beaten, terror-stricken, and maimed that 
tKe\ Zere stLIOed” () ,Q tKLs FoQte[t $QQe
s strXggOe to Iorge a OLIe 
and existence on her own terms could be thought of as an act of 
survival. 
  In the other chapters we learn about people and lives related to 
Ka's father's past job in Haiti and to his life in Brooklyn as an ordinary 
resident, barbershop owner married to a hair dresser (who also owns her 
own beauty shop), landlord, husband, and father. He is not named in the 
QoveO ,Q “7Ke %ooN oI tKe 'ead” Ke Ls desFrLEed E\ .a “6L[t\-five, 
five feet eight inches, one hundred and eighty pounds, with a widow's 
peak, thinning salt-and-pepper hair and velvet-brown eyes [with a] 
ropelike scar that runs from [his] right cheek down to the corner of his 
PoXtK” (-05). This physical description, especially the scar and the 
“ZLdoZ
s peaN” retXrQ Oater LQ tKe otKer FKapters LQ KLs vLFtLPs
 
descriptions of their torturer or killer of their parents. Ka's physical 
descriptions of her father and of her sculpture work as metaphors to 
what he was/is. She focuses on his physical appearance, the marks of his 
past (the scar she believes he got in prison), because she never got 
complete answers and detailed information about her parents' past in 
Haiti. She has constructed a narrative in an attempt to tell his (and her) 
story; yet, never in words.  
 The narrative moves on through apparently unrelated stories. 
&Kapter “6eveQ” is  a third person narration about a man whose wife is 
arriving from Port-au-Prince after seven years apart. He is welcoming 
his wife in the basement apartment he rents with two flatmates, Michael 
aQd 'aQ\ LQ %rooNO\Q ,Q FKapter “:ater &KLOd” tKe Qarrator tells the 
story of Nadine Osnac, a thirty-year-old estranged nurse whose parents 
still live in Haiti. She is grieving an aborted child from Eric, an ex-
boyfriend, whose phone number she discovers is unlisted. Chapter 
“1LgKt 7aONers” Ls aEoXt 'aQ\
s retXrn back to Haiti to visit his aunt 
(stLQa (stqPe ZKo raLsed KLP sLQFe “Ke Kad Oost KLs pareQts to tKe 
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dLFtatorsKLp” () 'aQ\ Ls EaFN to teOO KLs aXQt Ke Kas IoXQd tKe 7oQtoQ 
0aFoXte ZKo NLOOed KLs pareQts tKe “Oarge PaQ ZLtK a IaFe OLNe a soFFer 
ball aQd a ZLdoZ
s peaN dLppLQg LQto tKe PLddOe oI KLs IoreKead” () 
Dany rents a room in the basement of the former macoute, now a barber, 
and living there has caused him great distress. He has haircuts at his 
barbershop regularly so he can watch his moves. Dany expects the 
barber to show any sign of his past - “KLs Oarge KaQds to trePEOe” () ± 
EXt Ke Ls tKe oQe tKat trePEOes aQd sZeats aQgr\ aQd FoQIXsed oQFe “Ke 
would never know why ± why one single person had been given the 
power to destroy his entire OLIe” () 
 &Kapter “7Ke %rLdaO 6eaPstress” Ls tKe stor\ oI  $OLQe &aMXste 
a Haitian-American journalism intern at the magazine Haitian American 
Weekly. She has been assigned to interview Beatrice Saint Fort, a well-
known bridal seamstress in the Haitian community in New York, who is 
about to retire. Beatrice tells Aline she has found the prison guard ± the 
choukèt lawoze - who tortured her years ago in Haiti, living and working 
in her neighborhood.  
 
“+e asNed Pe to go daQFLQg ZLtK KLP oQe QLgKt “%eatrice 
said, putting her feet back in her sandals.  
I had a boyfriend, so I said no. That's why he arrested me. He 
tied me to some type of rack in the prison and whipped the 
bottom of my feet until they bled. Then he made me walk 
home, barefoot. On tar roads. In the hot sun. At high noon. 
This man, wherever I rent or buy a house in this city, I find 
him, living on my street. (132)  
 
 Aline is intrigued by Beatrice story but uncertain whether her 
trauma has affected her sanity, whether the prison guard is indeed 
following Beatrice as she believes he is. 
 &Kapter “0oQNe\ 7aLOs” aOterQates epLsodes EetZeeQ )eErXar\ 
7, 1986 in Haiti and February 7, 2004 in New York. It is narrated by 
Michael, who is recording into a cassette stories of his childhood in 
Port-au-Prince to his unborn son, while his nine-month pregnant wife 
sleeps in bed. Young Michael talks about his mother's over-protection of 
him among the confusion and irruption of violence in the streets due to 
Jean-Claude Duvalier and his wife's exile. As Michael describes:  
 
[...] the looting of homes and businesses of former 
government allies, the lynching, burning, and stoning of the 
128 
macoutes, the thousand of bodies that were suddenly being 
discovered in secret rooms at the city morgues and in mass 
graves on the oXtsNLrts oI tKe FapLtaO >«@ (-162) 
 
 His account blends his 12-year-old innocence and fear, his 
being torn between his mother's over-protection and the adventures his 
best friend, 18-year-old Romain, offers him. Through Michael's coming 
of age narrative we learn about familial relations and the weak bonds 
that sustain them under a violent, dangerous, and corrupt environment. 
Michael belongs to what he calls  
 
a generation of mostly fatherless boys, though some of our 
fathers were still living, even if somewhere else ± in the 
provinces, in another country, or across the alley not 
acknowledging us. A great many of our fathers had also died 
in the dictatorship's prisons, and others had abandoned us 
altogether to serve the regime. (141)  
 
 &Kapter “7Ke )XQeraO 6LQger” Ls tKe stor\ oI tKree +aLtLaQ 
immigrant women who met in a high school diploma class in New York. 
During the after class meals Rézia, Mariselle, and Freda share in Rézia's 
restaurant, Ambiance Créole, they tell each other about their past and 
ZK\ tKe\ OeIt +aLtL $s )reda reParNs “, tKoXgKt e[posLQg a IeZ detaLOs 
of my life would inspire them to do the same and slowly we'd parcel out 
oXr sorroZs eaFK ZaONLQg oXt ZLtK IeZer tKaQ Ze
d FarrLed LQ” () 
Freda is the narrator. She was a professional funeral singer before being 
expelled from Haiti and, in New York, at twenty-two, became a student 
in a high school validation class.  
 )reda
s IatKer Kad dLsappeared “oQe da\ oQe PaFoXte FaPe to 
take [his fish stall at the market] and another one tooN >KLP@ aZa\” 
() 2Qe da\ Ke retXrQed KoPe tootKOess aQd “aQ oOd XgO\ PaQ” 
(172). The next day he took his boat out to sea and disappeared forever. 
Years later her mother asked her to leave the country after she refused to 
sing at the national palace. Mariselle's husband was murdered by a 
PaFoXte Ior paLQtLQg “aQ XQIOatterLQg portraLt oI tKe presLdeQt >«@ +e 
Zas sKot OeavLQg tKe sKoZ” () :KeQ 5p]La Zas a gLrO sKe Zas seQt 
to live with her aunt, who ran a brothel, because her parents could not 
support her. Freda tells her story: 
 
One night when she was sleeping, a uniformed man walked 
in. She dug herself into the bed, but it did no good, so she 
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passed out. 
“, FaQ aOZa\s PaNe P\seOI IaLQt ZKeQ ,
P aIraLd” 5p]La 
says, fanning the smoke from the pots away from her face. 
“:KeQ , ZoNe Xp LQ tKe PorQLQg P\ paQtLes Zere goQe 0\ 
aunt and I never spoke about it. But on her deathbed she 
asked for my forgiveness. She said this man had threatened 
to pXt Ker LQ prLsoQ LI sKe dLdQ
t Oet KLP Kave Pe tKat QLgKt” 
(173)   
 
 Although these stories are fragmented and constantly 
interrupted, as the narrative develops, names and places begin to 
somehow connect one another and all of them to the title protagonist's 
life. He is the landlord of the husband, Michael, and Dany in chapter 
“6eveQ” 7Ke KXsEaQd seePs to Ee 1adLQe
s e[-boyfriend, Eric. Both 
PeQ ZorN tZo MoEs tKe QLgKt oQe as a MaQLtor at “0edgar (vers 
&oOOege” ( ) 1adLQe retXrQs (rLF
s pKoQe FaOO aQd dLsFovers KLs 
“QXPEer Kad EeeQ FKaQged to oQe tKat Zas XQOLsted” () 3rLor to KLs 
ZLIe
s arrLvaO tKe KXsEaQd
s pKoQe Zas goQe “>@ tKe pKoQe QXPEer 
he'd had for the last five years, ever since he'd had a telephone. (He 
dLdQ
t Qeed otKer ZoPeQ FaOOLQg KLP QoZ)” () 7Ke prLsoQ gXard 
Beatrice has recognized is currently working as a barber. Nadine's 
laryngectomies patient Ms. Hinds, a twenty-five-year-old teacher who 
will undergo speech therapy, seems to be Rézia, Mariselle, and Freda's 
teaFKer -XQe ZKose “voLFe KLsses EXt Ls IOat Qever rLsLQg or IaOOLQg” 
(167). 
 ,Q tKe ILQaO FKapter “7Ke 'eZ %reaNer” tKe Qarrator goes EaFN 
to Port-au-Prince circa 1967 to tell the story of how Anne and her 
husband met. He has been assigned the job of killing the Baptist pastor 
who had been accused of broadcasting messages against Duvalier on his 
Sunday morning show on Radio Lumière. His sermons were perceived 
as politically liberating and empowering, totally contrary to 
 
the sanctioned national prayer, written by the president 
KLPseOI “2Xr IatKer ZKo art LQ tKe QatLoQal palace, hallowed 
be thy name. Thy will be done, in the capital, as it is in the 
provinces. Give us this day our new Haiti and forgive us our 
anti-patriotic thoughts, but do not forgive those anti-patriots 
who spit on our country and trespass against it. Let them 
succumb to the weight of their own venom. And deliver them 
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Qot IroP evLO” () 
24 
 
 Readers learn about the dew breaker's history, what happened to 
his peasant family when army officers decided to take their land, how he 
came to join, at nineteen “tKe 0LOLFLeQs tKe 9oOXQteers Ior 1atLoQaO 
6eFXrLt\” (tKat Oater ZoXOd Ee NQoZQ as 7oQtoQ 0aFoXtes) () detaLOs 
about how he tortured and executed people, and his plans of retiring 
from this job and leaving the country for good. After all these years he 
knew he was suffering from what one of his victims had identified as 
“tKe greatest Ka]ard oI tKe MoE” “7X devLeQs XQ vprLtaEOe geQdarPe XQ 
EoXrreaX ,t Zas EeFoPLQg OLNe aQ\ otKer MoE” () 
 His Volunteers membership card (he did not like to wear their 
uniform) meant power and created in him a tyrannical behavior. He 
made sure he was respected and feared in every place he went. His 
favorite line - “, voOXQteered to proteFt QatLoQaO seFXrLt\ 8QIortXQateO\ 
or fortunately as you like, this includes yoXr oZQ” () - opened every 
door to him and gave him the right to act as he wished. 
 
>«@ restaXraQts Ied KLP aQ eQorPoXs aPoXQt oI Iood >«@ $ 
doctor, his landlord, gave him two rooms on the lower floor 
of a two-story house for free. Bourgeois married women slept 
with him on the cash-filled mattress on his bedroom floor. 
Virgins of all castes came and went as well. And the people 
who had looked down on him and his family in the past, 
well, now they came all the way from Léogâne to ask him for 
favors. (196) 
 
 +e Zas FaOOed “6ergeaQt” “&oOoQeO” “*eQeraO” aQd soPe 
ZoXOd reIer to KLP as “/LttOe 3resLdeQt” () +e Zas NQoZQ aPoQg tKe 
otKer voOXQteers Ior KavLQg “tKe Post pK\sLFaOO\ aQd ps\FKoOogLFaO 
ta[LQg trLaOs” () dXrLQg KLs LQTXLsLtLoQs ZLtK prLsoQers. One of his 
victims when interviewed for a documentary film thirty years later 
recalled one of his common methods: 
 
He used to call me by my name. He'd lean close to my ears to 
tell me, 'Valia, I truly hate to unwoman you. Valia, tell me 
where your husband is and I won't cut out your...' I can't even 
                                                 
24
 Danticat recalls that once a journalist asked François Duvalier what he represented for 
Haitians and his answer Zas “tKat Ke Zas tKeLr IatKer aQd tKe 9LrgLQ 0ar\ Zas tKeLr 
PotKer” ('aQtLFat  ) 
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say it the way he said it. I refuse to say it the way he did. 
He'd wound you, then try to soothe you with words, then he'd 
wound you again. He thought he was God. (198-199) 
 
 The arrested Baptist pastor was Anne's stepbrother. She 
desperately looked for him at the prison, Casernes, after learning about 
his arrest from the shoeshine man, Léon. At Casernes, the pastor was put 
in a prison cell awaiting for his interrogation when an order from the 
national palace is given to release the preacher. He was supposed to 
have been killed and not arrested, specially in the circumstances the 
arrest was done, in front of the pastor's whole congregation. Killing the 
preacher now would make him a martyr. As Rosalie, the protagonist's 
sXperLor at tKe prLsoQ teOOs KLP “<oX ZaQted KLP to sXIIer >«@ <oX 
tooN too PaQ\ OLEertLes <oX dLsoEe\ed >«@ +e
s \oXr respoQsLELOLt\ 
>«@ ,
ve seeQ KLP aQd Ke OooNs ver\ Ead 8Qder Qo FLrFXPstaQFes 
sKoXOd Ke dLe Kere” () 6tLOO Ke deFLdes to see the preacher in his 
private room and tell him to quit his radio show and sermons, and then 
let him go home.  
 What follows is a vivid narrative of the torturer's power and the 
preacher's trembling fear and agony as he attempts to anticipate his pain 
and his death. Hopelessly aware of his fate in this room and prison, the 
preacher accidentally touches a piece of wood broken from the chair. He 
aLPs at tKe PaFoXte
s IaFe ZLsKLQg to KLt KLP “EXt LQstead tKe spLNed 
stub ended up in the fat man's right FKeeN aQd saQN aQ LQFK or so” () 
The preacher slides the piece of wood down cutting the macoute's face 
down to his jawline who, shocked by the attack, fires his gun at the 
preacher's chest. The preacher had left a mark on his killer,  
 
a brand that he would carry for the rest of his life. Every time 
he looked in the mirror, he would have to confront this mark 
and remember him. Whenever people asked what happened 
to his face, he would have to tell a lie, a lie that would further 
remind him of the truth. (227-228) 
 
 He was wounded and tormented by the attack and the 
consequences of his disobedience, which suddenly became his final job. 
As he was leaving the barracks, he bumps into Anne in the sidewalk, 
ZKo Zas tKere OooNLQg Ior Ker ErotKer “+e Koped sKe Zasn't someone 
he'd harmed or nearly killed, someone who's been in the torture chamber 
adjacent to his office, for he wanted her sympathy, compassion from her. 
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He wanted her to have pity on him, take him to her house and bandage 
KLP” () 7Ke\ EotK Qeeded help and sympathy from the other. He 
advised her not to go further and she offered to help with his wound.  
 
“:Kat dLd tKe\ do to you"” sKe asNed 
This was the most forgiving question he'd ever been asked. It 
suddenly opened a door, produced a small path, which he 
could follow. 
“,
P Iree” Ke saLd “, ILQaOO\ esFaped” () 
 
 The next day they both flew to New York determined to leave 
the past behind and start a new life. Their unspoken agreement was 
silence and acceptance of whatever the other was willing to share. We 
learn in the first chapter that he told Anne about his past as a macoute 
after Ka was born. Although never certain, Anne has always suspected 
he was the one who had killed her brother.  
 
He endorsed the public story, the one that the preacher had 
killed himself. And she accepted that he had only arrested 
him and turned him over to someone else. Neither believing 
the other nor themselves. But never delving too far back in 
time, beyond the night they met. She never saw any of the 
articles that were eventually written about her brother's death. 
She was too busy concentrating on and revising who she was 
now, or who she wanted to become. (241) 
 
 Inasmuch as the final chapter pieces together the previous ones, 
connecting the characters' lives to Ka's father, it does not offer a 
resolution. It shows Anne's struggle with herself and with her daughter's 
TXestLoQ “0aQPaQ KoZ do \oX Oove KLP"” $QQe Kas IorgLveQ aQd 
married the man who killed her brother, at the same time, she lives with 
constant regret and resentment ± sKe Ls FaXgKt LQ a “peQdXOXP EetZeeQ 
regret aQd IorgLveQess” () $s tKe Qarrator poLQts oXt “8QOLNe Ker 
husband, she would never know how to tell a story like this, how to 
deFLpKer aOO tKe detaLOs aQd PaNe seQse oI tKeP” (). The 
incomprehensibility of her decisions were articulated into the 
compromises she made. 
 Also, this final chapter returns to the reader the issue of 
redemption in the contrast between the dew breaker's past and present 
aFtLoQs (“, ZoXOd Qever do tKese tKLQgs agaLQ”) $QQe Kas FoQstrXFted a 
narrative of the life she began to have the night they met. It is a narrative 
133 
oI PLraFOe oI savLQg tKat PaQ EeOLevLQg tKat “atoQePeQt reparatLoQ 
Zas possLEOe aQd avaLOaEOe Ior ever\oQe” () 6Ke ZaQted to EeFoPe 
that woman as much as he wanted to leave his job and past behind, 
receive sympathy and compassion from strangers, be forgotten by 
everyone who ever met him.  
 As Anne has not been able to fully reconcile with her husband's 
history and crimes, the reader is also left to struggle with sympathy, 
compassion, the possibility of forgiveness and reparation. The dew 
breaker has never been forgotten by whoever was forced to know him. 
But life moved on; and each chapter tells a story of the afterlife of the 
dew breaker's histor\ 7Ke “peQdXOXP EetZeeQ regret aQd IorgLveQess” 
(242) is a symbol for the instability of life in the novel. Relationships, 
families, jobs, houses, everything and everyone is constantly on the 
verge of disappearance. And in this impossibility and constant fright that 
Anne and her husband are able to forge a self and a life of their own, be 
it a secret one. By creating forgiveness through the compromises Anne 
makes, Danticat opens up a new realm of possibilities for transformation 
and reinvention, and for creativity and love. Recalling Iser's approach to 
the act of reading as an event in which the indeterminacy of imagination 
and creativity render it an encounter loaded with affect, we could say 
that the encounter with The Dew Breaker is one loaded with the violence 
of sensation. The reader's uncertainty and sensation of doubt are aroused 
when Danticat directs our attention towards looking at and knowing of 
potential afterlives for violence, of potential new ways of being in the 
world.  
 I want to use Abel's focus on the how of the aesthetic quality of 
a literary text in my reading of The Dew Breaker in order to propose that 
such reading experience works like a violent event: an encounter loaded 
with the violence of sensation. I argue that Danticat creates a site in her 
narrative for readers to experience affective reactions to the stories they 
are told. Danticat leaves to the reader the option of naming or not his/her 
reactions, of imagining resolutions to those stories, and of judging Ka's 
father and mother. Moreover, Danticat creates a narrative where one 
could rethink and reconstitute oneself in a novel way and through one's 
ability to love and to create; and while narrating that outcome of 
forgiveness, she requires readers to suspend their judgment. 
  
7.1 Deferring Judgment in The Dew Breaker 
 It has been mentioned above that Danticat's narrative strategy 
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offers no resolution to the dilemma of how to make sense of the 
torturer's history. The Dew Breaker is constituted by narratives that 
emerged from the title protagonist's work in Haiti. The narrators show 
us, readers, glimpses of Ka's family's history and the afterlife of her 
father's victims. Ka's question to her mother - “+oZ FaQ \oX Oove KLP"” 
± and Anne's inability to articulate it with words, to find words to 
explain her decision of continuing her life next to such person, haunt the 
ZKoOe QarratLve )orever FaXgKt EetZeeQ “IorgLveQess aQd regret” Ls 
somehow what made possible for Anne and her husband to fashion a life 
together. Anne suspended judgment the night she met the killer of her 
brother and refrained from asking for future explanations. For Anne, her 
attitude cannot be explained in a coherent manner, it does not mean this 
or that, right or wrong. She called it a miracle ± and miracles are a 
matter of faith and belief. A miracle simply is; it can be told over and 
over again as a story but this telling will never offer an explanation (in 
the way Ka wanted to know). For Anne, their miraculous encounter 
outside Casernes, and the uniqueness of the life they transformed and 
created for themselves in Brooklyn cannot be explained to Ka nor to 
anyone.  
 Abel's pedagogical exercise aimed at learning how to deploy 
and respond to the representations (images) of 9/11 for what they are 
without making them illustrative of a point of view. Anne's inability to 
answer her daughter's question or to account for her life choices and 
decisions, for that matter, work similarly to Abel's masocriticism. Anne's 
miracle could be seen as what Abel would call an irreducible event. It 
should be approached in its own terms by Ka (and by readers). No 
verbal language, therefore, no representation, can account for it. 
 In light of Abel's masocriticism, Danticat's narrative strategy 
asks the reader to follow the stories and the story of Ka's parents as 
irreducible events connected to each other. This apparent contradiction 
is the force behind The Dew Breaker. In the same manner, Precious' 
narrative of sexual abuse requires that readers undergo reading 
refraining from positing meanings that do not emerge from the 
singularity of her experience. Both novels teach the reader how to 
respond to them in a new, different way, without the reader's deployment 
of his/her point of view or familiar mode of response. In the process of 
reading, the reader is invited to see again, which in a significant way is 
an opportunity to see another, to see the other(s). Both Danticat and 
Sapphire do not offer resolutions, and that poses the question of 
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experiencing the violence of sensation, that is, the violation of the self 
brought by uncertainty. 
 Furthermore, although time has passed and the victims' lives 
have transformed, their past destructively lingers. The violence of the 
past has interrupted life as they knew it, and it lives as affect in their 
every day and in the lives of the ones around them; the connectedness 
brought by violence is a symptom of how the past is forever lingering in 
the present and future. The traumatic events of the past do not cease to 
affect their present unless one finds a way to compromise and live in an 
eterQaO strXggOe EetZeeQ “IorgLveQess aQd regret” as $QQe Kas doQe  
 In this absence of closure Danticat places existence and the 
basis for hope. In this way, I want to think of the violent events narrated 
in The Dew Breaker in terms of trauma and how the act of 
compromising creates a new, and perhaps the only, way of being in the 
world. 
 Trauma or traumatic experience are understood here in their 
Post geQeraO deILQLtLoQ as “aQ overZKeOPLQg e[perLeQFe oI sXddeQ or 
catastrophic events in which the response to the event occurs in the 
often delayed, uncontrolled repetitive appearance of hallucinations and 
otKer LQtrXsLve pKeQoPeQa” (&arXtK  ) 7o pXt Lt dLIIereQtO\ a 
violent event (the traumatic experience) takes hold of an individual too 
unexpectedly to be assimilated, and it is this not knowing (what 
happened originally) that returns in unwitting and repetitive phenomena 
such as nightmares, hallucinations, and repetitive unconscious actions 
from the victim.
25
 In this common medical and psychoanalytical 
(specially in Freud's work) definition, a wound is inflicted upon the 
mind of the victim and, unlike bodily wounds, it cannot be easily healed. 
These uncontrollable repetitions ± in a way haunting the individual ± are 
the wounded psyche's effort to communicate the truth or reality of the 
original violent event via a language entangled by what is known and 
what is not known (Caruth 01-09; Freud 1961: 06-07; 23-27). For Cathy 
Caruth, because the wound of the mind works in the form oI a “EreaFK 
LQ tKe PLQd
s e[perLeQFe oI tLPe seOI aQd tKe ZorOd” () traXPa 
FoPPXQLFates tKroXgK a OaQgXage “tKat deILes eveQ as Lt FOaLPs oXr 
                                                 
25
 Freud (1961) names such experiences of sudden violence involving risk to the individual's 
life traumatic neurosis. Repetitive phenomena are characteristic of traumatic neurosis and 
consist of recreating the scene of the violent event or accident in a way that brings the 
victim back to that situation and the original sensation of fright. Such repetition can take 
tKe IorP oI “dreaPs stor\teOOLQg or eveQ KaOOXFLQatLoQ” (24). 
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XQderstaQdLQg ()” 7KLs XQe[peFted aQd EeOated FoPPXQLFatLoQ 
Caruth highlights, does not only tell the victim of the reality of the 
violent event but also the reality of the incomprehensibility (06).  
 In light of Caruth's explanation of trauma, we could say that the 
repetition of what seems like haunting phenomena convey a double 
violence. It simultaneously reveals the known violence of the original 
event and conveys what is yet unknown, that is, what has not been 
named (affect).    
 In The Dew Breaker, the violence of their past in Haiti operates 
in a similar manner to the structure of trauma described above. The 
shutting down of narrativization (Garland), either as an impossibility or 
a strategy for forgetting, is illustrated in the characters' silence, secrecy, 
and imagining. The violence of the original event returns in nightmares, 
fantasies, and the actual presence of the macoute in their neighborhood. 
Or, in respect to Anne, it returns in the day-by-day compromise she 
makes in order to sustain her existence. 
 In the character of the torturer's wife Danticat rearticulates the 
notion of trauma.  Violence disrupted her life like it did to the other 
characters. However, different from them, Anne made the conscious 
choice of embracing the original violent event and its effects. Anne 
recreated herself and forged a life from her trauma. In Danticat's 
subversion of the afterlife of a traumatic experience, the victim (Anne) 
survives the violent event and, different from other survivors, she gives 
meaning to her haunting returns and behavioral repetitions. Living in a 
everOastLQg strXggOe EetZeeQ “IorgLveQess aQd regret” $QQe does Qot 
find words to tell her story, yet she finds a way to make sense of her 
choices and history: she names them miracles. By giving meaning to a 
violent event, Anne compromises.  
 If we return to Abel's argument that uncertainty may generate a 
state of violence (the violence of sensation) which carries the potential 
for new ways of seeing the other, we could say that Anne deferred 
judgment when she first encountered the torturer outside the prison. In a 
way, the overwhelming violent state in which that encounter took place 
reconfigured Anne's and the torturer's familiar reactions. For once, he 
wanted another person's sympathy and compassion, and Anne refrained 
from what seemed the obvious conclusion in that situation: that he 
worked in that prison, that he was a macoute, and that he knew what 
was happening to her brother. In that violent event new possibilities 
emerged. Nevertheless, that momentary pause was unsustainable for too 
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long. As soon as she chose her future ± to leave Haiti with that man ± 
Anne relies upon a familiar narrative (of religious miracles) in order to 
refrain from representing a macoute. And that representation comes at 
an enormous price. On the one side, the guilt, the secrecy, the 
resentment; on the other side, the companionship and the love required 
to sustain that narrative. In this incomprehensibility Anne forges an 
existence and love.   
 There is no healing nor reconciliation in The Dew Breaker. The 
past, like trauma, is indelible. It exists as a scar visible to everyone, a 
mark right onto one's face, a constitutive part of an individual, his/her 
family, community, and country. However, there is hope and the 
unexpected is seized as a choice of moving on; partnerships are taken as 
source of hope, of change. The character of Anne, in contrast to the 
other characters, illustrates that purported impossibilities or 
incomprehensibilities may be transformed. The deferral of truth occurs 
in two levels in the novel.  
 On the one level, the suspension of meaning lies in the fact that 
meaning, that is narrativization (therefore, healing) is not found. As in 
trauma, the survivor is haunted by the unwanted return of reality. As 
Aline remarks after meeting Beatrice:  
 
[she] had never imagined that people like Beatrice existed, 
men and women whose tremendous agonies filled every 
blank space in their lives. Maybe there were hundreds, even 
thousands, of people like this, men and women chasing 
fragments of themselves long lost to others. (137-138)  
 
 On the other level, meaning is willfully given to reality, the 
truth is rewritten so life can continue, new feelings can emerge (love and 
desire), and new lives can be created (Ka). In The Dew Breaker, it is the 
impossibility of finding meaning for a traumatic event that constitutes a 
new way of thinking and feeling (Deleuze 1991: 16). In the character of 
Anne, living is not interrupted but transformed in a new way of being: 
one that is flawed and painful but also hopeful and creative.  
 In this way, we could think of Danticat's multivocal narrative as 
examples of the potential of day-by-day resolutions, one-on-one 
responses in the context of extreme violence and interplay of traumatic 
experiences. Danticat creates a fictional world where violent practices 
and the infliction of pain reach unreasonably destructive and denigrating 
levels. In such world, Danticat challenges the reader's familiar responses 
138 
when she requires a suspension of ethical judgment in order to propose 
Anne's narrative of hope and creativity as basis for existence; she 
suggests that encounters and partnerships hold the potential of 
transformation. Although readers may not support Danticat's proposed 
point of view, her narrative strategy creates a site for affective 
encounters with a text. In The Dew Breaker, forgiveness is represented 
based on a focus towards the future. Anne's act of forgiveness places the 
past in history and memory and leaves the present and the future as sites 
for action and creation, where transformation is still possible.  
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FINAL REMARKS 
 
 As I reached the end of my doctoral study, I went back to 
Without Sanctuary for another look at the photographs. They are still 
horrific images. However, I must acknowledge that if I keep looking at 
them, they might become familiar images. Surely repetition is a way of 
making violence familiar to us. It is certainly a strategy used by the 
media in the construction and maintenance of discourses of othering as 
identified by Chouliaraki, Sontag, and Butler, among other authors. And 
by making the watching of violence and suffering familiar to us, these 
authors have argued, the media format (of representing violence and 
suffering) has desensitized audiences. 
My initial interrogation was how to maintain the violence in and 
of those lynching photographs in order to avoid being accustomed to 
what was represented there. As I have already asked: how do we keep 
the shock, the violation of our mind, senses, and body, that watching 
violence and pain are capable of triggering? Hopefully this  study has 
shed some light towards the issue of desensitization in the representation 
of violence and suffering. It has been argued that mass media discourse 
renders unpacked representations of violence and suffering, whereas the 
aesthetic register disrupts the representation of violence by creating a 
space for imagining, and potentially, for reflection. Here affect 
(sensation) plays a vital role in the experience of watching and/or 
reading about violence and suffering. To put it succinctly: if we remove 
the violence of sensation from the representation of violence that 
representation will stop being violent.  
Marco Abel via the work of Gilles Deleuze has defined the 
violence of sensation  as the violation of the self that might occur when 
we are confronted by an event that escapes our understanding. Unable to 
offer a quick reaction and/or an explanation we are forced into 
imagining, reflecting, and creating. A momentary pause for the 
construction of meaning is, for Abel, one way of seeing again, of seeing 
things and people anew, and thus, of imagining and creating new ways 
of being in the world.  
Abel identified the aesthetic quality of works of art (literature 
and cinema) as capable of creating that momentary pause or suspension 
of judgment, as he calls it. A literary text and/or a film representing 
violence are approached by his methodology as a violent event loaded 
with the potential to cause the violence of sensation. That is to say, the 
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experience of reading a violent literary narrative may violate our sense 
of self once the text forces us to defer meaning. Writers represent 
violence in various manners and their use of writing strategies will 
create or not that momentary suspension of meaning. In addition, as 
Wolfgang Iser posit in The Act of Reading, the gaps in the narrative and 
the text's own limitations in representing, in this case, violence and 
suffering, create indeterminacy. The reader's task is summoned: in the 
process of reading, the reader will experience the uncertainty, gaps and 
structural limitations of the text in order to forge meanings. In violent 
narratives, this space of indeterminacy may also be the space where 
readers experience the violence of sensation.      
 In the works analyzed in this study the violence of sensation is 
experienced by the reader in the rewriting of histories. Toni Morrison, 
Sapphire, and Edwidge Danticat offer a space for voices to be heard and 
affects to be felt and shared. In these three novels pain finds expression 
once traumatic affects return to haunt characters and readers. The 
literary narrative becomes a medium in which the shutting down of 
narrativization is translated via the aesthetic register. We see that in the 
space of the text, several narratives emerged because although violence 
destroys language, as Elaine Scarry argues, the author creates a 
fictionalized space for the return of what has been silenced. Physical 
wounds are brought back to focus, are asked to be seen and confronted. 
Psychic ones are vocalized once the text serves as a mediator to pain. 
The expression of pain, therefore, is reworked through fiction which, in 
turn, rewrites history.  
 Ashraf H.A. Rushdy (1999) recalls the issue of writing from a 
double perspective often asserted by Morrison in interviews in which 
sKe FOaLPs tKat tKe “%OaFN ZoPaQ ZrLter” Ls “oQe ZKo OooN>s@ at tKLQgs 
in an unforgiving/loving way..., writing to repossess, re-name, re-oZQ” 
(quoted in Rushdy 45). The double perspective in Beloved is expressed, 
aFFordLQg to 5XsKd\ LQ “rePePEerLQg aQd IorgettLQg aFFXsLQg aQd 
ePEraFLQg EXr\LQg aQd revLvLQg Mo\ aQd oppressLoQ” (46). As she 
states, what could seem paradoxical come to play a crucial role in the 
narratives of Black women writers. This double perspective embraces 
imagining (what Iser referred to as seeing with one's minds eyes). By 
being guided by a double perspective, which is also at the core of a 
narrative strategy of deferral of truth, Morrison, Sapphire, and Danticat 
have created  sites for the violence of sensation. That is to say that these 
narratives are aesthetically and thematically violent. These authors have 
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used the theme of violence in order to create a sensation capable of 
triggering movement, transformation, new ways of seeing what was 
thought to be already known. 
 In Beloved, the truth of the violent event of infanticide is 
deferred by the narrative's articulation of notions of love, freedom, and 
violence once the latter overtook freedom and re-signified love. In Push, 
Precious' experience of rape and incest requires a suspension of 
judgment from readers as she writes and makes sense of what has 
happened to her. While Precious (re)writes her story, she also re-
signifies (by revealing their complexity) the affectivity and subjectivity 
involved in notions of rape, sexuality, and love. In The Dew Breaker, the 
acts of a torturer are rewritten by his victims as his family awaits for 
meaning, or better, the impossibility of coming to terms with the acts 
and choices Ka's parents have made. However, it is in this impossibility 
of truth that Danticat reveals to the reader a source of hope and creation.   
 Literature carries the potential to make noise, to disturb, and to 
heighten our capacity of imagining. These encounters with literary texts 
opeQ Xp patKs toZards tKe XQNQoZQ tKe\ FaQ aOter “tKe FoXrse oI oXr 
Ldeas FoQFerQLQg” oXrseOves oXr OLves aQd peopOe aQd things around us 
(Holloway 1992: 40). Violent narratives can do that by bringing back 
sensation, by incorporating affect to the representation of violence. In 
Beloved, Push, and The Dew Breaker these paths are explored by 
narratives in which meaning escapes the reader and indeterminacy and 
doubt are constant features of the act of reading.  
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